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ABSTRACT 
In 1988 the United States Supreme Court declared constitutional the federal 
government’s development plan in an area (known as the High Country) that was 
considered central to the religious practice of three local American Indian nations. The 
Court admitted that “It is undisputed that the Indian respondents’ beliefs are sincere and 
that the Government’s proposed actions will have severe adverse effects on the practice 
of their religion.” Nevertheless, because the disputed area was on public land, the Court 
thought that the government should be allowed to manage its property in any way it saw 
fit, regardless of the severe adverse effects on the religious practice of the local Indian 
nations. A lot has been written about this case, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery 
Protective Association (1988), but one thing that scholars have not paid attention to is the 
declaration of a study that comprised the central evidence in the case, according to which 
seeing the practice in question as religious is problematic, because it forces an Indian 
practice into a Western category. This case, therefore, raises questions about the 
relationship between law and religion in the United States, and specifically in the context 
of American Indian rights. Why was this case argued as one about religion? If it is not 
about religion, what is it about? In this dissertation I offer two readings of this case.   
In Part One I read this case as it is normally read, as a case about religious 
freedom. I read the Supreme Court decision, which does not doubt the religiosity of the 
practice, its sincerity, and the burden imposed on it by the government’s development 
plan and nevertheless denies it First Amendment protection, against the body of 
precedent available to the Court as well as the evidence and testimony provided in the 
original District Court trial. I argue that a broader understanding of religion calls for 
 
 
constitutional protection of this practice. But I find this reading to be missing something, 
and it has become less satisfactory to scholars of law and religion who have recently 
doubted the free exercise route as one that is useful for religious and racial minorities. In 
Part Two I suggest reading this case as one about Indigenous sovereignty. I read the 
dissenting opinion in the case against the background of the evidence and testimony in 
the trial as well as scholarship on sovereignty and on indigeneity. But sovereignty – just 
like religion – is a Western concept, and applying it to American Indian nations requires 
some critical adjustments as well. Listening to the voices of American Indian witnesses 
and scholars, I think about ways to modify the concept to make it useful for Indigenous 
communities seeking justice in the United States.  
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PREFACE 
 
When I teach courses on law and religion, the thing my students find most intriguing is 
how we get from a human story, rich with detail, with experience and with emotion to a 
short, dry Supreme Court decision. When I was a law student, we talked about this 
question quite a bit. But my students are college students, taking a humanities class, and 
most of them do not have access to such questions and to their answers. Actually, as 
Duncan Kennedy has written, even law students spend most of their time reading 
Supreme Court decisions, thus forgetting the stories behind the texts, the people who 
have experienced something that was so significant that they were willing to fight for it in 
three different courts, and whose fight was over something so significant that the 
Supreme Court agreed to hear it. Of course, we also forget all the cases that never 
reached the Supreme Court.1 William Felstiner, Richard Abel, and Austin Sarat argue 
that thinking about legal disputes only through looking at court decisions distorts our 
understanding of the social reality: 
 Studying the emergence and transformation of disputes means studying a social 
process as it occurs. It means studying the conditions under which injuries are 
perceived or go unnoticed and how people respond to the experience of injustice 
and conflict. In addition, though the study of crime and litigation rates seems to be 
derived from and to support the conviction that both are too high – that there is a 
need for more police and longer prison terms, that the courts are congested with 
“frivolous” suits – the study of the emergence and transformation of disputes may 
                                                           
1 Duncan Kennedy, “Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy,” in The Politics of Law: A Progressive 
Critique, ed. David Kairys (New York: Pantheon, 1990). 
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lead to the judgment that too little conflict surfaces in our society, that too few 
wrongs are perceived, pursued, and remedied.2 
I am writing my dissertation in a religion department and with the assumption that my 
readers have a greater interest in the humanities than in law. I therefore believe that my 
readers would be interested in the human story that turned into the infamous Supreme 
Court decision in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association (1988) that 
is at the center of my dissertation. Taking seriously the critiques of Kennedy, Felstiner, 
Abel, and Sarat, I decided to try to tell a more robust story about Lyng than the one told 
in the Supreme Court decision. In order to tell the story behind the case I traveled to San 
Bruno, California, for archival research that discovered the transcripts of the District 
Court trial, including the examination of dozens of witnesses – Yurok and Karuk 
members, expert witnesses, and Forest Service officials – and a lengthy report of a 
comprehensive study concerning the High Country (the area at the heart of the dispute), 
an area which is seen by some as sacred, by others as a cultural resource to be conserved, 
and yet by others as private property whose owners should be able to do whatever they 
want with it.  
This question – about the story behind the case – will hopefully be of interest to 
my readers. But why is it of interest to me? What do I have to do with some legal case 
from California in the 1980s? I arrive at the Lyng case with a background that is 
somewhat different than that of most Americans – both those whose training is in law and 
those with training in religious studies. In order to see beyond the brief description of the 
facts of the case and the technical analysis of the legal issues that it raises, I wanted to 
                                                           
2 William F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel and Austin Sarat, “The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: 
Naming, Blaming, Claiming…,” Law & Society Review 15 (1981): 632. 
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know how lay people understood this case. I was interested in the position of lay people 
whose everyday lives are tied with the fate of this area which is, at once, a place of 
worship and public land. I thought that if I understood this case better, I would 
understand America better.  
In what follows, I describe the things I found at the San Bruno archive. I wish I 
could describe all the people involved in the trial – the judge, the lawyers, the witnesses. I 
would describe what they look like, the sound of their voices, the hesitation of a witness 
when responding to questions filled with legal jargon, the facial expression of a witness 
whose storytelling is being interrupted by the judge. I wish I could see Merilyn Miles, the 
Indian plaintiffs’ litigant, then a lawyer fresh out of law school, who is now a retired 
California Superior Court judge. Would the reader be interested in her occasional 
apologies, reminding the judge that she is “obviously new to this”? would the reader be 
interested in the judge’s reassurance that she is doing well?  
Going back to my theology students and religion scholars who are my potential 
readers, I ask again, what is of interest to them? What will they want to know? Can the 
transcripts teach me – and can I then teach my readers – anything new about religion? 
Anything new about religion beyond what the Supreme Court decision in Lyng teaches 
us? Different people tell different stories about the High Country: these people include 
Yurok and Karuk members who tell the story from a “traditional” perspective, 
archeologists and geologists who tell the story from an environmental point of view, and 
government officials who tell the story from an owner’s point of view. Because the 
Indian perspective has been neglected, I focus on their story in this dissertation.  
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A few words about my positionality as a non-Indigenous author are due here. I 
feel comfortable writing about Common Law, reviewing the colonial history as well as 
the body of precedent, and critiquing the U.S. Supreme Court and its decision in this 
case. For this critique I use, among other things, the words of the witnesses in the trial, in 
which I was not present, and to which I gained access through archival research. During 
the work on my dissertation I felt strong resistance to “reporting” about the trial in my 
own words. Part of my aim in this work is to let the witnesses’ voices to be heard, and so 
rephrasing their testimonies, interpreting them, and editing out large parts of their stories 
seemed to go against my aim. To mitigate this problem, I added the full testimony of two 
of the witnesses as appendices to my dissertation. But this addition did not solve the 
whole problem. Admitting that anything I might write about the trial would require 
interpretive work and realizing that what I do here is telling a more robust story about 
Lyng than the one told by the Supreme Court – but that the story is nevertheless 
incomplete – allowed me to pursue the task at hand. The story told here, therefore, is 
partial. It contextualizes the Lyng decision legally, historically, politically, and, finally, 
religiously.     
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1988 the United States Supreme Court declared constitutional the federal 
government’s development plan in an area (known as the High Country) that was 
considered central to the religious practice of three local American Indian nations. The 
Court admitted that “It is undisputed that the Indian respondents’ beliefs are sincere and 
that the Government’s proposed actions will have severe adverse effects on the practice 
of their religion.”3 Nevertheless, because the disputed area was on public land, the Court 
thought that the government should be allowed to manage its property in any way it saw 
fit, regardless of the severe adverse effects on the religious practice of the local Indian 
nations. A lot has been written about this case, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery 
Protective Association (1988), but one thing that scholars have not paid attention to is the 
declaration of a study that comprised the central evidence in the case, according to which 
seeing the practice in question as religious is problematic: 
Because of the particular nature of the Indian perceptual experience, as opposed 
to the particular nature of the predominant non-Indian, Western perceptual 
experience, any division into “religious” or “sacred” is in reality an exercise 
which forces Indian concepts into non-Indian categories, and distorts the original 
conceptualization in the process.4 
This case raises, therefore, questions about the relationship between law and religion in 
the United States, and specifically in the context of American Indian rights. Why was this 
                                                           
3 Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 U.S. 439 (1988), 447. 
4 Theodoratus Cultural Research, Cultural Resources of the Chimney Rock Section, Gasquet–Orleans Road, 
Six Rivers National Forest, Fair Oaks, CA (hereafter “Theodoratus Report”), 44. 
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case argued as one about religion? If it is not about religion, what is it about? In the 
following pages I offer two readings of this case.   
In Part One I read Lyng as it is normally read, as a case about religious freedom. I 
read the Supreme Court decision – which does not doubt the religiosity of the practice, its 
sincerity, and the burden imposed on it by the government’s development plan and 
nevertheless denies it First Amendment protection – against the body of precedent 
available to the Court as well as the evidence and testimony provided in the original 
District Court trial. I argue that a broader understanding of religion calls for constitutional 
protection of this practice. But I find this reading to be missing something, and it has 
become less satisfactory to scholars of law and religion who have recently doubted the 
free exercise route as one that is useful for religious and racial minorities.5 In Part Two I 
suggest reading Lyng as one about Indigenous sovereignty. I read the dissenting opinion 
in the case against the background of the evidence and testimony in the trial as well as 
scholarship on sovereignty and on indigeneity.     
Reading the case as one about sovereignty requires attention to the fact that 
sovereignty, just like religion, is a Western concept. Therefore, arguing for Indigenous 
sovereignty has an effect similar to that of arguing for Indigenous religious freedom: on 
the one hand, one faces the danger of forcing non-Western phenomena into Western 
categories, thus misunderstanding the phenomena (or the categories) altogether; on the 
other hand, such practice has the effect of destabilizing the Western categories as 
including only Western phenomena. In other words, arguing the Lyng case as one about 
                                                           
5 See, for example, Tisa Wenger, Religious Freedom: The Contested History of an American Ideal (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2017), Finbarr Curtis, The Production of American Religious 
Freedom (New York: New York University Press, 2016), Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, The Impossibility of 
Religious Freedom (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011). 
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religious freedom implies that not only Christianity deserves constitutional protection as 
“religion.” Arguing against the development of the High Country because of Indigenous 
sovereignty implies that not only states can be sovereign.       
 
Law and Religion 
 
In this work I join an ongoing conversation, one that I find productive, in a field that has 
been given the title “law and religion.” The academic field of law and religion has gained 
popularity in the United States in recent years. Several journals and edited collections 
have been dedicated to the subject.6 While religious freedom has been a central issue in 
the field, scholars have attempted to approach other questions through this methodology 
as well. In the legal field, approaches of “law and x” have been popular for decades. Law 
and society, law and economics, and law and literature are just a few examples of the 
approaches taken by legal scholars. Similarly, approaches of “religion and x” have been 
popular in the academic study of religion, where religion and science, religion and 
society, and religion and psychoanalysis are just a few examples.  
Joining the conversation on law and religion involves acknowledging the 
reciprocal relationship between the two categories. Law is an important tool through 
which religion is shaped, but religion is itself a tool through which positive law is 
constantly examined. Together, the two shape American citizenship. But law and 
                                                           
6 See, for example, Timothy L. Fort, Law and Religion (Jefferson: McFarland, 1987); Silvio Ferrari and 
Rinaldo Cristofori, eds., Law and Religion, An Overview: Volume I (Burlington: Ashgate, 2013); Rex J. 
Ahdar, ed., Law and Religion (Burlington: Ashgate, 2000); The Journal of Law and Religion (published by 
Hamline University School of Law since 1983); Rutgers Journal of Law & Religion (published since 
1999). 
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religion, as lenses through which we view the world, also share many qualities. In Silvio 
Ferrari’s words:  
This is the profound meaning of the relationship between law and religion: 
religion, like law, is an attempt to provide answers to the great questions which lie 
at the base of the existence of men and things. For this reason philosophers, 
theologians and legal scholars have pondered for so long on what unites and what 
distinguishes law from religion.7     
The study of law and religion has emerged in Germany and Italy in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, conducted by lawyers interested in the relationship between states and 
religious communities. Today it is popular worldwide and revolves around three main 
lines of research: the relation between state and church, the right to religious freedom, 
and the role of religion in the public sphere. While in the past the focus of the study of 
law and religion had been solely on the relation between church and state and was of 
interest mostly to lawyers who specialized in the relation between the state and religious 
organizations, things changed in the 1980s and 1990s, when critiques of the theory of 
secularization have become popular, and the field of law and religion has become 
interesting to the general public. The focus of studies on law and religion shifted to the 
right to religious liberty, placing this field in contact with scholarship on human rights. 
My own point of entry to this field through the Lyng case, which was decided in the late 
1980s, demonstrates this shift at its height.    
What does it mean to work on law and religion? How do the two fields intersect? 
Law and religion are both similar in many ways and interact in many ways. This 
                                                           
7 Ferrari and Cristofori, Law and Religion, xi. 
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characteristic makes them into a productive dyad to study. I am especially interested in 
law and religion as sites where identity is performed or articulated but also produced or 
constructed.8 It is important, in this kind of study, to think of each of the two as historical 
forces that shape each other and our identities while deprivileging both – “to view them 
as human, historical, interested, and necessarily ideological.”9  
I am interested in thinking of indigeneity as a kind of identity that is shaped in 
close relationship with law and with religion. Specifically, in Lyng Indigenous peoples 
appeal for the protection of the free exercise of their religion, but I argue that the identity 
that is articulated and produced in the case is Indigenous rather than religious; I also 
argue that the freedom that they are denied in this case is not only religious freedom but 
also sovereign freedom. Each of the central concepts in this paragraph – religion, 
indigeneity, sovereignty – occupies its own chapter in this dissertation. 
Law and religion in the context of indigeneity have been studied in several ways. 
Legal anthropologists have studied jurisprudence in Indigenous communities (Karl N. 
Llewellyn’s and Max Gluckman’s studies are central examples of this field).10 Religious 
studies scholars, such as Robert Michaelsen and Huston Smith, have explored Indigenous 
                                                           
8 Winnifred Sullivan writes about law as a privileged site in which the public struggle for identity and 
meaning takes place (Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Paying the Words Extra: Religious Discourse in the 
Supreme Court of the United States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 7)   
9 Gregory B. Johnson, “Law and Religion in Indigenous Cultures.” Encyclopedia of Religion (February 2, 
2018). http://www.encyclopedia.com/environment/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/law-and-
religion-law-and-religion-indigenous-cultures. Similarly, Ben Berger’s work on law and religion “seeks to 
knock law from its managerial or curatorial perch, from where it administers and assesses cultural claims, 
and to understand it, instead, as itself a cultural form – that is, an interpretive horizon composed of sets of 
commitments, practices, and categories of thought, that both frames experience and is experienced as 
such.” (Benjamin L. Berger, Law’s Religion: Religious Difference and the Claims of Constitutionalism 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015), 17). 
10 Karl N. Llewellyn, The Cheyenne Way: Conflict and Case Law in Primitive Jurisprudence (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1941); Max Gluckman, Politics, Law and Ritual in Tribal Society (Chicago: 
Aldine Publishing Company, 1965).  
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traditions and the ways in which they were affected by contact with Christianity.11 A 
third trend in the study of law and religion in the context of indigeneity moves toward 
critiques of human rights discourses, questions of citizenship and decolonization.12  
Because law and religion are sites of identity formation, articulation, and 
production, the problem of authenticity is central to their study. Many scholars have 
critiqued the ways in which law essentializes indigeneity, requiring the Indigenous 
subject before the law to perform a certain identity that would be recognized as 
“authentic” in order to grant her certain rights. I find this critique influential in my own 
work. When I say that the identity that is articulated by the plaintiffs in Lyng is 
Indigenous rather than religious I am trying to move away from the tendency of the law 
to expect a proof of authentic identity. I understand Indigenous identity as tightly related 
to questions of conquest and sovereignty. Nevertheless, I do not want to dismiss religious 
identity as part of the Lyng case altogether. As we will see, the witnesses in the trial use 
religious language continuously in their testimony. As we will also see, the Western legal 
framework defines religion in a way that fails to adequately reflect an Indigenous sense 
of the world. Justice Brennan points in this direction in his dissent, which I read closely 
in Chapter Three.      
Ronald Niezen argues that indigeneity (or “indigenism” in his terminology) is an 
invented category:   
                                                           
11 Robert S. Michaelsen, “Dirt in the Courtroom: Indian Land Claims and American Property Rights,” in 
American Sacred Space, ed. David Chidester and Edward Tabor Linenthal (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press,1995); Huston Smith, A Seat at the Table: Huston Smith in Conversations with Native 
Americans about Religious Freedom (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006).  
12 Elizabeth Povinelli, The Cunning of Recognition: Indigenous Alterities and the Making of Australian 
Multiculturalism (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002); Glen Sean Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks: 
Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014). 
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When we look for things that indigenous people have in common, for what brings 
them together and reinforces their common identity, we find patterns that emerge 
from the logic of conquest and colonialism. These patterns apply equally to 
peoples otherwise very different in terms of history, geography, method of 
subsistence, social structure, and political organization. They are similarities 
based largely on the relationships between indigenous peoples and states.13 
My reading of Lyng as a case about indigeneity follows this understanding (which has 
been expressed by many other scholars as well).14 
 Of course, not only indigeneity is constructed, but also religious and legal 
identities. Susan Staiger Gooding points to this fact when she writes: 
One task for contemporary scholars of Native America […] is to take account of 
legal discourse as an historical force, without taking it as our framework for 
understanding. Such is certainly the case with Native American religions. In fact, 
among the Indian scholars I read and the tribal members with whom I work there 
is a kind of double-voicing with regard to religion. While there is agreement that 
the struggle for religious rights is among the most important issues in Indian 
Country today, there is also an insistence that the very concept “religion” is a 
colonial concept.15  
                                                           
13 Ronald Niezen, The Origins of Indigenism: Human Rights and the Politics of Identity (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2003), 87. 
14 See, for example, Jennifer A. Hamilton, Indigeneity in the Courtroom: Law, Culture, and the Production 
of Difference in North American Courts (New York: Routledge, 2009), Joanne Barker, Native Acts: Law, 
Recognition, and Cultural Authenticity (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), Kathleen Birrell, 
Indigeneity: Before and Beyond the Law (New York, NY: Routledge, 2016). 
15 Susan Staiger Gooding, “At the Boundaries of Religious Identity: Native American Religions and 
American Legal Culture,” Numen 43, no. 2 (May 1996): 159. See also Tomoko Masuzawa, The Invention 
of World Religions: Or, How European Universalism was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).  
10 
 
 
 
Gooding writes that the domestication of American Indians (the discontinuation of treaty 
making and beginning to make policies for – rather than with – Indians, treating them as 
“wards” of the federal government rather than foreign, sovereign nations), marked the 
beginning of regulating Indian religiosity. Together with limiting the movement of 
Indigenous communities and invading every aspect of their domestic life, religion was 
also an object of regulation. “Policies about religion were at the core of this invasion,” 
Gooding writes.16 Between 1869 and 1872, all recognized Indian nations were assigned 
one of the thirteen recognized Christian denominations, and Christian boarding schools 
were institutionalized on a national scale. But these policies, Gooding argues, were not 
the result of a concern with Indians’ belief but with their ceremonial practices. In 1883, 
Courts of Indian Offences were founded on all reservations to enforce the prohibition on 
traditional practices referred to as “the old heathenish dances, such as the sun-dance, 
scalp-dance, etc.”17 The practices that were prohibited suggest that the policy aimed to 
eliminate the social and political communities that were created and maintained through 
them rather than at any religious belief.18 The Lyng case is about a religious practice that 
is highly territorial, which suggests that the refusal to grant it protection is concerned not 
merely with communal ceremonies but with the strong ties it maintains between 
American Indians and the land. As we can see in the testimonies of religious practitioners 
in the Lyng trial, they talk about their schooling at BIA schools off-handedly, not in order 
                                                           
16 Gooding, “At the boundaries of Religious Identity,” 160. 
17 Ibid., 161. 
18 A similar argument can be found in Tisa Wenger, We Have a Religion: The 1920s Pueblo Indian Dance 
Controversy and American Religious Freedom (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009).  
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to speak directly about the continuity of the religious ceremonies in the area. A sensitive 
reader, however, will notice the connection.19   
 There is extensive scholarship on each of the concepts that are at the center of my 
research. Scholars of different disciplines have studied sovereignty, approaching it from 
different angles: political theorists have taken a comparative approach, looking at what 
sovereignty means in different parts of the world; historians have searched for the 
meaning of sovereignty in different historical periods; legal scholars have closely read 
laws, treaties, and court decisions regarding sovereignty; theologians have sought to 
recover the theological roots of sovereignty, looking for clues in scripture. Many have 
questioned the relevance of this concept in an age of globalization, yet the study of 
sovereignty has persisted. 
Similarly, scholars have been interested in the concept of indigeneity both 
comparatively and historically. Anthropologists studied Indigenous peoples around the 
world and then were criticized for their Eurocentric approach. The study of indigeneity 
has prospered, mainly in the context of human rights and political identity. Indigenous 
history and practice have interested scholars and practitioners of spiritualism, alternative 
medicine, and environmental studies; they have been the focus of attention of ethnic 
studies scholars, who read Indigenous literatures, histories, and law with a motivation to 
decolonize our society in general and academia in particular. I see my work as joining the 
latter conversation.         
The scholarship on free exercise of religion is robust both in the United States and 
outside it. In the United States, scholars of constitutional law, of political science, and of 
                                                           
19 The testimony of two of the religious practitioners is brought in full in the appendices to this dissertation, 
and both of them mention their schooling at the beginning of their testimony. 
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religious studies have studied it as a fundamental principle of American citizenship and 
public life alongside disestablishment. There is great popular interest in this concept as it 
is related to current controversial issues such as marriage equality and contraception. As 
such, it has been studied in the context of human rights and civil rights. 
2018 marks the fiftieth anniversary of the Indian Civil Rights Act (1968),20 the 
fortieth anniversary of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act (1978),21 the thirtieth 
anniversary of the Lyng case, and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (1993).22 The question of American Indian religious freedom is 
especially relevant today not only because of these multiple anniversaries but also 
because of the current struggle against the reduction of Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-
Escalante National monuments and the recent protest against the construction of the 
Dakota Access Pipeline. While Indigenous sacred land claims are central to both these 
cases, neither the Native leaders involved nor the public discourse around them 
emphasized the issue of religious freedom. Reading Lyng closely will help us, I argue, to 
understand these contemporary cases better.  
Neither AIRFA, that declared in 1978 that “it shall be the policy of the United 
States to protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to 
believe, express, and exercise [their] traditional religions,” nor RFRA’s declaration in 
1993 that “Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even 
if the burden results from a rule of general applicability”23 provide American Indian 
                                                           
20 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1304. 
21 42 U.S.C. § 1996. 
22 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2004. 
23 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a). 
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nations with appropriate mechanisms to aid their efforts to stop the logging, mining, and 
commercial development that increasingly threaten Indigenous sacred places.24  
The connections between Lyng and RFRA is interesting and often overlooked. 
Lyng, a landmark case in constitutional law that denied the right of three American Indian 
nations to the free exercise of their religion for the sake of protecting property rights of 
the federal government, is the main precedent used in the more well-known Supreme 
Court case of Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith 
(1990)25 – the peyote case that directly led to the enactment of RFRA in order to secure 
the strict scrutiny of generally-applicable legislation that burdens the free exercise of an 
individual’s (or a group’s) religion.26 As noted above, and as discussed at length in this 
dissertation, the Court in Lyng determined that even though there was no doubt that the 
religious practice at the center of the dispute was based on a “sincerely held belief,” and 
there was also no doubt that the government’s development plan at the center of the 
dispute imposed a “substantial burden” on this religious practice, the development plan 
was not unconstitutional. The Court has been criticized for its neglect of minority 
religious communities, and RFRA is a result of this criticism. Nevertheless, RFRA has 
been ruled unconstitutional as applied to states by the Supreme Court in its City of 
Boerne v. Flores27 decision in 1997, and several individual states have legislated in 
response their own versions of religious freedom protection laws.28 
                                                           
24 Steven Moore provides an account of the legislation of AIRFA and its ultimate failure, including the 
Forest Service’s reaction to the law, in Steven C. Moore, “Sacred Sites and Public Lands,” in Handbook of 
American Indian Religious Freedom, ed. Christopher Vecsey (New York: Crossroad, 1991).  
25 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
26 The story of Smith is explored in Carolyn N. Long, Religious Freedom and Indian Rights: The Case of 
Oregon v. Smith ( Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000). 
27 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
28 The following states have RFRA statutes: Alabama (Alabama Const., Amend. 622 [2003]), Arizona 
(A.R.S. § 41-1493 [2003]), Connecticut (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-571b [2003]), Florida (Fla. Stat. § 761.01 
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But, as also noted above and discussed at length in this dissertation, the Lyng case 
is even more complicated. The complication has to do with the doubt that the evidence in 
the case sheds on the religiosity of the practice in question, because religion is a Western 
category into which American Indian practice cannot fit. Given this doubt, I raise the 
question whether arguing cases about American Indian sacred sites as cases about 
religious freedom is appropriate or effective. Given that no Indian religious freedom case 
has been won so far, some scholars and litigators have concluded that it is inappropriate 
to argue them as such.          
What route, then, should cases about the protection of American Indian sacred 
sites take? We have recently seen a significant movement toward arguments about 
environmental justice in American Indian sacred land cases (such as the Dakota Access 
Pipeline and Bears Ears), but I worry that this strategy overlooks something that is unique 
about these cases, something that has to do with American Indian sovereignty. Can the 
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 help us to address these questions better? The Indian 
Civil Rights Act, that is celebrating its fiftieth anniversary this year, applies the Bill of 
Rights, including religious freedom, to American Indian nations. But this act is also 
fundamentally about American Indian jurisdiction, sovereignty, and self-government, and 
it therefore offers us another way to think about the protection of American Indian sacred 
sites as an issue of Indigenous sovereignty rather than merely one of religious freedom. 
This interpretation is explored in Part Two of this dissertation.  
                                                           
[2002]), Idaho (Idaho Code § 73-402 [2003]), Illinois (775 ILCS 35/5 [2003]), New Mexico (N.M. Stat. 
Ann.§ 28-22-1 [2003]), Oklahoma (51 Okl. St. § 251 [2002]), Pennsylvania (71 P.S. § 2401 [2003]), Rhode 
Island (R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-80.1-1 [2002]), South Carolina (S.C. Code Ann. § 1-32-10 [2002]), and Texas 
(Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 110.001 [2003]). (See Sullivan, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom, 
23, n. 34). 
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 The structure of this work is as follows: Part One, “Religious Freedom,” offers a 
reading of the Lyng case as a case about the free exercise of religion and is divided into 
two chapters. Chapter One, “Law,” offers a close reading of the Supreme Court decision 
in the case, focusing on Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s majority opinion. I follow the 
main legal and religious studies scholars who have criticized O’Connor’s opinion and her 
limited understanding of religion as fundamentally Protestant. I then contextualize the 
majority opinion within the body of precedent available to the Supreme Court when 
deciding the case. While Lyng is the first case about American Indian sacred sites to have 
reached the Supreme Court, there is a substantial body of Supreme Court decisions about 
free exercise as well as a few lower court decisions about American Indian sacred sites. I 
review these cases in Chapter One. Chapter Two, “Religion,” follows the testimony and 
evidence presented in the Lyng trial, as far as they are relevant to my reading of the case 
as one about free exercise. The Theodoratus Report describes the religious practice of the 
relevant nations at length, and four religious practitioners who testified in the trial 
describe their religious relation to the area as well as the ways in which the development 
of the area would burden their religious practice.  
 Part Two, “Indigenous Sovereignty,” offers a reading of Lyng as a case about 
Indigenous sovereignty. It is divided into two chapters. Chapter Three, “Indigeneity,” 
reads Justice William Brennan’s dissenting opinion in the case and argues that, despite 
being celebrated as progressive and promoting American Indian rights, it essentializes 
and depoliticizes indigeneity. In Chapter Four, “Sovereignty,” I read the history of 
Federal Indian law, which turned American Indian communities from sovereign nations 
with whom treaties are negotiated and signed into “domestic dependent nations.” I read 
16 
 
 
 
the history of the relationship between Northwest California Indian nations and the 
United States in relation to this broader legal history, beginning to contextualize 
Brennan’s dissent in order to politicize indigeneity. I also read the testimonies of Indian 
witnesses in the Lyng trial alongside scholarship on Indigenous sovereignty and propose 
that not only does indigeneity need to be politicized, but cases about American Indian 
sacred sites need to be understood as cases about Indigenous sovereignty.  
 At the closing of this introduction, I would like to address terminology and my 
positionality as a non-Indigenous scholar. Whenever possible, I refer to specific 
Indigenous peoples by their specific affiliation. I only use the terms “tribe” or “tribal” – 
which are considered derogatory nowadays – where they appear in direct quotations. 
Instead, I use the term “nation(s),” following Indigenous scholars, even though I am 
aware of the problematics this term brings with it. The terms “Native Americans,” 
“Indigenous peoples,” and “American Indians” are used here interchangeably, following 
Indigenous scholarship from recent decades that has appropriated the term “American 
Indian” as empowering rather than insulting.  
The category “Western” is not used here as a marker of modernity or progress. 
When I write that religion is a Western category I do not mean that it necessarily fits 
better to describe the practice of American Christian religious practitioners, for example, 
than it fits to describe the ceremonies of Native Americans. I also do not mean that 
because religion is a Western category we should not use it at all (I am well aware that 
the categories “sovereignty” and “nation” are just as Western as the category of 
“religion” is, and I use them nevertheless). I use the term “Western” (rather than 
“imperial” or “colonial,” for example) because this is the term used in the trial testimony 
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and evidence. While scholars of postcolonial theory tend to avoid using the term 
“Western” today, I am using here the language of the main actors in the Lyng case, which 
may seem outdated to contemporary readers. What the witnesses and the experts stress is 
that the case is argued as one about religious freedom because of the existing legal 
framework, and not because the plaintiffs themselves necessarily see the practice of 
which they seek protection as religious. This category, they say, was given to them (or 
forced upon them) following contact; it is not natural or trivial to them. I believe that is 
what they mean when they refer to religion as a Western category, and my use of the term 
follows theirs.    
Writing this dissertation as a non-Indigenous (and non-American) scholar, I am 
well-aware of the limitations of my perspective. My point of departure, then, is the U.S. 
legal discourse on religious freedom. Even though I am very much an outsider to this 
discourse, I do bring to this project experience in a common-law legal system. Allowing 
Indigenous voices to be heard, I aim to transcend the religious freedom discourse and 
move into the realm of Indigenous sovereignty.   
Discussions of religious freedom in the United States are often prompted by 
conflict over school prayer, teaching of evolution, conscientious objection, and prisoners’ 
devotion. The right to the free exercise of religion is understood as an individual right in 
the U.S. context because of its framing in the First Amendment. Growing up and 
studying and practicing law in Israel, a nation defined by its Jewish identity, I have a 
different perspective on religious freedom. In Israel/Palestine, where the land is 
considered sacred by many, the freedom of religion and the freedom to possess land are 
often one and the same. When this is the case, freedom of religion is not an individual 
18 
 
 
 
right; it is a collective right. Arriving in the United States, I noticed the starkly 
contrasting conception of religious freedom. The relationship between religious freedom 
and land rights that seemed obvious from my Israeli perspective was not at all part of the 
conversation about religious freedom in the U.S. Given the similarities between Native 
American land rights claims and Israeli/Palestinian land rights claims, rooted in 
understandings of land as sacred, but also in a history (and present) of oppression, I 
believe that to achieve justice, we need not only to expand our understanding of religion 
to include territorial religions, but also to think of religion in the context of settler 
colonialism, as tightly related to questions of Indigenous sovereignty.29 I believe that the 
Lyng case demonstrates this relation, and in what follows, I explore it through a reading 
of the case.   
 Reading closely the Lyng decision can offer insight into the relationship between 
land and religious freedom, an insight important to legal scholars and to religious studies 
scholars alike. But I believe that approaching the case and the conceptual questions it 
raises from two disciplinary points of view – that of a legal scholar and that of a religious 
studies scholar – is valuable as well. The two perspectives can enrich each other’s 
understanding of each of the concepts discussed here and the relationships between them. 
While religious studies scholars have been serving as experts in courts, in academia the 
two fields have remained separate. I believe that my background in both fields can offer a 
complex understanding of the issues at hand, both practically and theoretically. In 
addition, while the existing literature tends to study sovereignty, indigeneity, and 
religious freedom from an exclusively American or an exclusively European point of 
                                                           
29 For an excellent discussion of decolonization in the context of Palestine see Raef Zreik, “When Does a 
Settler Become a Native? (With Apologies to Mamdani),” Constellations 23, no. 3 (September 2016).  
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view, I believe that my position as an outsider lends me a unique view of the American 
landscape that I study. 
A reading of the Lyng case requires a complex understanding of land as a place of 
worship as well as an object of legislation; of religion as a cultural practice as well as a 
constitutional right; of freedom as a liberal (negative) right as well as a positive feature of 
citizenship. My background as a scholar of both law and religion enables me to offer a 
rich reading of the case. 
My work draws on methods from three different disciplines: religious studies, 
Indigenous studies, and legal studies. From legal studies, in Chapter One, I take the 
question how the courts and the parties to the case participate in a continuing game of 
defining religion. The tools of religious studies help me, in Chapter Two, to expand the 
understanding of religion to include mythology and experience. Drawing on Indigenous 
studies, I show in Chapters Three and Four, how the definitional question overshadows 
other questions that can be woven in, like the question of sovereignty. The 
interdisciplinary method I employed reflects the nature of the relationship between law 
and religion, in the sense that in order to decide what religion means legally, courts need 
to take into account knowledge from different disciplines, such as history and 
anthropology, in addition to the more obvious bodies of knowledge of jurisprudence and 
theology. As a religious studies project, my dissertation participates in two sub-fields in 
religious studies and asks to build a bridge between them –law and religion on the one 
hand, and Indigenous religions on the other. 
I chose Lyng because it seemed very central, on the one hand (every constitutional 
law student reads it in the first year of law school), and on the other hand, it seemed to be 
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understudied, at least outside of the legal academic world. In comparison with Oregon v. 
Smith, that centers around an individual practice and therefore, to some extent, fits well 
into familiar categories, in Lyng the postcolonial context is hard to ignore, and it is 
nevertheless absent in the Supreme Court decision.  
When I read Lyng through the lens of Indigenous sovereignty, I could understand 
better how an ostensibly-insignificant dispute over a six-mile segment of a road in a 
national forest became important enough for the Supreme Court to agree to hear it. 
However, new questions arise when we read the case through the lens of Indigenous 
sovereignty: first and foremost, how did it come to be that an area that is sacred to three 
Indian nations had turned into a national forest rather than a part of a reservation of at 
least one of the Indian nations? The Supreme Court did not address this question. 
Without employing an interdisciplinary approach, I could not have answered all the 
questions that this case raised. I turn now to explore these questions and their possible 
answers.  
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PART ONE: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
 
CHAPTER ONE: LAW 
 
Background 
 
In 1982, the U.S. Forest Service made a plan to harvest timber and construct a paved road 
through federal land, including the Chimney Rock area of the Six Rivers National Forest. 
This area, as reported in a study commissioned by the Service, has historically been used 
by the Yurok, Karuk, and Tolowa Indian nations for rituals that depend upon privacy, 
silence, and an undisturbed natural setting. Rejecting the study’s recommendation that the 
road not be completed through the Chimney Rock area because it would irreparably 
damage the sacred sites, and also rejecting alternative routes outside the National Forest, 
the Service selected a route through the Chimney Rock area. After exhausting 
administrative remedies, the Indians filed suit in the federal District Court challenging 
both the road-building and timber-harvesting decisions. The court issued a permanent 
injunction that prohibited the government from constructing the Chimney Rock section of 
the road or putting the timber-harvesting plan into effect, holding, inter alia, that such 
actions would violate the respondents’ First Amendment right to freely exercise their 
religion. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in pertinent part, and the Supreme 
Court reversed the decision. The government’s plan, according to the Supreme Court, did 
not violate the Indians’ free exercise right regardless of their effect on the religious 
practices of the respondents, because it compelled no behavior contrary to their belief. In 
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other words, the government can do whatever it wants with its land, even if it virtually 
destroys a religious practice, as long as the destruction of this religious practice is not the 
explicit target of the government’s actions. As I discuss below, this decision indicates a 
conception of land as property, something to be owned, which may be seen as 
contradicting the respondents’ conception of the land as a place of worship.  
 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor writes in her majority opinion that “The Free 
Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the Government cannot do to the individual, 
not in terms of what the individual can exact from the Government,”30 presenting us with 
an interpretation of the religion clauses of the First Amendment as protecting an 
individual – rather than collective – right. Justice O’Connor’s interpretation of religious 
freedom is tightly related to the Court’s understanding of land as private property rather 
than a place of worship. Justice William J. Brennan Jr., dissenting, points to the absurdity 
created by focusing on one aspect of this land (as federal property) and ignoring another 
aspect of it (as a place of worship), which causes the “gravest threat to [respondents’] 
religious practices.”31 As he puts it, “the Court believes that Native Americans who 
request that the Government refrain from destroying their religion effectively seek to 
exact from the Government de facto beneficial ownership of federal property.”32 Justice 
Brennan in his dissent lays the ground to critiquing U.S. legal conceptions of land and of 
religious freedom as deeply intertwined. Moreover, according to Justice Brennan’s 
reading of the case, it is a conception of land as property – rather than an interpretation of 
                                                           
30 Lyng, 451 
31 Ibid., 459. 
32 Ibid., 458. 
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religious freedom – that leads to the majority opinion and ultimately to the Court’s 
decision.  
At the background of this discussion there is another issue. Given the Court’s 
understanding of land as property (an understanding that detaches land both from 
sovereignty and from indigeneity) and of religious freedom as an individual right, the 
Lyng decision invites us to reflect on what it means for Native Americans to use U.S. law 
as their tool for demanding justice, when their understanding of fundamental concepts 
such as sovereignty, religious freedom, and ultimately, social justice, is so different than 
that of the Court’s. Thinking practically, it seems that a different path might have been 
more successful – using the Court’s conceptions of land and of religious freedom – as the 
Court might be unable to accommodate other, non-Western conceptions of the two. On 
the other hand, resigning one’s own belief system in order to be heard by one’s 
colonizer’s court does not seem as a potential path to a more just society. Abby Abinanti, 
a Yurok judge who was involved in the litigation of the Lyng case as a law student, 
expresses something of this sentiment in an open letter to Justice O’Connor: 
My belief in the High Country emanates from what I believe you would call “the 
soul.” I have never been farther than the former end of the road, yet I know of its 
importance. But how do I explain that to you? Must I find concepts that are 
familiar to you? Things you think are important to protect? Is that how we can 
survive, by somehow showing you how alike we are? The problem is that we are 
not alike.33 
                                                           
33 Abby Abinanty, “A Letter to Justice O’Connor,” Indigenous Peoples’ Journal of Law, Culture, and 
Resistance 1 (2004): 1. 
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The most fundamental difference in this case is between seeing the land as a sacred, 
living thing – with its own subjectivity – and seeing it as property, a mere object to be 
developed. And this clash is so essential, because, as Philip Arnold writes, “Maintaining 
the vitality of the living presence of the land is a core value of Indigenous 
communities.”34 Brian Brown adds:  
Since the unique identity of the different Indian tribes is so often coherent with 
the land that animates and sustains their religious beliefs and practices, 
bureaucratic decisions to alter land sites are intrusive invasions of tribal self-
understanding; the dissipation of tribal identity is the inherent consequence of 
land desecration.35 
What does it mean for Indian nations to appeal to their colonizer to recognize their right 
to use land the nations had inhabited before the land has been colonized? More generally, 
what does it mean for Indigenous peoples to use their colonizer’s legal system to protest 
against their colonization? First and foremost, it means acknowledging the state-
sovereignty of the U.S. The Native American case is complicated, since, as Vine Deloria, 
Jr. explains, on the one hand, the Native American conception of salvation and of protest 
is tightly related to “a return to the old ways, the old religion and the old political 
structure,”36 which means returning to a theology that “demands that the sacred places of 
the earth be discerned and communities of whole human beings be allowed to live on 
                                                           
34 Philip P. Arnold, The Urgency of Indigenous Values (unpublished), 121. In another book, Arnold 
compares Indigenous and European attachments to land using the concepts “religion as habitation” in the 
case of Indigenous Americans, and “religion as occupation” as in the case of the Europeans. (Philip P. 
Arnold, Eating Landscape: Aztec and European Occupation of Tlalocan (Miwot: University Press of 
Colorado, 1999). 
35 Brian E. Brown, Religion, Law, and the Land: Native Americans and the Judicial Interpretation of 
Sacred Land (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1999), 6. 
36 Vine Deloria, Jr., For this Land: Writings on Religion in America (New York, NY: Routledge 1999), 33. 
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them.”37 On the other hand, they seem to have to accept their colonizer’s conception of 
sovereignty as closely tied with ownership of land in order to be heard in U.S. courts. 
This absurdity, I suggest, follows a more general problematic, namely, that law and 
religion, the tools of the colonizer, are the only tools that the Native American protesters 
can use in order to protest. Cases where Indian nations have tried avoiding the courts, 
contesting state sovereignty in other ways, such as purchasing land with casino profits, as 
happened recently in City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York (2005),38 have 
often ended up in court. Paradoxically, contesting U.S. sovereignty has the effect of 
acknowledging it. Acknowledging U.S. sovereignty by way of arguing a case in its 
Supreme Court allows the Court to determine the terms of the debate. The Court in Lyng 
understands land as private property and religious freedom as an individual right. The 
privatization of land and the privatization of religion occurred in early modern Europe at 
the same time, as part of a more general process of secularization.39 
Marc DeGirolami points to what he sees as two fundamental clashes in Lyng. One 
is a clash between conceptions of religious liberty. The Court understands its role as 
protecting individuals from coercion. The Indian nations in Lyng emphasized a different 
value, one that DeGirolami interprets as piety. “The Court takes non-coercion or non-
compulsion to be the monistic value of religious liberty protected by the Free Exercise 
Clause,” he writes.40 According to the Indians, on the other hand, piety demanded in their 
case “a solitary, tranquil, and undisturbed holy ground in order to undertake a spiritual 
                                                           
37 Ibid., 33-4. 
38 544 US 197 (2005). 
39 See Kathleen M. Sand, “A Property of Peculiar Value: Land, Religion and the Constitution,” Culture and 
Religion 6, no. 1 (2005). 
40 Marc O. DeGirolami, The Tragedy of Religious Freedom (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2013), 168. 
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journey leading to an apperception of the transcendent – within their overarching concept 
of what it is to lead a moral life. Religious liberty was valuable to them precisely in order 
to participate in and live out that moral life.”41 What DeGirolami overlooks, to my mind, 
is that there is a clash here between understanding religious liberty as an individual right 
and understanding it collectively. What is certain, DeGirolami argues, is that non-
coercion (negative freedom of religion) and piety (positive freedom of religion) cannot 
coexist if either is taken as the monistic value of religious liberty. But can the two be 
thought of as concurring values of equal importance? If not, the Court’s conception is 
bound to win. 
The second clash in Lyng occurs between the Indians’ religious liberty and the 
government’s interest in building the road. This conflict turns on the fact that Chimney 
Rock, after all, “belongs” to the government, according to the Supreme Court. According 
to DeGirolami, “a theory of religious liberty that divested the government of all rights to 
use its own land as it saw fit would be wholly inadequate.”42 I think he is right in the 
sense that such a theory would not prove successful in court. But what are the moral 
implications of a theory that does not doubt the government’s right to the land at all? We 
need to ask, I argue, about the value that the government wants to promote, and whose 
interests it wants to support (and it is almost never the Indians’ interest). Furthermore, 
thinking of the land as belonging to the government while ignoring the context of 
conquest is problematic. Had the respondents in the case been a majority group (for 
example, urban Protestants whose church the government wants to destroy in order to 
construct a road), we might have said that there is a clash here that can be reconciled – 
                                                           
41 Ibid., 169. 
42 Ibid., 170. 
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perhaps the government’s interest is the respondents’ interest as well, in which case there 
is a clash among the same group’s different interests (they need a place of worship but 
they also need the road). The respondents in Lyng might benefit slightly from the 
government’s development plan (it might create more jobs in the area in the short term), 
but they are going to lose something more significant in the long term – their traditional 
practices that keep the community tight. In this case the clash seems irreconcilable. And 
it is irreconcilable because essentially, the dispute in this case is over land rights – those 
of the government and those of the Indians.  
The Indians find themselves in an absurd situation because they claim the land is 
sacred, and therefore belongs to everyone, or to no one, but the Court thinks of land as 
something that is owned, and it rejects the Indians’ claims as if they asked it to 
acknowledge their ownership of the land, while they were essentially arguing the 
opposite. In Justice Brennan’s words, the Lyng decision:  
represents yet another stress point in a longstanding conflict between two 
disparate cultures – the dominant western culture, which views land in terms of 
ownership and use, and that of Native Americans, in which concepts of private 
property are not only alien, but contrary to a belief system that holds land 
sacred.43 
Describing the clash in Lyng as a clash between the Indians’ right to religious liberty and 
the government’s property rights seems to be based on the understanding of colonial 
invasion as a discrete event. In the view of the Court, the occupation of the land might be 
                                                           
43 Lyng, 458. A critique of the assumption that Indians have no concept of property can be found in Kristen 
A. Carpenter, Sonia K. Katyal, and Angela R. Riley, “In Defense of Property,” Yale Law Journal 118, no.6 
(April 2009). I expand on it in Chapter Four. 
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a wrong, but it is one that belongs in the past, rather than an ongoing one.44 The Court 
does not doubt that the land belongs to the government. Nevertheless, if we see invasion 
as a structure – a worldview complete with creation myths and value systems – and not as 
an event, then the clash in Lyng is not necessarily between property rights and religious 
freedom; in a way, protecting the Indians’ freedom to worship on the land must involve 
admitting that the land was wrongly taken from them. When we read the Court’s 
decision, we might conclude that it is not the Indians who need the protection of the 
Court against the violation of their right to worship, but the government’s property rights 
that need protection against the Indians’ claim to the land. As Brown writes:  
The non-Native notion that religion is separable and essentially discrete from 
land, reduced to a core of beliefs and behavior that are ultimately distinct from the 
customary and traditional mores and practices of a particular society, often 
blunted the courts’ sensitivity to the extent of the spiritual and cultural harm from 
which the tribes sought protection.45  
But the conception of land as property was more harmful than the conception of religion 
as a set of beliefs rather than a way of life. Even though the Court recognized the 
detrimental effects of the construction of the road on Indian religion, it nevertheless freed 
the government of its obligation to prove a compelling state interest of sufficient 
magnitude that would justify the consequent religious harm. It ultimately determined that 
whatever rights the Indians may have, those rights do not divest the government of its 
right to use what it, after all, its land. Justice Brennan’s acknowledgement that the land is 
                                                           
44 Patrick Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” Journal of Genocide Research 8, 
no. 4 (December 2006): 388. 
45 Brown, Religion, Law, and the Land, 5. 
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sacred to the Indians is not enough. Acknowledging the sacredness of the land is 
important because the land as sacred is in dynamic relationship with the land as political, 
as Joanne Barker writes.46 Jodi Byrd adds:  
For American Indians, who have lived for tens of thousands of years on the lands 
that became the United States two hundred and thirty years ago, the land both 
remembers life and its loss and serves itself as a mnemonic device that triggers 
the ethics of relationality with the sacred geographies that constitute indigenous 
peoples’ histories.47  
Amy Bowers and Kristen A. Carpenter, too, propose a political reading of the story of 
Lyng, one that is told from the perspective of the Indians. It is a story of a community that 
is forced to defend itself against the assimilationist agenda of the federal government, 
developing a contemporary political identity in the process.48  
The road was never constructed, and the timber was never harvested in the High 
Country. In 1984, while the case was still pending, Congress passed the California 
Wilderness Act exempting much of the High Country from logging.49 In 1990, Congress 
passed the Smith River National Recreation Area Act, exempting the proposed site of the 
road from such construction.50 The sacred areas were largely preserved. Lyng is “a story 
of the inextricable relationship between Indian people and lands, in which the Tribes’ 
attachment to their sacred sites ultimately triumphed over the Supreme Court’s narrow 
                                                           
46 Barker, Native Acts, 105. 
47 Jodi A. Byrd, The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2011), 118. 
48 Amy Bowers and Kristen A. Carpenter, “Challenging the Narrative of Conquest: The Story of Lyng v. 
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association,” in Indian Law Stories, ed. Carole Goldberg, Kevin K. 
Washburn, and Phillip P. Frickey (St. Paul: Foundation Press, 2011). 
49 Pub. L. 98–425, 98 Stat. 1619. 
50 16 U.S.C. § 460bbb. 
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application of religion and property laws.”51 Retelling the story in this way helps making 
this connection between the sacred aspect of the land and its political aspect. It recreates 
the Indian nations as communities rather than individuals. It stays committed to the 
notion of land as sacred rather than as something that is owned, because it sees the 
continued worship as a triumph, not acknowledging the Court’s power to decide that the 
land is government property. 
In order to enrich my discussion of religious freedom and of Indigenous 
sovereignty through a reading of Lyng, I read the Supreme Court decision in the context 
of historical, theoretical and legal backgrounds, but most importantly, in the context of 
the trial – including the evidence and the testimonies of Indian religious practitioners, 
Forest Service officials, and expert witnesses. I do so to avoid privileging abstract legal 
categories as my point of departure, relying instead on a thick description. Like Benjamin 
Berger, who refers to his work as a “phenomenological turn in the study of law and 
religion,” I seek to “privilege experience of the law as the analytic starting point, rather 
than legal concepts or ideal forms of theory.”52  
 The plaintiffs in the case included the Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective 
Association, four Indian religious practitioners (Jimmie James, Sam Jones, Lowana 
Brantner, and Christopher H. Peters), six environmental organizations (the Sierra Club, 
Wilderness Society, California Trout, Siskiyou Mountains Resources Council, Redwood 
Region Audubon Society, and Northcoast Environmental Center), and two individual 
members of the Sierra Club (Timothy McKay and John Amadio). A second lawsuit, filed 
by the state of California, acting through the Native American Heritage Commission, was 
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consolidated for trial. The defendants were the Secretary of Agriculture John R. Block, 
Forest Service Chief R. Max Peterson, and Regional Forester Zane H. Smith. (By the 
time the case reached the Supreme Court, Richard E. Lyng had become Secretary of 
Agriculture and the case was known forever after as “Lyng.”)  
 The Indian plaintiffs were represented by Marylin Miles of the California Indian 
Legal Services, the environmental organizations were represented by attorney Michael 
Sherwood, and the state of California was represented by Deputy Attorney General Edna 
Walz. The Forest Service was represented by Rodney Hamblin, Assistant U.S. Attorney. 
The plaintiffs brought eight claims, challenging the decisions by the United States 
Forest Service (1) to complete construction of the last 6.02 miles (Chimney Rock 
Section) of a paved road from Gasquet, California, to Orleans, California (the “G-O 
road”), and (2) to adopt a forest management plan providing for the harvesting of timber 
for the Blue Creek Unit of Six Rivers National Forest. Plaintiffs argued that the Forest 
Service’s decisions violated (1) the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States; (2) the American Indian Freedom of Religion Act, (3) the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)53 and the Wilderness Act,54 (4) the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act,55 (5) water and fishing rights reserved to American Indians on the Hoopa 
Valley Indian Reservation, and defendants’ trust responsibility towards those rights, (6) 
the Administrative Procedure Act,56 (7) the Multiple–Use Sustained–Yield Act of 1960,57 
and (8) the National Forest Management Act of 1976.58 
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55 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387. 
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The case was assigned to Judge Stanley A. Weigel, a Jewish Republican who 
referred to himself as “agnostic” and was known for his toughness and independence. “It 
was a fortunate selection for the plaintiffs. A member of the national board of the 
American Civil Liberties Union at the time President John F. Kennedy appointed him to 
the bench, Weigel was unafraid to uphold unpopular causes, and had represented 
professors in a dispute over loyalty oaths with the University of California.”59 
The two-week trial began on March 14, 1982. Twenty-three witnesses were 
examined over those two weeks: the four individual Indian plaintiffs testified alongside 
two expert witnesses (anthropologists Arnold Pilling and Dorothea Theodoratus) for the 
Indian plaintiffs. The State of California called and examined William James Pink, the 
executive secretary of the California Native Heritage Commission. The environmental 
organizations, together with the State of California, examined eight other expert 
witnesses.60 The defendants called and examined eight Forest Service employees.61  
While the plaintiffs won the case in the district court and in the court of appeals, 
they lost in the Supreme Court. I turn now to reading the majority opinion of Justice 
O’Connor, which ignores most of the testimony and evidence that were presented at trial. 
I return to the trial in Chapter Two. 
 
  
                                                           
59 Bowers and Carpenter, “Challenging the Narrative of Conquest,” 510. 
60 The witnesses were engineering geologists Eugene Kojan and Ralph Graham Scott, professor of 
environmental geology Robert Curry, fishery biologist Richard Wood, soil scientist Annette Parsons, 
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61 The witnesses for the defendants were forest supervisor Joseph Harn, forest cultural resource specialist 
Kenneth Wilson, forest geologist Richard Farrington, director of building and planning Ernest Wesley 
Perry, forest engineer Robert Black, forest fishery biologist Jerry Barnes, forest hydrologist Christopher 
Knopp, and forest soil scientist Brent Roath. 
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Justice O’Connor’s Majority Opinion 
 
In this section, I read closely O’Connor’s majority opinion in Lyng, before turning, in the 
next section, to a discussion of her opinion against the background of the body of caselaw 
and legislation available to her in making her decision. I then turn, in Chapter Two, to the 
body of evidence and testimony presented in the Lyng trial that is largely missing from 
O’Connor’s opinion.  
O’Connor, joined by Justices Rehnquist, White, Stevens, and Scalia,62 
acknowledged in her opinion that “It is undisputed that the Indian respondents’ beliefs 
are sincere and that the Government’s proposed actions will have severe adverse effects 
on the practice of their religion.”63 Nevertheless, she disagrees with the respondents that 
the burden is heavy enough to violate the respondents’ First Amendment free exercise 
right unless the government can show a compelling interest in completing the road or 
executing the timber-harvesting plan. Her disagreement relies mostly on the Court’s 
previous decision in Bowen v. Roy (1986),64 where it was decided that: 
The Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require the Government 
to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious beliefs 
of particular citizens. Just as the Government may not insist that [the Roys] 
engage in any set form of religious observance, so [they] may not demand that the 
Government join in their chosen religious practices by refraining from using a 
                                                           
62 The dissenting opinion was filed by Justice Brennan, who was joined by Justices Marshal and Blackmun. 
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63 Lyng, 447. 
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number to identify their daughter […] The Free Exercise Clause affords an 
individual protection from certain forms of governmental compulsion; it does not 
afford an individual a right to dictate the conduct of the Government’s internal 
procedures.65 
According to O’Connor, “The building of a road or the harvesting of timber on publicly 
owned land cannot meaningfully be distinguished from the use of a Social Security 
number in Roy.”66 In both cases, she explains, government actions would interfere with a 
private person’s ability to practice his or her religion. Nevertheless, in neither case does 
the government coerce any individual to act in violation of his or her religious beliefs. 
Similarly, in neither case does the government penalize a religious practice or belief. 
Therefore, in neither case is there a violation of the First Amendment’s free exercise 
clause.  
O’Connor is able to equate the two cases because she understands the burdened 
practice or belief as personal or private. It seems, therefore, that challenging this 
understanding of religion as a private matter would be useful in distinguishing the cases. 
But none of the respondents in the case challenged this conception of religion as private. 
Instead, respondents focused on other aspects of the two cases. As O’Connor describes: 
We are asked to distinguish this case from Roy on the ground that the 
infringement on religious liberty here is “significantly greater,” or on the ground 
that the government practice in Roy was “purely mechanical” whereas this case 
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involves “a case-by-case substantive determination as to how a particular unit of 
land will be managed.”67 
I argue that these are not the meaningful differences between Roy and Lyng. While in Roy 
it is the spiritual development of an individual that is allegedly infringed through the 
government actions, in Lyng it is a community’s wellbeing that is violated.68 
The State of California argued that Roy should be distinguished from Lyng 
because in Roy the government actions took place in a remote location, the Roys did not 
have any real knowledge about them, and therefore the notion that the government’s 
actions created a burden on the Roys’ religious practice was merely subjective. In Lyng, 
on the other hand, the government’s actions “physically destroy the environmental 
conditions and the privacy without which the [religious] practices cannot be 
conducted.”69 O’Connor rejects this reasoning. Any attempt to distinguish between the 
cases, she explains, would require the Court to determine the truth of the underlying 
beliefs that led to objections to the government’s actions, and this task is simply 
impossible to accomplish. Note that it is not the sincerity of the belief that matters 
according to O’Connor, but the objective truth of the belief. This is an implausible 
interpretation of the free exercise clause, one that renders all free exercise cases 
impossible to decide, unless we assume that Supreme Court Justices are theologians with 
unique access to knowledge about the truth or falsehood of all religious beliefs (and 
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O’Connor has already told us that this is not the case, that she is unable to determine the 
truth of religious beliefs of American Indians).70 
Because the Court cannot determine the truth of the religious belief underlying the 
Roys’ objection to the Social Security system, it cannot evaluate the burden resulting 
from government actions. Nevertheless, O’Connor tells us, “Respondents [in Lyng] insist 
[…] that the courts below properly relied on a factual inquiry into the degree to which the 
Indians’ spiritual practices would become ineffectual if the G-O road were built.”71 
O’Connor portrays the free exercise clause as protecting not sincere religious belief or 
practice, but outcome. Because she cannot know what would happen to the effectivity of 
the religious practice in question, she cannot offer it protection. But what the religious 
practitioners are arguing here is that the practice of their religion itself would be 
burdened, not its effectivity. Indeed, they would be unable to practice their religion if the 
road is built (rather than arguing that they can continue the practice but it would not be as 
effective). Separating the practice from its (anticipated) results seems to misunderstand 
religion altogether.72 
                                                           
70 Later in her opinion, O’Connor responds to Brennan’s dissent, elaborating further on this issue: “the 
dissent proposes a legal test under which it would decide which public lands are ‘central’ or ‘indispensable’ 
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which government programs are ‘compelling’ enough to justify ‘infringement of those practices.’ We 
would accordingly be required to weigh the value of every religious belief and practice that is said to be 
threatened by any government program. Unless a ‘showing of centrality’ is nothing but an assertion of 
centrality, the dissent thus offers us the prospect of this Court holding that some sincerely held religious 
beliefs and practices are not ‘central’ to certain religions, despite protestations to the contrary from the 
religious objectors who brought the lawsuit. In other words, the dissent’s approach would require us to rule 
that some religious adherents misunderstand their own religious beliefs.” (Lyng, 457; citations omitted) 
71Ibid., 450. 
72 Similarly, Adeil Sherbert argues that she is not allowed to work on Saturdays rather than arguing that if 
she works on Saturday something would happen to her (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)); the 
Yoders argue that it is against their belief to send their teenage kids to public schools rather than saying that 
something would happen to them at school (Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)). 
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O’Connor’s distinction between Sherbert v. Verner (1963) and Lyng is 
unconvincing as well. While she agrees that the Court “has repeatedly held that indirect 
coercion or penalties on the free exercise of religion, not just outright prohibitions, are 
subject to scrutiny under the First Amendment,” she nevertheless determines that this 
does not mean that “incidental effects of government programs, which may make it more 
difficult to practice certain religions but which have no tendency to coerce individuals 
into acting contrary to their religious beliefs, require government to bring forward a 
compelling justification for its otherwise lawful actions.”73 The differentiation relies on 
an understanding of the word ‘prohibit’: “For the Free Exercise Clause is written in terms 
of what the government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual 
can exact from the government.”74 Does O’Connor mean that in Sherbert the 
government’s refusal to pay unemployment to Adeil Sherbert, who lost her job because 
she refused to work on her Sabbath, amounted to a prohibition of religious practice while 
the construction of the G-O road did not? In any case, deciding free exercise cases cannot 
rely on the spiritual development of the religious objector to the government’s actions, 
according to O’Connor.75 We could say that what O’Connor implies here is that free 
exercise does not equal spiritual development. I could not agree more. But the Lyng case 
is not about “personal spiritual development”76 either. Reading the testimonies in the trial 
and the Theodoratus Report in Chapter Two will help me to establish that.  
“The Government does not dispute, and we have no reason to doubt, that the 
logging and road-building projects at issue in this case could have devastating effects on 
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traditional Indian religious practices.”77 This acknowledgement seems encouraging at 
first, but O’Connor explains the use of the High Country thus: 
Individual practitioners use this area for personal spiritual development; some of 
their activities are believed to be critically important in advancing the welfare of 
the tribe, and indeed, of mankind itself. The Indians use this area, as they have 
used it for a very long time, to conduct a wide variety of specific rituals that aim 
to accomplish their religious goals. According to their beliefs, the rituals would 
not be efficacious if conducted at other sites than the ones traditionally used, and 
too much disturbance of the area’s natural state would clearly render any 
meaningful continuation of traditional practices impossible.78  
This explanation of the practice allows O’Connor to determine that it does not deserve 
First Amendment protection, despite the acknowledgement of the G-O Road’s adverse 
effects on it. Firstly, it is individuals rather than communities who use the High Country 
for personal spiritual development, and O’Connor has already determined that spiritual 
development does not equal exercise of religion.79 Secondly, those practitioners believe 
that their rituals advance the wellbeing of the community and of the whole world. 
Unfortunately, the Court cannot determine the truth of the claim that those rituals would 
not be effective if performed in other places. This focus on efficacy prevents the Court 
from asking why it is important for the practitioners to practice their religion specifically 
in the High Country regardless of results. This question, I argue, calls for contextualizing 
the case more broadly, which in turn allows for an understanding of this case as one that 
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Two. However, it is also used, perhaps primarily, for other, communal purposes. 
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is about more than free exercise. I pursue this line of thought in Part Two (“Indigenous 
Sovereignty”).    
“Even if we assume that we should accept the Ninth Circuit’s prediction, 
according to which the G-O road will ‘virtually destroy the Indians’ ability to practice 
their religion’,”80 O’Connor continues, the Court cannot decide the case in favor of the 
respondents, because “government simply could not operate if it were required to satisfy 
every citizen’s religious needs and desires.”81 The argument unfolds as a ‘slippery slope’ 
argument, according to which many people would surely find some government action 
offensive, and some of these people would base their objection on sincerely held beliefs. 
Moreover, some people would find the opposite action offensive, and their objection may 
also rely on sincerely held beliefs. Because the constitution must apply equally to all 
citizens, no one can be given a veto over a public program that does not prohibit the free 
exercise of religion. And even though the respondents are not objecting to the current use 
of the area by tourists and other Indians (they only object to the development plan), 
“Nothing in the principle for which they contend, […] would distinguish this case from 
another lawsuit in which they (or similarly situated religious objectors) might seek to 
exclude all human activity but their own from sacred areas of the public lands.”82 The 
task of balancing between different citizens’ demands on the government, even if those 
demands are based on religious beliefs, if it is possible at all, “is for the legislatures and 
other institutions.83  
                                                           
80 Lyng, 451. 
81 Ibid., 452. 
82 Ibid., 452-3. 
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O’Connor moves on to briefly describing the religious practice as it is explained 
in the respondents’ brief, and then reveals what seems to be the real reason behind her 
ruling: “No disrespect for these practices is implied when one notes that such beliefs 
could easily require de facto beneficial ownership of some rather spacious tracts of public 
property.”84 The case turns, at this point, into one about land ownership rather than 
religion, even if the two issues are mixed together in O’Connor’s words: 
The Constitution does not permit government to discriminate against religions 
that treat particular physical sites as sacred, and a law forbidding the Indian 
respondents from visiting the Chimney Rock area would raise a different set of 
constitutional questions. Whatever rights the Indians may have to the use of the 
area, however, those rights do not divest the Government of its right to use what 
is, after all, its land. […] Nothing in our opinion should be read to encourage 
governmental insensitivity to the religious needs of any citizen. The 
Government’s rights to the use of its own land, for example, need not and should 
not discourage it from accommodating religious practices like those engaged in 
by the Indian respondents.85 
I discuss the treatment of the case as one that is about property in Part Two.86  
O’Connor adds that the government has done everything that could be expected 
from it to minimize the impact that construction of the G-O road would have on the 
respondents’ religious practice. She counts the commission of the Theodoratus Report, 
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86 I also address there Brennan’s dissent, according to which we should distinguish Lyng from Roy because 
in Roy the government was acting “in a purely internal manner,” whereas land-use decisions “are likely to 
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the steps taken to minimize audible and visual intrusions, and the selection of a route that 
avoids specific ritual sites (pointing this out suggests a misunderstanding of the sacred 
nature of the High Country, as I discuss below). These steps, O’Connor adds, are in line 
with the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, according to which: 
It shall be the policy of the United States to protect and preserve for American 
Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the 
traditional religions of the American Indian […] including but not limited to 
access to sites, use and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship 
through ceremonials and traditional rites.87 
A second section of AIRFA required an evaluation of federal policies and procedures in 
consultation with Native religious leaders, of changes necessary to protect and preserve 
the rights and practices in question. The Theodoratus Report satisfies this requirement. 
“Nowhere in the law is there so much as a hint of any intent to create a cause of action or 
any judicially enforceable individual rights.”88  
O’Connor ends her discussion of AIRFA with a quote from the sponsor of the 
statute, Representative Udall, who defined it as “a sense of Congress joint resolution,” 
that in fact “has no teeth in it.”89 O’Connor’s analysis of the local traditions demonstrates 
a misunderstanding of them, but it may also be critiqued as misinterpreting religious 
freedom.90 Understanding O’Connor’s majority opinion in Lyng requires a review of the 
caselaw she cites in her decision as well as the caselaw she ignores. In the next section I 
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read the Supreme Court cases about free exercise that were decided before Lyng, as well 
as cases about Indian sacred sites that were decided by the lower courts before Lyng. 
Other authors have provided similar reviews to the one I offer below; while some focus 
on the free exercise issue, others focus on the sacred lands issue.91 In the following 
section I follow Donald Falk, who, in a 1989 Note,92 focuses on both Supreme Court free 
exercise precedent and on lower courts’ sacred site jurisprudence as a background for his 
critique of the Lyng decision as “curtail[ing] the ability of American Indians to preserve 
sacred sites on federally owned public lands.”93 
Lyng is the first Supreme Court case about Native American sacred sites; 
however, the Supreme Court only ruled on the free exercise issue and not on any 
statutory issue (“The Government, which petitioned for certiorari on the constitutional 
issue alone, has informed us that it believes it can cure the statutory defects identified 
below, intends to do so, and will not challenge the adverse statutory rulings.”)94 
Therefore, I believe that the first step toward understanding and critiquing this decision is 
to read it against the background of free exercise jurisprudence. Let me turn to this task 
now. 
 
                                                           
91 See, for example, Marcia Yablon, “Property Rights and Sacred Sites: Federal Regulatory Responses to 
American Indian Religious Claims on Public Land,” Yale Law Journal 113, no. 7 (May 2004); Donald 
Falk, “Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association: Bulldozing First Amendment Protection 
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Defining Religion 
 
As we have seen, O’Connor’s interpretation of Lyng is based almost exclusively on the 
then-recent Supreme Court decision in Bowen v. Roy. However, reviewing the hundred-
year long history of free exercise jurisprudence and the body of precedent available when 
deciding the case may show us that Lyng could have been decided differently if it were to 
rely on other cases. A review of free exercise jurisprudence and scholarship follows.  
 The religion clauses of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution declare 
unconstitutional any prohibition on the free exercise of religion and laws respecting the 
establishment of religion. The consequence is that whenever a group demands to be 
recognized as religious and be granted the right to the free exercise of religion, courts 
must determine whether the religious practice in question is “legally” religious. This 
situation is problematic, because American law is essentially secular – the American 
people have chosen to live under the rule of law (as opposed to the rule of God) – and 
therefore, allowing (or requesting) law to define religion may have grave consequences 
on the category of religion.  
How does the Court go about to define religion? As Eduardo Peñalver points out, 
the case of religious freedom is unique, because, unlike free speech, where the legal 
definition of “speech” is clearly different than the colloquial use of the term, in the case 
of the free exercise of religion the courts tend to use the term “religion” unreflectively, as 
if the everyday use of the term makes it clear what religion means.95 But, as Winnifred 
Sullivan points out, religion today is as difficult to define as truth is in Rashomon. In our 
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everyday use of the term, everything may be recognized as religion and nothing is 
exclusively defined as religion. This fact renders the courts’ job of securing the right to 
religious freedom (but also of securing disestablishment) impossible, as Sullivan’s book’s 
title suggests.96  
Legal scholars have suggested different definitions of – or different methods for 
defining – religion, hoping that courts would rely on their suggestions when deciding 
cases about religious freedom. Some have sought substantial definitions, relying on 
classic definitions such as those of scholars of religion like Émile Durkheim97 or Clifford 
Geertz,98 and some have defined religion in a functional way: John Sexton proposes to 
understand religion as Paul Tillich did,99 functionally, and to declare anything of 
“ultimate concern” to a person as deserving constitutional protection.100 Kent Greenawalt 
rejects the notion of a dictionary-style definition of religion and proposes a method for 
the court to use when trying to identify religion.101 He proposes to identify religion 
through analogy, something similar to a Wittgensteinian “family resemblance,” and 
Peñalver, following Greenawalt, suggests a similar, but more elaborate, method. Peñalver 
is in favor of creating a method instead of a definition. He supports the Wittgensteinian 
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method, but he also offers three guidelines for the identification of religion by the court, 
and the method of analogy or family resemblance is only one of them. The first guideline 
is to seek to define only religion, rather than offering broader definitions that would 
include conscience as well, as has been done in some cases. The second guideline is to 
take into account the evolving nature of language, which means that the definition has to 
be flexible and bear the potential to evolve alongside ordinary language. The third 
guideline is to compare the phenomenon in front of the court to as many phenomena that 
already count as religion as possible, in order to avoid bias toward a specifically-Western 
definition of religion.102  
Having surveyed the scholarly debate of the legal definition of religion and before 
turning to the courts’ opinion(s) on the matter, I would like to explore the political 
implications of the need for the law to define religion. Political and legal theorists agree 
that the U.S. is a secular nation that cares deeply about religion. Paul Kahn refers to this 
feature of the American polity as “cultural pluralism,” and says that it raises a theoretical 
challenge, but also a practical one (how can we decide which minority practice is 
tolerable?)103 Bette Novit Evans adds that in a pluralist culture, defining religion becomes 
more and more difficult, because religious practice has become more diverse. 
Furthermore, religious organizations have started offering many services beyond the 
religious service, and at the same time the government is regulating more and more areas 
of life. Therefore, the conflict between government and religion becomes inevitable.104 I 
think the main problem that arises has to do with the principle of separation between 
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church and state, because if separation (or disestablishment) is dependent on the state or 
the law defining what counts as religion, then how can we see the two as separate? 
Scholars have understood disestablishment as the neutrality of the state between different 
religions and between religion and non-religion, but Evans notes the difficulty to provide 
a neutral definition that would not offend anyone. If we want a broad definition it will 
probably be very superficial, and if we want a deep definition it is doomed to be too 
narrow. Evans worries not that politicians and courts would resent religion, but that they 
would be ignorant about it; thus, they may be unaware of the importance of land to 
Native American worship or of the yarmulke to Orthodox Jewish identity. Sullivan adds 
to that worry that religion in the twenty-first century, when diaspora religion is the most 
common one, and when most religious people in the West live in secular states, is “lived 
religion.” This means that religion changes constantly according to the circumstances, 
and therefore any theoretical definition would always be too static to capture the 
phenomenon.105 Elizabeth Shakman Hurd writes that “religion is too unstable a category 
to be treated as an isolable entity, whether the projective is to attempt to separate religion 
from law and politics or design a political response to ‘it.’”106 For her, then, the challenge 
is “to signal an interest in a category, religion, which is legible to many, while also 
arguing for a different understanding of it.”107 
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Free Exercise Jurisprudence Before Lyng 
 
Like legal scholars, the Supreme Court has had to grapple with the question “what is 
religion?” throughout the years as well. Though it has not been as adventurous as the 
lower courts, it has allowed the First Amendment to protect a variety of phenomena as 
religious. In Reynolds v. U.S. (1878)108 the Supreme Court defined religion for the first 
time, ruling that the First Amendment protects only religious belief and not the actions 
that it entails.109 The Reynolds Court ruled that the Mormon defendant’s belief that 
practicing polygamy was a religious duty did not exonerate him from criminal 
conviction.110 According to the Court, criminal statutes against polygamy enforce a social 
duty and cannot be attacked on free exercise ground, lest religion become the law of the 
land and every citizen become her own law. This Lockean differentiation between 
religious belief and religious conduct is problematic, as commentators have argued.111 
This differentiation cannot be meaningful because states can only regulate conducts; they 
cannot regulate belief.112  
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This definition of religion as belief was rejected by the Supreme Court more than 
half a century after Reynolds, in Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940).113 In Cantwell, the 
Court unanimously reversed the conviction of Jehovah’s Witnesses for soliciting money 
for a religious cause without prior government approval and common law breach of the 
peace. The Court held that the religion clauses of the First Amendment applied to the 
states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment and interpreted the free exercise clause as 
protecting against laws prohibiting both belief and “chosen form of religion.”114 
According to Justice Roberts, “the Amendment embraces two concepts – freedom to 
believe and freedom to act,” even if the freedom to act is not absolute.115 “Conduct 
remains subject to regulation for the protection of society,”116 but deprivation of a 
religion’s means of survival is considered an impermissible “censorship of religion.”117 In 
Cantwell, the Court struck down a law as infringing free exercise rights for the first time, 
balancing the citizens’ right to exercise their religion freely against the legislature’s 
prerogative. In Falk’s words, “States could not place the physical means of a religion’s 
continued existence at the discretion of public officers. Further, general regulations that 
might infringe on religious practice had to have a permissible motive and could not 
inhibit free exercise more than was necessary to protect a substantial state interest.”118  
Cantwell’s protections were sharply but briefly limited in Minersville School 
District v. Gobitis (1940).119 Gobitis rejected a free exercise challenge by Jehovah’s 
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Witnesses to a statute requiring all schoolchildren to salute the American flag and recite 
the Pledge of Allegiance daily. The Court exempted any “general law not aimed at the 
promotion or restriction of religious beliefs” from free exercise scrutiny,120 and limited 
free exercise protection to three narrow rights: subjective belief, conversion of others, and 
assembly in a chosen place of worship. The government thus could justify a broad range 
of burdens on religion unless the offended parties could show clearly that the government 
action lacked any rational basis. Sarah Gordon explains that because the flag salute was a 
nonreligious exercise, the Jehovah’s Witnesses refusing the salute were seen by the 
public as simply unreasonable: “By importing religion into a nonreligious exercise, they 
seemed superstitious and disloyal, as well as impolite and aggressive.”121 According to 
the District Court judge who heard the Gobitis trial, however, “the decision about what 
counts as religious should rest with the believer, not school officials.”122  
Three years later, West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943) 
overruled Gobitis and refined the Cantwell test. Barnette rejected the toothless “rational 
basis” test for legislation and held that the First Amendment religious rights of the 
individual limited the scope of state power.123 The Court ruled such rights could be 
restricted “only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the state may 
lawfully protect.”124  
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Three principles established in Barnette – which was decided on the grounds of 
free speech – are relevant to free exercise according to Falk:  
First, infringements upon the free exercise of religion could be justified only if the 
government is safeguarding a legitimate state interest from grave and immediate 
danger. Second, the Court would not defer to legislative or executive judgment on 
Bill of Rights issues. Action by other branches of government was always subject 
to judicial scrutiny when that action conflicted with freedoms guaranteed by the 
Bill of Rights. Third, the Court found that the government has no inherent power 
to act contrary to the Bill of Rights; all levels of government must respect the 
freedoms guaranteed therein.125 
In the 1960s, the Court began to consider cases about government actions that indirectly 
burdened free exercise, and it also broadened its definition of religion. In Torcaso v. 
Watkins (1961)126 the Court declared a religious test for public office unconstitutional. In 
a famous footnote in his majority opinion, Justice Hugo Black wrote that the First 
Amendment protected not only religions that were based on the belief in the existence of 
a creator, but also nontheistic faiths, such as Buddhism, Taoism, and secular 
humanism.127 Two days later, in a decision in Braunfeld v. Brown (1961),128 the Court, 
considering whether Sunday closing laws infringed the free exercise rights of an 
Orthodox Jew, established a framework for evaluating laws that had the purpose or the 
effect of burdening the free exercise of religion, unless the secular purpose cannot be 
achieved without this burdening. While the plurality opinion did not see economic 
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burdens as amounting to the prohibition of religious practice, the dissent (filed by Justice 
Brennan) focused on the compulsory effect of forcing one to choose between religious 
belief or practice and economic survival. While the plurality opinion used a rational-basis 
standard, Brennan argued for using strict scrutiny.     
 Sherbert v. Verner (1963), two years after Braunfeld, sees such forced choice 
between religious belief or practice and economic benefits as amounting to “the same 
kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed […] for […] 
Saturday worship.”129 According to the Sherbert strict scrutiny test, a government action 
that incidentally burdens religion is justified only by a “compelling state interest in the 
regulation of a subject within the State’s constitutional power to regulate.”130 Moreover, 
where there is such compelling interest, the government also needs to show that “no 
alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses without infringing First 
Amendment rights.”131     
 Under the Sherbert test, as it was clarified in Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) and in 
Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division (1981),132 a 
plaintiff must show that a sincerely-held belief is burdened by a government action. The 
burden of proof then shifts to the government to show either that the religious practice 
poses a grave and immediate threat to society (in the case of direct burdens) or a 
compelling state interest that cannot be achieved in less restrictive means (in the case of 
indirect burdens). While Yoder expands the strict scrutiny test of Sherbert, it narrows the 
definition of religion that was broadened in Torcaso. Yoder, which Justice O’Connor 
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distinguished from Lyng in her majority opinion and Justice Brennan cited as relevant 
precedent in his dissent, exempted Old Order Amish children from compulsory secondary 
education because high school attendance is contrary to Amish beliefs. The Yoder Court 
held that a facially neutral statute that advanced substantial state interest is subject to the 
balancing test because it unduly burdened free exercise rights. But it required the 
plaintiffs to demonstrate that the practice in question is sincerely rooted in religious 
belief, thus narrowly understanding religion as belief rather than conduct yet again. Even 
though compulsory school attendance threatened the Amish way of life, this burden was 
declared unconstitutional because this way of life was rooted in religious belief (rather 
than understanding this way of life as religious in itself).    
The court in Thomas clarified the test applied to state actions that indirectly or 
incidentally infringed upon a religious practice: such infringement is justified only if it is 
the least restrictive means to achieve a compelling state interest. Even more important to 
our reading of Lyng is the Court’s holding that the religious belief of a group does not 
have to be accepted by, or even comprehensible to, nonbelievers. Furthermore, to invoke 
First Amendment protection, a belief need not be articulated with precision or shared by 
all members of a religious sect. In Goldman v. Weinberger (1986),133 however, the Court 
exempted the military from the compelling interest balancing test and excused the Air 
Force from review of its rational justification. The Court held that “the military’s 
perceived need for uniformity,” reasonably and evenhandedly applied, legitimized the 
infringement of Goldman’s religious practice.134 The dissent in Goldman noted that a 
regulation written from a Christian point of view could not be considered “neutral.”   
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In Bowen v. Roy (1986), the Court rejected an Abenaki Indian’s suit to prevent the 
use of a Social Security number to process welfare benefits for his daughter. Roy claimed 
that use of the number would rob his daughter of her spirit and prevent her from attaining 
greater spiritual power. The Court held that the free exercise clause “does not afford an 
individual a right to dictate the conduct of the Government’s internal procedures.”135 An 
individual could not use the clause as a sword to make the government “behave in ways 
that the individual believes will further his or her spiritual development.”136 The Court 
was divided on whether the government could require Roy to use his daughter’s Social 
Security number to receive benefits. Chief Justice Burger distinguished the case from 
Sherbert and claimed that “mere denial of a governmental benefit by a uniformly 
applicable statute does not constitute infringement of religious liberty.”137 The opinion 
lowered the standard of free exercise clause analysis in benefits cases. Government 
benefits programs would withstand scrutiny as long as the government’s scheme was 
neutral and uniform in its application and was a “reasonable means of promoting a 
legitimate public interest.”138 
Justice O’Connor, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, concurred in part and 
dissented in part. Justice O’Connor found the Sherbert balancing test applicable to the 
question whether Roy had to provide the number despite his beliefs and that the 
government had available less restrictive means to prevent welfare fraud. Justice 
O’Connor noted the lack of precedent for the reasonable means test, which would 
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relegate free exercise claims to “the barest level of minimal scrutiny.”139 She believed 
such a lax interpretation of the clause would enfeeble the Constitution’s “express limits 
upon governmental actions limiting the freedoms of […] society’s members.”140 
The last free exercise case decided by the Supreme Court before Lyng was Hobbie 
v. Unemployment Appeals Commission of Florida (1987),141 which reaffirmed the 
traditional free exercise analysis of incidental burdens on religious practice. The Court 
expressly rejected Burger’s attempt in Roy to apply a reasonable means test to some 
“incidental neutral restraints on the free exercise of religion.”142 Thus, prior to Lyng, the 
Court’s free exercise clause doctrine stood as follows: Direct criminalization of religious 
activity and compulsion to act in a manner contrary to religious belief (direct burdens) 
were forbidden unless justified by a grave danger to a substantial government interest. 
Indirect burdens on religious practice had to be justified by a government interest of the 
highest order that could not be served by less restrictive means. 
 
American Indian Sacred Land Cases Before Lyng 
 
Before Lyng, the Supreme Court had never considered whether development of federal 
land could injure the free exercise rights of American Indians. Lower federal courts, 
however, had considered several such claims.143  
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The first appellate opinion on an Indian free exercise challenge to public lands 
development was Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority (1980).144 Cherokee Indians 
challenged the impoundment of the reservoir behind the Tellico Dam in Tennessee, 
claiming that the dam would flood their sacred homeland along the Little Tennessee 
River, inundating and destroying sacred sites, medicine gathering sites, holy places, and 
innumerable ancestral grave sites, and would otherwise “disturb the sacred balance of the 
land”145 by stopping up the last free-flowing stretch of the largest and best trout-fishing 
water east of the Mississippi River. The trial court had rejected the plaintiffs’ free 
exercise claim because the Cherokees lacked a property interest in the site. However, the 
Court of Appeals balanced the burden on religion against the government’s interest, 
following Sherbert and Yoder. The absence of a property interest was not conclusive in 
view of the history of Cherokee expulsion from the area at issue and the importance of 
geographic sites to the Cherokee religion. For sake of such balancing, however, the Sixth 
Circuit required that the Cherokees prove (again, following Yoder), the “centrality or 
indispensability” of the area to be flooded to their religious practice. Ruling that the 
plaintiffs failed to show that the sites at issue were “central or indispensable to religious 
practice,” the court determined that the plaintiff’s affidavits reflected “personal 
preference,” which is unprotected by the First Amendment.146  
Six months later, in Badoni v. Higginson (1980),147 the Tenth Circuit Court 
dismissed the appeal of Navajo Indians similarly confronted with the disappearance of 
sacred land under invasive waters impounded from yet another government-sponsored 
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dam. In opposition with Yoder, the court discussed the government’s compelling interest 
in operating and maintaining the dam before discussing the question whether this 
operation and maintenance burdens the Navajo religion. Plaintiffs sought to prevent the 
flooding and desecration of sacred sites in Rainbow Bridge National Monument by 
enjoining the continued filling of Lake Powell and by forcing the government to institute 
stricter controls on tourist activities in the area. The court concluded that the 
government’s interest in the dam was of the highest order and could not be served if Lake 
Powell was kept at a level low enough to protect plaintiffs’ religious sites. Examining the 
burden that the dam imposed on the Navajo religion, the court determined that plaintiffs 
had to show the coercive effect of government action on their religious practice, which 
they failed to do, because they were not denied access to the sacred areas. But while the 
court decided in favor of the government, it also subjected federal land management 
policies to free exercise clause scrutiny.  
In Wilson v. Block (1983),148 the District of Columbia Circuit Court rejected Hopi 
challenges to the expansion of a ski resort in the San Francisco Peaks within the 
Coconino National Forest. While the plaintiffs established the indispensability of the San 
Francisco Peaks as a whole, they failed to establish “the indispensability of that small 
portion of the Peaks encompassed by the Snow Bowl permit area” or the site of the 
proposed expansion.149 The court required that the particular land threatened would be 
“indispensable to some religious practice,” and that “plaintiffs seeking to restrict 
government land use in the name of religious freedom must, at a minimum, demonstrate 
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that the government’s proposed land use would impair a religious practice that could not 
be performed at any other site.”150 
While plaintiffs might have believed that the sacred quality of the Peaks was 
impaired by the ski resort development, they had not shown a cognizable burden on 
religious practice. Wilson thus focused free exercise inquiry on the link between a 
particular geographic area and a particular religious practice that could not be performed 
elsewhere. Though land development might erode religious beliefs, the free exercise 
clause was not implicated unless the mode of worship was irreparably injured as well.  
The Lyng lower courts followed this logic, and based on the evidence and 
testimony in trial, both the District Court and the Ninth Circuit Court151 decided that the 
High Country was indispensable to the local Indians’ religious practice and that the 
government’s interest in developing the area was not compelling enough to justify the 
burden it would impose on the Indian religious practice. As we have seen, the Supreme 
Court reversed this decision. In the following chapter I read the trial evidence and 
testimony in order to understand the local practice as the practitioners themselves present 
it.  
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CHAPTER TWO: RELIGION 
 
Introduction 
 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, according to the Sherbert test, in the case of 
incidental burdens on religious practice, the court first needs to determine whether the 
practice of which plaintiffs seek protection is based on a sincerely-held belief, and 
whether the government’s action poses a substantial burden on plaintiffs’ ability to 
exercise this religious belief. If these two elements are established, then the government 
must show that it is acting in furtherance of a compelling government interest and using 
the least restrictive means to pursue it. In the present chapter I offer a reading of the 
testimony and evidence presented in the Lyng trial. I organize this reading around the first 
two elements of the Sherbert test: “sincerely-held belief” and “substantial burden.” After 
establishing these two elements, I show that they are not enough to grant the sought 
protection in this case because the Sherbert test is suitable for the protection of an 
individual exercise of religion and does not allow for the establishment of a close tie 
between religion and land. Specifically, understanding burden as prohibition or coercion 
does not fit with territorial religion and therefore basing a decision on such an 
understanding of burden does not require scrutinizing the government’s interest in the 
development plan. To show this I follow the descriptions of the High Country as sacred 
land as they appear in the testimony and in the Theodoratus Report.    
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The Theodoratus Report is composed of ethnographic, historic, and archeological 
chapters. It was conducted by Theodoratus Cultural Research for the United States 
Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Six Rivers National Forest. Its purpose is:  
to identify cultural properties and evaluate their significance to Native Americans 
in the area of potential environmental effect of the Gasquet-Orleans Road, 
Chimney Rock Section; to describe the various impacts which may be expected 
from proposed changes in the area; to discuss mitigation alternatives if adverse 
effects are found to be involved; and to offer recommendations relative to the 
management of the cultural properties.152 
The geographic study area encompassed in this research is located in Del Notre, 
Humboldt, and Siskiyou Counties, California. The project area, situated within the study 
area, is located seventeen miles east of the town of Klamath and twenty-five miles north 
of the settlement of Weitchpec. Within the project area the proposed Chimney Rock 
section of the Forest Service road, known popularly as the G-O Road, would constitute 
the final link in a double lane paved road connecting the towns of Gasquet and Orleans. 
The existing Chimney Rock section is passable by two-wheel drive, high clearance 
vehicles from west to east only, and in both directions by four-wheel drive vehicles from 
June to October each year. The length of the proposed section of the G-O Road varies 
from 5.7 to 9 miles and covers from 41 to 163 acres, depending on which of nine 
alternative routes is chosen. The research for the report centered on the Blue Crick area of 
the Six Rivers National Forest and the adjoining Klamath National Forest, an area 
conceptually referred to by local Native Americans as the “High Country.”  
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 Journalist Sarah Neustadtl describes the High Country thus: 
In the high country, a few unusual but not very imposing landforms punctuate a 
medium-sized ridge. These are the legendary medicine rocks of the Yurok and 
Karuk Indians. Chimney Rock (5,727 feet) is a small protuberance of 
weatherworn red rock. Nearby there is the bare and rusty hilltop known as Turtle 
Rock. Doctor Rock (4,924 feet) is not far north of them, a small brushy dome 
from which a monument-sized boulder rises like a podium. In the protected crack 
of this boulder is a soot-blackened grotto littered with beer cans – a medicine 
cave. Only in the high country can medicine men and women pray for the rooted 
steadiness that countervails when the universe in knocked out of balance by 
human foolishness.153    
Doctor Rock “is the place where a few select Yurok women can go questing for visions, 
after which they return to the villages to train with older women as doctors.” At Chimney 
Rock, “men pray for wisdom and strength, and the medicine men pray for a power they 
can shoot down to the people on the river like a shaft of light.” The rituals included “the 
Jump Dance and the White Deerskin Dance of World Renewal – standing in a long line, 
they stamped their feet on the ground to balance the world.” The medicine men guided 
the Yurok to pray for law. “When the law was broken, the universe blistered with 
sickness and storm, insanity and murder,” and they still believe today that “the world is in 
turmoil because of individual wrongdoing. A lawbreaker is seized by a bad luck that 
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shakes him into humility, for when the law is broken, the balance needs to be found 
again.” Neustadtl concludes that “This Indian religion is no once-a-week genuflection; it 
is a voice of the universe, with the power to make itself heard.”154 
The Theodoratus Report describes a “bitter disagreement” between different 
Forest Service employees regarding the impact of the development plan. One of the 
employees is Arnold Pilling, who will later become an expert witness in the case.155 The 
Theodoratus Report was commissioned because of this disagreement and was meant to 
(1) locate and document all cultural properties within the project area and its immediate 
environs; (2) determine the religious significance of the High Country to contemporary 
Northwest California Native Americans; (3) investigate “the presence of an ongoing, 
shared, religious system in the study area,” and determine whether this contemporary 
system constitutes “traditional religious behavior or is idiosyncratic in nature”;156 (4) 
determine the number of Native Americans who were using the High Country for 
ritual/religious purposes and the nature and extent of such use at the time the study was 
conducted; (5) find out whether and how the G-O Road would affect traditional religious 
beliefs and/or contemporary ritual/religious use of the High Country; (6) investigate other 
types of culturally significant practices which would be adversely affected by the road.157 
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The report is divided into three major sections. Part One, the ethnographic 
component, presents cultural data on Northwest California Indian peoples, relates the 
data to specific sites within the G-O road project area, summarizes the findings, and 
presents a brief discussion of conclusions and recommendations. Part Two, the historical 
component, presents historical materials which supplement and give further context to the 
ethnographic research. Part Three, the archeological component, presents the research, 
conclusions, and recommendations resulting from the archeological survey of the G-O 
road project area. The final section briefly reviews the findings of the study as a whole 
and presents overall recommendations. In my dissertation I present the ethnographic and 
historical parts of the study but not the archeological part, because the first two are 
relevant to my explorations of Lyng as a case about religious freedom and Indigenous 
sovereignty, while the third is concerned with data that is not central to my own project. I 
do, however, present the conclusions of the Theodoratus Report, and those are derived 
from all three parts of the study.     
I present and analyze the historical part of the report in Chapter Four, where I use 
it to support an argument that the Lyng story must be read as one not only about religious 
freedom but also about Indigenous sovereignty. In the present chapter, I focus on the 
ethnographic part of the study, and I read it alongside trial testimonies about the practice 
of which the plaintiffs seek protection, that portray religion as fundamentally territorial 
(as opposed to the approach of the courts to religion, which favors a Tillichian definition 
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of religion as “ultimate concern,” as discussed above in Chapter One). I do so in order to 
examine the problematic described in the introduction – the practice in question is 
described at once as religious and as transcending the category of religion. I argue that if 
the practice is religious and burdened by the development plan then according to the 
Sherbert test the government should show a compelling interest in completing the road, 
as well as that the route chosen is the least harmful means to pursuing this interest. 
However, I believe that once we know more about the practice in question, we will 
understand why the compelling-interest test was not invoked by Justice O’Connor.       
The ethnographic chapter opens with an explanation of the measures taken in 
order to avoid problems that are common to relationships between ethnographers and 
Indians, who are often suspicious of people who attempt to study them.158 The field 
research was primarily conducted through open-ended interview questions that can be 
divided into four categories. The first set concerned the general Blue Creek area, the 
second set was meant to discover knowledge of specific sites in the area. A third set of 
questions related to the consultant’s involvement in, or concern for, the local Native 
                                                           
158 See, for example, Vine Deloria, Jr., “Anthropologists and Other Friends,” in Custer Died for Your Sins 
(New York: McMillan, 1969); Thomas Biolsi and Larry J. Zimmerman, Indians and Anthropologists: Vine 
Deloria and the Critique of Anthropology (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1997). 
The report talks about the need to establish credibility: “TRC identified and contacted various 
influential individuals and groups to discuss project concerns. Every effort was made to establish this study 
as important, definitive and likely to set a precedent. The credibility of the research was enhanced through 
the presence on the staff of locally hired and trained Native American researchers. These researchers 
greatly extended TRC’s range of contact and scope of knowledge, and helped to gain credibility from the 
community.” (Theodoratus Report, 7-8)  
However, the report also states that during the conduction of the study, local people were involved 
in political activities centering on political and economic issues, particularly the question of fishing rights 
on the Klamath River. The researchers took great care not to become involved in these issues, in order not 
to inject politics into the research. I am suspicious of this statement, both because it seems impossible for 
an ethnographer who is living among the community she studies to remain distanced from the issues that 
concern that community, and also because the study itself is conducted from the premises of the Northwest 
Indian Cemetery Protective Association (who ends up being the principal plaintiff in Lyng), which suggests 
that the Theodoratus Cultural Research staff is not neutral in its relation to the local Indian communities. 
On the other hand, I do appreciate the need to appear neutral and distanced from local concerns, especially 
because the study was commissioned by the Forest Service. 
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American culture, aiming to determine the extent and intensity of local Indian cultural 
involvement. The fourth and final set of questions involved the potential cultural impact 
of the proposed road. I identified similar categories of questions in the examination of 
witnesses in the Lyng trial, which helps in reading the report and testimonies together.  
Four thousand adult Indian people are believed to be living in the three counties 
of Del Notre, Humbolt, and Siskiyou. Out of them, TRC interviewed 166 people. There is 
no available list of people of Indian descent in the area and their affiliation with specific 
nations. The total number of Indians in the area is unknown.159 Let us turn now to a 
discussion of the religious practice of the Yurok, Karuk, and Tolowa Indians in the High 
Country, as it is presented in the Theodoratus Report and by the witnesses in the Lyng 
trial. 
 
Sincerely-Held Belief   
 
The Yurok, Karok and Tolowa Indian tribes live in the northwestern corner of 
California. These tribes share the use of a very special religious area. That area is 
located in the southern portion of the Siskiyou mountains, and referred to by the 
Indian people as the “High Country.” Doctor Rock, Chimney Rock, Pick 8 and 
Little Medicine Mountain are located within this religious area and are some of 
the more sacred places within the High Country. They have been used throughout 
the years by Indian people who go there to pray for special purposes or special 
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130), but see estimates of 4500 religious practitioners by witness Christopher Peters (Reporter’s 
Transcript., 113). 
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powers, or medicine. The High Country was placed there by the Creator as a place 
where Indian people could seek religious power.”160 
Thus begins Christopher Peters (Yurok/Karuk) his testimony in the Lyng trial. I return to 
this testimony below. The Theodoratus Report prefaces its description of Yurok, Karuk, 
and Tolowa religious practice with a similar characterization, stating that “Native 
American uses of the high country articulate closely with an unending search for spiritual 
power. This search permeates daily life and as such is interrelated with many other 
aspects of Native American culture.”161 Thus, the ethnographic part of the report 
describes aspects of the communities’ daily life, such as religious ceremonies, social 
institutions, and technological and material culture. This introductory remark is in line 
with the general observation made by scholars that: 
 […] Native American religions are territorial in conception, […] they exist in 
relation to, and dictate conduct within, a geographic place. It is a comprehensive 
way of life with extensive economic implications that simply cannot be practiced 
on certain days, inside designated buildings, or through purely intellectual 
exertions. […] Native Americans live a life shaped by belief, rather than viewing 
religion as a transcendent phenomenon to be experienced fully only in the next 
world.162    
The territorial aspect of Native religiosity is discussed extensively by the witnesses as 
well as in the Theodoratus Report, which notes that descriptions that single out specific 
cultural sites as isolated (e.g., Doctor Rock, Chimney Rock, Peak 8) are distortions of 
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Indian conceptualizations of these important cultural properties.163 The report adds a 
preliminary remark about the conception of religious sites that is at the center of the 
investigation (and at the center of AIRFA and other cultural preservation laws). How 
should we conceptualize a “site”? the report asks. While “in the conventional definitions 
the concept of ‘site’ is usually tied to a building, a rock formation, or an area of cultural 
debris,” 
local Indian residents have defined a site as more than a limited measurable 
locality. For instance, a religious site can be a condition – silence. In this report 
religious site descriptions are given in terms of the perceptions of local Native 
Americans and therefore may include psychological, visual, and other sensory 
aspects of a particular area. Another element of perceptual difference, the idea 
fundamental to local Native Americans, that sacred sites are used qualitatively 
rather than quantitatively, also defines site locations in a manner which is 
unconventional to many non-Indian Americans. In order to understand what a site 
means to Native American residents of this area, a mental shift must be made 
away from the purely physical aspect of a site to an extended definition which 
includes various qualitative, psychological and sensory aspects.164  
With all this in mind we can start looking into the content of the religious practice of 
which the Yurok, Karuk, and Tolowa Indians seek protection.   
The report describes a relationship between religious and social status. Both are 
described in terms of height, both in relation to rank and to sacredness of specific places: 
“the higher a house on the side of the hill, the higher the social rank of the owner. This 
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relationship of height to social rank can be seen as a secular reflection of the sacred world 
wherein the higher places in the mountains possessed greater sacred power.”165 The 
social life of Northwest Indians has been described as organized around individual rights, 
property, and prestige. The report brings an early account of this by a Yurok woman, 
Lucy Thompson, who in 1916 talked about the “Talth” or “High Priests” of the Yurok: 
“Among them were our leaders… These men and women in our language we call Talth, 
and were the High Priests, and great rulers who ruled our people. Therefore, we were one 
of the tribes that was never ruled by a single chief, but by our Talth, or High Priests… 
The Talth were the mediators between man and God…166 “High Men” are also referred to 
in 1973 by Harry Roberts, who has lived in close association with the Yurok for over 50 
years, and he connected between high men and high places: “Chimney Rock, Turtle 
(Frog) Rock, and Sawtooth Mountain are places where ‘high’ medicine was made, and it 
was in these places that many of the great men of the tribes received their final training 
and confirmation as High Men.”167   
Lucy Thompson also described “men doctors” who mediated with women 
doctors, served in family disputes, and organized the White Deerskin Dance biannually. 
The men doctors were wealthy, and they had secrets they had learned from relatives. 
According to Thompson, before beginning practice, the doctor went “back to the 
mountains to some distant and secluded place where there is a large rock or high peak, 
where he can look over the whole surrounding country all alone. There he prays to his 
God for health, strength and success.”168 Thompson described the training which sons of 
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aristocratic Yurok families undertook in order to validate their social position: it included 
abstaining from food and water, remaining in the secluded area for eight to twelve days, 
returning home and smoking a pipe. Then the supplicant was ready to become a doctor, 
use roots, herbs, and minerals for curing disease. Scholars have observed that validation 
of social position was done through performance of religious duties, including sweating, 
sexual abstinence, and sweathouse training to become “real men.”169  
The TRC field research showed a continuing importance of “high men” in 
contemporary local Native American communities. But while traditionally, prestige and 
leadership roles were gained through “wealth” (property or rights), today the quest for 
such wealth is interpreted as an integral part of “a more basic and deeply meaningful 
search for the sacred, the sanctified, and the spiritual aspects of life.”170 
 Having explored the relationship between social life and religious status, the 
report turns to discuss specific religious beliefs and practices, declaring this discussion to 
be the most important aspect of the study. As indicated in the introduction to this 
dissertation, the researchers are aware of the problematic nature of classifying the beliefs 
and practices they have observed as “religious.” First of all, all aspects of Native lives are 
interconnected and cannot be separated into religious and secular ones. Secondly, the 
category of religion is a Western category, and it is not adequate to analyzing Indigenous 
practices. A statement made by a Hupa woman testifying in 1954 before a committee of 
the United States Senate gives partial insight into the Indian concepts: 
[…] To most people, hunting and fishing is a sport. To the American Indian it is a 
part of a religious custom. The American Indians are a very pious – I do not like 
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the insinuations of ‘pious’ – but they are a very religious people. We did not 
believe in a church just one day; we believed in a church every day of the week 
and in every act that we did. And we have continued with that belief. Therefore, 
even the taking of food was a religious sacrament in a way, particularly in regard 
to the hunting of the deer. We had a set custom that we followed in the conserving 
of it and the way we used the meat and our sharing it with others and so forth.171  
In trial, witness Christopher Peters expresses a similar sentiment: “It is difficult to talk 
about traditional types of things in translating it into the English language. I think the 
court will find […] converting Indian concepts into European language loses something 
in the translation.”172 In order to avoid distortion of Indian concepts by forcing them into 
Western categories, the authors of the Theodoratus Report focus on delineating events 
and features of local Indian life as they relate to the High Country. In many cases, they 
discover that seemingly unrelated elements are, in fact, closely interrelated. They declare 
an awareness of such interrelationship to be important to the examination of the religious 
life of the peoples concerned, and of the relationships of religious beliefs and practices to 
certain locations within the project area.173  
The report than turns to discussing the major ceremonial events and of the 
philosophical precepts upon which they are based. Many of these events stress the quest 
of rejuvenation of the world, the community, and the individual. Special attention is 
given to the training of “medicine people,” as we can see below. Northwest California 
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Indian religious practice is focused on world renewal, aiming to stabilize and preserve the 
earth from catastrophe and mankind from disease.174 In trial, Peters explains that “world 
renewal” has both physical and spiritual aspects: 
[…] they are world renewal ceremonies, and most of the time when people think 
of world renewal, the general understanding, the image or the concept is making 
the physical world over again. The ceremonies do do that deed, but also they 
make a spiritual world over again, a spiritual bond that holds tribal people 
together.175  
The religious practitioners believe that world renewal ceremonies were initiated by pre-
human spirits who inhabited the world and brought all living things and culture to 
humankind. The Karuk call these spirits ixkareya and see them as guides for human 
behavior; the Yurok call them woge and believe that they are afraid of contamination by 
mortals.176 Ceremonies of world renewal include reciting of origin myths such as the 
following: 
The Yurok myths … belong to a time period when the earth was inhabited by a 
race of beings called woge … small humanoid beings who reluctantly yielded the 
earth to mankind. There is an eerie sense of nostalgic sadness and loss whenever 
the woge are mentioned … the woge withdrew into the mountains or across the 
sea or turned into landmarks, birds, or animals in order to escape close contact 
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with newly created man. Yet the woge are still present in some sense, and they are 
depicted as being glad to be called upon (in ritual formulas and the like).177      
The medicine people (whom I describe at length below) who go to the High Country to 
communicate with the spirits recite set narratives at specific places in a fixed order. A 
complicated process of purification is required before attending the High Country – 
abstaining from water, sex, and profane activity, fasting, isolation in the sweathouse, and 
using tobacco and a specific medicine made at a specific site in the High Country.178 
Medicine women must not be menstruating at the time of the ceremony, and neither can 
any other of the female participants (e.g., the mother of a sick child for whom the 
ceremony is being conducted). About twenty girls and boys participate in the Brush 
dance, the girls prohibited from dancing once they get married or have a child.179 
Elements of the traditional ceremonies (hereditary rights, importance in loaning of 
regalia, reciprocal assistance across tribal lines, responsibility to feed visitors, and 
payment to mourners) continue to be an integral part of Northwest Indian present-day 
ceremonies.180  
 Ceremonial dances are performed at the sites where the pre-human figures are 
said to have first brought certain gifts to man. The dances are considered to be the 
reaffirmation of the gifts and to have the power to remove evil from the world and to 
restore balance with the earth. While ethnographers have argued in the past that the 
Yurok dance regalia is merely a marker of status and wealth, the Yurok interviewed in 
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the Theodoratus Report disagree, seeing the regalia as symbolic and sacred. According to 
those consultants, the regalia is regarded as living spirits and sacred objects. They say 
that the ethnographers’ focus on material wealth has led to misinterpretation of their 
culture. One of the consultants said that “Dances are our religion,” while another 
specified that “when ceremonies are held, the people pray about everything, for the 
salmon to come, for the acorns to grow, for the presence of all kinds of game, and for 
children to grow up to be good.”181  
 The Theodoratus Report turns to discuss “people with power,” i.e. doctors and 
medicine men. The category of doctors includes people who are capable of curing ill 
patients. The other category includes those who have acquired “medicine” for any 
purpose other than curing illness. Today such individuals are often called “doctors” too. 
Both doctors and medicine people are trained in the High Country, and only those who 
train in the mountains are said to achieve great power. The word “doctor” is a locally 
accepted term for any of the esoteric practitioners who have had High Country training. 
The Theodoratus Report uses the term “doctor” to refer to a spiritual specialist who 
achieves “power” through trance from an order other than the “natural” world.182 For the 
Yurok these doctors were women. The report uses the term “medicine man” to refer to 
male formalists or priests who are ceremonial practitioners. The report (and the witnesses 
in trial) discuss another category – of people who sought particular expressions of power, 
such as that for “good,” “long life” or “strong.” The people in the latter category are 
referred to as “medicine makers” in the Theodoratus Report, which defines medicine 
making thus: 
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[a] homogenous constellation of physical, mental, and vocal actions, and 
experiential events, undertaken or sought in a religious manner and frame of 
mind, the purpose of which is to maximize the practitioner’s potential […] to act 
in a desired direction, or to live in a desired way. It invariably involves … the 
practitioner’s experiencing contact with supernatural forces, either generalized or 
specific. While medicine making may incorporate given ascetic acts, and 
prescribed rituals, prayers, or ordeals, it is, in the purest sense, an inwardly 
experienced moment of intense awareness and, in the more lofty (or “High”) 
medicines, of transcendent understanding. A man or woman might, then, carry out 
all of the prescribed actions, and yet not “make medicine”; that is, not experience 
the requisite inner state.183 
The report discusses a “universal energy” (which it refers to as “power,” “spirit,” and 
“fire” interchangeably, and explains that it is part of the “creator”). Such power can be 
obtained in several ways. Every Yurok child is born with it, and s/he also has a “soul,” 
which is a more individuated spiritual element, as well as a body and a mind-element. 
While some people get an extra portion of this “power” at birth, others acquire it after 
birth. The Yurok believe that the “soul” enters the body ten days after birth, at which 
point the child is recognized as a human being. At this point a doctor can “shoot” the 
child with power, giving the child an added increment of spirit and, hence, added 
potential for power. A person may also inherit potential power: the ability to train for 
doctoring. The report refers to this potential power as “calling.”184  
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Although doctors, usually women, often come from families of doctors, each 
individual must seek the realization of this power on her own. While doctoring is a path 
to wealth, the training it requires is too strict for many people. One TCR Yurok 
consultant said: 
I had to fight against being a doctor. I drank water so I couldn’t be a doctor. I had 
foresight to see future events. I foresaw an automobile accident. It was terrible. I 
woke up in the night singing doctor songs. That’s why I drank water, to keep from 
being a doctor.185     
Those who seek to be curing doctors must first experience a “vision” in a trance or dream 
state. A person or an animal appears and guides the novice, who is undergoing a “pain” – 
an animate object introduced into the novice’s body during the vision. This vision is 
followed by training in which the novice learns to control the pain in order to use it while 
curing patients. The doctor usually possesses pairs of “pains” which are used to draw 
illness out of the bodies of others. The concept of calling is invoked again: no one 
volunteers or is appointed to become a doctor; “One is called.” 
The training for power acquisition includes performing a Kick Dance in a 
sweathouse for ten days under the guidance of an older doctor. During the dance, the 
trainee is considered ill; she learns to control her “pain,” and when she can do so, she is 
considered to be cured. This is called “cooking the pains” to make them amenable to her 
control. In the summer following this dance, the novice goes to the mountains to dance 
overnight, usually accompanied by another doctor or assistant who watches over her. 
Another Kick Dance follows her return from the mountains, and then she is ready to enter 
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the profession of a doctor. Specific accounts of doctors who trained in the High Country 
appear in the report186 and in Bowers and Carpenter.187 The mountains are the focal 
source of curative powers because this is where the woge-spirits went when humans came 
to the earth, according to the myth described above, and in death, the doctors’ souls 
follow the path of the woge-spirits to the mountains.  
In the past, disease was thought to be caused in several interrelated ways, 
including sin or breach of taboo. Modern disease theory, while accepted, has not changed 
basic curing patterns. The doctor diagnoses the precise cause of an illness before 
beginning treatment. The patient is placed by a living-room fire with assembled family 
and friends gathered to sing and watch the cure. The doctor smokes tobacco in her pipe 
and dances until reaching a state where she can divine the cause of the illness. Breaking 
of a taboo has to be publicly confessed. (in the consultants’ stories, it sounds like 
recurring deaths in the family is considered a disease). After public confession of 
breaches of taboos (those pertaining to death or sex, usually), the doctor would affect the 
cure. She removed the “pain” from the affected part of the patient’s body with her mouth. 
The pain would then enter the doctor’s body, and she would vomit it into her hand or into 
a basket, exhibit it to the people, and then dance until it disappeared.188  
 A variety of personal non-curing medicines might be sought in order to influence 
a number of aspects of daily life. The Report mentions medicine for alleviating personal 
bereavement, women’s menstrual mountain medicine, medicine for success in stick 
games, singing, dancing, hunting, gambling, love, good life, long life, philosophy, and 
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spiritual enlightenment.189 One might seek supernatural help through proper ritual 
behavior at certain spots that have specific types of power. Again, fasting and abstinence 
from sex and water were part of this search. The ritual of gathering sweathouse wood in 
the hills is one example. All Indians in the study area observe this practice, and the higher 
the location, the more desirable the wood. The gathering of sweathouse wood is regarded 
as a religious act which is meant to bring the gatherer good fortune or money. It was 
believed that sweathouse wood gathered from the high country gave greater power to the 
sweating for which it was used.190  
As noted above, medicine makers (those who use the High County to gather non-
curing medicine) are usually men. Their training is described in the report and by some of 
the witnesses. The process is described as difficult and lonely. The training is a period 
when pollution is particularly contagious, and therefore you must cook for yourself and 
eat alone, to avoid association with menstruating women or with people who engage in 
sexual relations. You could have a post-menopausal woman cook for you, because she 
would be considered to have lost interest in sex and is, in fact, sociologically classified as 
a male. A trip to the High Country must be preceded by a ten-day purification period of 
fasting and praying, confessing sins and ridding oneself of bad feelings. It is traditionally 
done in the sweathouse, under the instruction of a trainer. The purification procedure is 
aimed to allow the individual sufficient power to enter the High Country. During the 
purification period, the individual waits for acknowledgement of the spirits that his quest 
is sincere and sanctified. The acknowledgement can come in the form of a dream, a sign, 
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or a vision. The training itself, in the High Country, is a long-term endeavor involving a 
great deal of preparation, both on the part of the initiate and of the trainer.  
The preparation for training involves what is seen as a “community support 
system.” Because the medicine maker is considered to achieve knowledge or a skill 
which is of benefit to the community, and because any achievement of medicine is 
viewed by the remainder of the community as adding to the total store of medicine/power 
within that community, communal interest is very important. While only very few people 
ever make medicine on Chimney Rock for instance, the entire community has a vested 
interest in the success of those few individuals, whether they be doctors making medicine 
at Doctor Rock or Chimney Rock, or men making “high medicine.” In either case, the 
community will benefit, and thus is supportive of the person seeking power when his or 
her quest is not secret. 
One enters the High Country to make medicine walking or running. The trainer 
sometimes follows the medicine-maker at a distance. The trainer’s presence in the 
individual’s first medicine trip is important because the trainer might have to save the 
student from gaining the wrong power, from making mistakes, from dying or having a 
psychological crisis. The trainer might also “shoot” his power into the student while the 
student is making medicine. Vehicles may not be used. Often the trip itself is full of 
difficulties and tests the individual’s endurance. The person is tested by dangers along the 
trail, such as bears or tempting food. It is also important that the seeker take the 
appropriate trail, which depends upon the type of medicine sought as well as the seeker’s 
abilities. It is also important that the seeker not look into the eyes of passersby along the 
trail, in order to maintain his purity, to protect innocent people from the medicine, and to 
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maintain secrecy. Such contact might put the innocent passerby in grave danger, and it 
also interferes with the person seeking power. On the way out of the prayer seat or 
medicine area, in order to maintain his concentration, the medicine maker must avoid 
conversations or eye contact with anyone along the trail, as those would spoil the effort 
by bringing the person too quickly into a world in which he does not yet care to be. 
Generally, privacy is emphasized in the High Country. One means of insuring this is 
through building rock piles. The rocks psychically warn the medicine-maker if anyone is 
coming, since if someone who is not pure is met inadvertently, the entire effort is spoiled. 
When in the high country the medicine-maker uses a number of techniques to induce 
trance states. One of these is the use of “Rhythm Sticks” made of wood and beaten in 
constant rhythm to get the person into the mental framework which allows him to be 
receptive to the spirit from whom he is seeking inspiration.191 
The report dedicates a short chapter to contemporary religions in the area. It 
stresses that even those Indians who adhere to recently-introduced religions, such as 
Christianity, have simultaneously maintained traditional Native American religious 
beliefs. Indian participation in traditional practices has continued despite vast social 
changes, even if not regularly. According to one TCR consultant, religious traditions are 
still alive and religious power is maintained through the way people live and think. “One 
of our religious beliefs is that we don’t expose our sacred practices. It is a personal 
thing.”192 Another consultant stated that she believed that White people have cut off 
religion at one point but that Native American beliefs go beyond that point. “Now the 
Indians are reviving the old ways to the point that they have the power to enable them to 
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fly, to send their souls elsewhere beyond their bodies and many other things too.”193 
Many other consultants referred to the concept of soul travel as an enduring feature of the 
belief system.  
People seeking power continue to go to the High Country to achieve personal 
medicine and curing medicine. Older men go there, sometimes alone and sometimes in 
pairs, “to recharge their batteries.”194 Some Karuk members who use the Blue Creek area 
were originally trained somewhere else, but their sites were desecrated so they have 
switched to this new area.195 There are present-day practitioners who could be classified 
as “inactive users” since they do not now walk to the area because of age or health 
reasons. Several consultants spoke of the ability (both past and present-day) to turn to the 
High Country from a distance and derive a regeneration of power. In trial, witness Chris 
Peters estimates that about forty people physically or actively use the area at the time, 
qualifying this estimation with a remark that there is a training aspect involved (which 
suggests that more people are learning to actively use the area). But he continues: 
 The other response is a multiple use, and that’s in terms of understanding what 
Indian religions are. You need to understand a process of mental telepathy, if you 
will – it is an awkward translation, again, a spiritual visitation that is through the 
mind and through the power you get from there, so people can return to the area 
spiritually and engage in a religious expression through a spiritual movement, not 
requiring a physical presence in that area.196 
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At the time of the Lyng trial, several Indian doctors in the area practiced various forms of 
curing. Training of doctors was not openly discussed since this is a personal seeking of 
medicine, and part of the belief system regarding doctoring requires that Indians avoid 
indiscriminate discussions about this sacred training.197 However, guarded references 
made by consultants regarding the continued training of novice doctors (reportedly six 
during fall 1978) gives strong evidence that this religion is a viable one in Northwest 
California, the report concludes.198 In a letter to Judge Weigel, attorney Marylin Miles 
explains that the number of people directly using the High Country is unknown – and 
probably very small – thus:  
[…] only a limited number of people are called or chosen by the Creator or Spirits 
to be such persons. Thus, only certain people can go to the Doctor Rock area on 
behalf of the rest of the community, and only then for a proper purpose and at a 
proper time. But this is not unlike other religions; not all members of a particular 
faith are permitted on the alter, for the alter is reserved for the priest or spiritual 
leader.199 
Miles explains that the few people who are allowed in the High Country use the powers 
that they get there in ceremonies that benefit the entire community, adding a photo to 
illustrate her point.  
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 Miles describes the photo as follows:  
Enclosed for the Court’s assistance is a photograph from a recent ceremony in 
Weitchpec. The medicine woman in the center of the photograph was required to 
go to the sacred high country for guidance and power to pray for the Indian child 
held by her mother and for others in the community, and all those in attendance 
are dependent upon the powers and Spirits of the area, and thereby “use” the 
sacred region.200  
I find this use of the photo interesting and illustrative of another point. While the Indian 
religious practitioners consistently argue that secrecy with regard to their ceremonies is 
required, they realize that seeking protection of their free exercise right from the court 
requires them to reveal their secrets, thus violating the sacred nature of the ceremonies 
and the area, at least partly. This is another aspect of the absurdity of arguing an Indian 
religious freedom case in U.S. courts, discussed in the introduction to this dissertation.  
 Miles concludes her letter to the Judge Weigel: 
This is the best, and perhaps the only answer Indian plaintiffs can give the Court. 
The number of persons who physically go to the high country is not known, 
although Indian plaintiffs recognize that the numbers may not be large. As 
explained above, however, it is wrong to measure the religious values of this 
sacred area and the associated practices in terms of the number who set foot 
there.201    
When asked about their religion the Indian plaintiff-witnesses describe a religious system 
that begins with community and its relation to the natural world, rather than with the 
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individual and her relationship with God. Jimmie James tells the court that “[t]he most 
important thing was to have an understanding of nature. Love your people, and always 
remember to follow out the command of the Great Spirit, the Great Creator, and this up-
to-date, I have tried to be obedient to those commands.”202 The most important religious 
virtue is an understanding of nature, because nature, or specific natural settings, is 
considered to be sacred. Sacred places are those in which communication with the 
Creator, or the Great Spirit, can be conducted. As Peters explains, “[t]he High Country – 
Doctor Rock, Chimney Rock – is essential to our religious beliefs, and serves as the very 
core of our cultural identity.”203 Therefore, “[t]his area is our church: cannot be moved or 
disturbed in any way.”204  
 The witnesses often compare the High Country to a church, and I think it is 
because they assume (probably justifiably) that it would be easier for the court to 
understand the importance or centrality of the area to their religion through this analogy: 
the High Country is to Yurok and Karuk religion what a church is to a Christian 
congregation. But this analogy is misleading, because, as Marc DeGirolami points out, a 
church could easily be moved while the High Country cannot. And so, while moving a 
church structure to the other side of a street in order to accommodate a development plan 
is not unheard of, the picks in the Six Rivers National Forest cannot be moved; moreover, 
one cannot simply declare another part of the forest a new place of worship (thus 
allowing for the Chimney Rock area to be developed). The witnesses explain that the 
specific site is central to their religious practice because it was given to them by the 
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Creator. “This is where we meet with the Great Spirit, that area, and that’s why we all get 
a call to go there.”205 In addition, the sacredness of this area has been intensified 
following the development and consequent desecration of many other sacred mountains 
by White settlers.206 This last point will be elaborated in Chapter Four.   
 Questions about the specific ways in which the area is being used by religious 
communities and individuals are being addressed through specific stories. Beyond Peters’ 
general explanation that the area has “been used throughout the years by Indian people 
who go there to pray for special purposes or special powers, or medicine,”207 and that 
“the High Country is used by Indian people who have dedicated years for special training 
and preparation,”208 James tells about his grandmother, who “lived to be about 110 years 
old, […] and has fought the spirits of the devil for our people, she’s well known.” 
And then she goes back to Elk Valley and stays there quite a number of days to 
give thanks, and you might say give praise to the Creator. Then, from there, she is 
all going to different areas wherever she is called, wherever she is called, she 
goes, regardless of what kind of weather. She charges nothing, and whatever they 
give her, she smiled.209  
James has also used the area himself:  
I had a beautiful experience there. I went up there because I felt that my family 
had a friction against me, and I went up there and I come out of there with a 
pleased answer, and it was not long when one of my boys was in a car wreck in 
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the canyon, 300 feet down the mountain, in the car. There was nothing left to it. 
And his head was split, his shoulder was busted up, two fractures in his back, a 
chunk of his arm was taken off, and when the doctor saw him, he said he would 
live only three days. I finally took him to another doctor. He said, that is all, he 
would live three days. But we talked with the Great Spirit about it, and that has 
been in ’68, and he is still alive. I wish I brought him with me today. That area 
means a lot to me.210 
When asked why the area is important to his communication with the Spirit, Mr. James 
says: “It was given to us. this is where we meet with the Great Spirit, that area, and that’s 
why we all get a call to go there.”211 
Chapter Two of the Theodoratus Report, “Ethnogeography,” is dedicated to 
specific sites in the project area. The chapter begins with a description of the possible site 
attributes. A site can possess, according to the report: (1) a visual, aesthetic perspective; 
(2) a set of physical conditions; (3) a set of sensory conditions; (4) a specific human 
construction; (5) or a combination of all of these. The medicine that is found in a specific 
locale is only a part (even if a central part) of what makes it into “a site.” Standing on a 
“site” is not the total experience for those who seek the medicine. Rather, the quality of 
silence, the aesthetic perspective, and the physical attributes, are an extension of the 
sacredness of that particular site. For example, while Doctor Rock is an important source 
of medicine in the project area, several locations near or on the mountain are very salient 
aspects of the sacred site, since all these locations are identified with the mountain. The 
report notes that sites in the project area increase in sacredness as one travels from lower 
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to higher elevations above the Klamath River (this observation is in line with the 
discussion above of the connection between height and social status as a secular 
reflection of the sacred nature of high locales). Nevertheless, lower sites are still crucial 
to the overall use of the area, since training doctors must progress through a sequential 
regimen that encompasses a spiritual journey toward power paralleled by the physical 
journey to the High Country.    
 Reading the trial transcript, it is interesting to note the different ways different 
witnesses describe the High Country. James says he is familiar with the area “because 
[his] grandmother was a Pomo Indian Doctor, and she went through very much before 
she could get the power from the Great Creator.”  
Here is Doctor Rock, and this is where they start out their dancing, and Elk Valley 
is where they come first to meditate, to clean themselves, clean their hearts, so 
that they can thank the Great Spirit, the Great Spirit will be pleased before they 
can even talk to him. […] Then they go down to the Doctor Rock and do their 
dancing, and they don’t get involved with other voices but the Great Spirit, and 
from there, they are told what to do before they begin or are granted the power.212     
Peters provides two descriptions of the area – a physical one and a spiritual one: 
First, let me describe it physically. The area has had many intrusions already. 
There has been a jeep road, there has been trails put there by the U.S. Forest 
Service. That intrusion has been limited when compared to the proposed 
harvesting plan and G-O road development. The area still maintains significant 
acres of quality roadless, pristine environment. Significant strands of old growth 
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still exist there. There is animal life there that is not found in other places, and in 
an abundant form. It is a wilderness area as closely defined in terms of wilderness 
areas set aside in other areas throughout the country. It’s as close to a natural 
setting as exists in today’s society.213  
The witness also provided a spiritual description of the area: 
The area, in terms of my conversations with older generations, the area has 
spiritual qualities. It is a sacred area. The area is a place where people can engage 
in an emotional interaction with a spiritual world. A translation to that in the 
English language may be likened to a prayer, but a lot more significant than a 
prayer. It is said that that area is not even a part of this world that we live in here. 
That that place up there, the High Country, belongs to the Spirit and it exists in 
another world apart from us.214 
Since the environment as a whole has religious significance, local Indians believe that 
any changes to the area would destroy the cleanliness and purity that are attached to the 
High Country. Therefore, the government’s argument according to which other sites in 
the area – which are supposedly not affected by the development plan – are just as sacred 
as those in Blue Crick, is irrelevant. The government attorney, Mr, Hamblin, says in his 
opening statement in the trial: 
Your honor has indicated earlier and had asked me the question about overriding 
public interest. If this was a sacred area, and to that extent we will show that while 
this area up in the Chimney Rock—Doctor Rock and Pick 8, that they are held by 
at least the plaintiffs in this case and other local Yurok Indians, Tolowa and 
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Karok, to have a special spiritual significance to them, we will show that the same 
tribe – when I use the word “tribe,” the same three Tolowa, Yurok and Karok, 
hold other areas to be equally spiritual. This is not the one and only place. […] 
there are some twenty-five other areas throughout the entire Six Rivers National 
Forest held by other local Indians to equally be of spiritual significance in those 
areas […]215  
This argument represents a misunderstanding of the relationship between the local 
Indians and the High Country. There is a physical-psychological interaction that takes 
place between those who go to get medicine and the sacred place which furnishes this 
medicine. If one feature of this interaction is disturbed, the flow of power is blocked. The 
notion of desecration of the sacred High Country is highlighted by the following analogy: 
“Empty beer cans and used condoms are about as appropriate on Doctor Rock as they 
would be on the altar of a cathedral; traditional Indian religion places great emphasis on 
abstinence from physical pleasures while seeking spiritual energy.”216 TRC consultants 
are concerned that with increased access to the High Country, there is increased 
possibility that the area will by improperly used. This concern for the future is reflected 
in a statement by a TRC Yurok consultant who expressed concern that her children or 
grandchildren might be called to be doctors and that there might not be a place for them 
to go when they are ready to receive power. In the words of a Karuk consultant: 
These areas need to be there when a new Indian person gets the “calling” to 
become a medicine person. Suppose the “calling” is received and the person 
arrives to find an army of tourists to take pictures and make tape recordings of a 
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real live medicine person in the process of training. Also the trees are gone, the 
whole area logged off. The solitude and atmosphere for meditation is totally lost. 
How will that person train properly? … The culture has been torn apart by 
progress and now people are asking for the pieces to be torn in smaller places.217      
 
Substantial Burden 
 
The Theodoratus Report dedicates a short chapter to “contemporary attitudes toward non-
Indian incursions.”218 It discusses the impact of the G-O Road on the High Country and 
the rituals that are conducted there by the Yurok, Karuk and Tolowa. This discussion, 
following the consultants’ answers to interview questions about the impact of the road, is 
presented within a more general context of Indian-White contact, which suggests that the 
problem is larger than the immediate impact of the construction of the road on the ability 
to perform specific rituals in specific locales. I therefore propose, in Part Two of this 
dissertation, to think about the Lyng case as one that is (also) about Indigenous 
sovereignty, and I refer there to the longer history of Indian-White relationships in the 
area and in the U.S. more generally at length.  
 According to the Theodoratus report, the Indian consultants’ view of the impact 
of the road on their religious practice could be referred to as an “environmental 
viewpoint.” This means that they view the environment as a whole: 
[…] the mountains, rivers, wildlife, and ocean are viewed as a whole in which 
each part is related to each other part. Thus, a discussion of the religious use of 
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the high country around Doctor Rock leads to consideration of the effect that a 
road there might have on the visual and aural properties of the area, then to the 
effects of logging on the environment, especially natural plant growth, then to the 
effects on the streams, silting of the river and finally to salmon fishing.219        
This approach to the environment teaches us something about religion as well. “The 
religious aspect is not a thing apart, it is part of the whole […]”220  The report explains 
that this wholistic view of the environment is itself a part of “traditional Indian 
religion/culture,” and that even though this worldview coincides with the view of 
contemporary environmentalists it originated from a different root.221 Some consultants 
are concerned with the overuse of resources that would destruct the forest. They say that 
their people had been using the resources that they need to live (not only for religious 
needs) for centuries and had taken measures to conserve those resources. Therefore, 
many consultants, while not objecting to logging altogether, believe that much more care 
for the environment should be taken during and after the logging activities, that long-term 
consequences – beyond immediate economic benefits – should be taken into account, and 
that logging should always be done in the least expensive manner, regardless of the 
consequences for the land. However, the consultants knew many places along the 
Klamath River where there were slides into the rivers, severely eroded hillsides, and the 
silted-up mouths of creeks, all of which were results of poor logging, according to 
consultants.222   
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 Consultants have felt that the Forest Service had declared a systematic war on 
sacred sites. In their description of the impact of the development plan they explain that 
they believe that the road would lead to logging regardless of the specific route chosen, 
and that because of the religious characteristics of the area it must be treated as a whole 
rather than as consisting of distinguished individual sites: 
Many consultants stated that because of the religious characteristics of this area, 
nothing should be removed. It is believed that living things, especially trees and 
other plants, should not be removed from the high country unless it is done 
following the specified procedures of Indian culture. To do so is considered 
irreligious. It is also believed, and reinforced by tradition, that “improper” 
removal is likely to bring extremely bad luck or disease to the offender (whether 
he/she be a believer or a non-believer).223  
I would like to highlight two important points in this passage: one is that the logging 
itself is considered to be a burden on the local Indians’ religious belief and practice, 
because the trees themselves are considered living beings whose removal would be 
irreligious. The other is that the cause of such irreligious behavior would be “extremely 
bad luck.” This understanding of “substantial burden” – but also of “sincerely held 
belief” seems to be different than the ones we saw in the precedent, and it does not seem 
compatible with O’Connor’s understanding of burden as prohibition. Because the logging 
itself is considered irreligious, there is no distinction between the government action and 
its consequences. The practitioners in this case cannot – as they could in Yoder or in 
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Sherbert – disobey and avoid “extremely bad luck” in the cost of a fine, imprisonment, or 
loss of unemployment benefits. It is interesting to note – and we see this in the testimony 
in trial as well – that for the practitioners there is no distinction between the government 
action and the burden, or between the burden and the results. Logging leads directly to 
bad luck. In other descriptions we can read a story that seems more in line with the 
prohibition interpretation: the construction of the road would result in heavier traffic, 
which would have an adverse effect on the audiovisual conditions of the area (which, as 
we have seen at the beginning of this chapter, are themselves considered to be a “sacred 
site”), which in turn means that the religious ceremonies that take place in the area would 
not be effective, which would lead to more adverse effects. When this is the story, one 
might say that the government plan does not prohibit the Indians from using the High 
Country for their rituals (even though there is some adverse impact on the rituals). But 
the interpretation according to which logging itself is desecration of the sacred area does 
not lend itself to the interpretation of burden as prohibition or coercion.  
 When the witnesses in trial are asked whether (and why) the High Country should 
remain undeveloped, they give several different answers. Witness James explains: “Let 
me put it this way: if we took a bulldozer and run it through the White man’s church, it is 
like if they went in there and felled the trees, it would be like pulling the lumber and 
everything off of the walls, and then destroy their bible – it is the same as that.”224 Peters 
adds that the pristine nature of the area is its main religious characteristic, and this would 
be destroyed with development.225 In reference to the difference between the existing 
jeep road and the new proposed section of the road, he explains: 
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The road is a dirt road, and it connects, it goes through the area. The use of the 
area disturbs the quiet and the solitude of the area, though the road itself, as 
discussed earlier in previous hearings, may not have a direct adverse effect. The 
use of the road has a significant and destructive impact on the ability to engage or 
maintain engagement with the spiritual world. […] The new road would provide 
significantly greater numbers of people using the area. It is also the basis of 
whether further development will occur. […] You know, in Indian customs 
generally, a decision of this magnitude is not only made for the current generation 
but is made for six or seven generations to come. The management plan may 
produce some immediate jobs and stimulate some economics today, but it will 
have a destructing effect on generations to come, […] cultures are not dying, they 
are coming back stronger.”226  
Peters’ story is much more in line with O’Connor’s interpretation; according to this story 
the road in and of itself does not burden the religious practice. It is the use of the road that 
would disrupt communication with the spiritual world. When asked directly how the 
6.02-mile proposed section of the road would burden the religious practice he has just 
described, Peters explains: 
The whole area, the High Country, as I’ve indicated, the belief was that it’s there 
for Indian people to prepare themselves and then go up into and communicate 
with a spiritual world. What we’re talking about here is what I refer to as spiritual 
trespass, that is when people on the far extreme of manifest destiny can say they 
can manage something better than the Creator, and this is the Creator’s land, and 
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to build a road to intrude directly through that spiritual land is spiritual trespass, 
and that is what the Forest Service has perpetrated.227     
This is an unexpected response to the question about burden, which demonstrates how 
different the witness’s view of the conflict is than that of the court. For the witness, the 
construction of the road is unacceptable because it interferes with the Creator’s plan for 
the area and its use. The judge does not accept such an answer, and even though he is 
generally very sympathetic to the witness, here he tells him that his answer has not been 
responsive. The witness, who probably knows well that this is not an answer that the 
court can accept, immediately agrees and returns to the question of burden:  
The road development in the area, once it is completed, would bring with it a lot 
of damage and more destruction. The road itself represents something down here 
in this world, asphalt for one, signs for another, and that intrusion in the area is 
significant. The dirt road intrusion has not been as significant as to what it would 
bring with it in terms of the new road, which is the asphalt.228  
Again, the judge does not understand what the problem is with asphalt.  The witness 
illustrates this point with a story: “Last night a woman […] prayed for us, and to do that 
effectively, she had to take off everything that was a white man’s stuff, jewelry and 
things like that, to engage the powers that she has. In the same respect here, you are 
bringing into a spiritual area something that is foreign to that area, and it is an 
intrusion.”229 
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PART TWO: INDIGENOUS SOVEREIGNTY 
 
In Part One I argued that the Indian respondents have lost their case in the Supreme Court 
because of the Court’s limited understanding of the concept of religion in general and 
particularly of Indigenous religiosity. Reading scholarship on religious freedom and the 
body of precedent available to the Supreme Court while deciding the case, as well as 
taking seriously the story told in the trial through testimonies and evidence about 
Northwest Indian religiosity, I showed that the case could have been won by the Indians 
just as it was won in the lower courts. But I also argued that categorizing the Northwest 
Indians’ way of life as described by the witnesses and in the Theodoratus Report as 
religious forces a Western category on a non-Western set of practices. Arguing the case 
as one about religious freedom might have been necessary given the legal framework 
available to the plaintiffs; insisting that non-Western practices should be recognized as 
religious may be seen as usefully destabilizing the Western category of religion. 
Nevertheless, adopting the category of religion to describe the Northwest Indians’ 
relation to the High Country is limited and problematic, and arguing their case as one 
about religious freedom ultimately failed. As we will see in Part Two, Justice Brennan’s 
view of the religiosity of the Northwest Indians is more robust and sympathetic than 
Justice O’Connor’s, and according to Brennan’s dissent, the set of practices described in 
the case should be granted First Amendment protection. But Brennan’s dissent is also 
problematic in its view of indigeneity, that is at the background of his description of the 
Yurok, Karuk and Tolowa Indian religion.       
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Part Two focuses on Indigenous sovereignty and offers a reading of Justice 
Brennan’s dissent in Lyng against the background of recent scholarship on sovereignty 
and on indigeneity, as well as the history of U.S.-Indian relationship as it is described or 
alluded to in the Theodoratus Report and by the Indian witnesses in the Lyng trial. While 
I acknowledge the positive aspects of Brennan’s view of the Indians’ deep religious 
relation to the land, I also criticize it as essentializing and depoliticizing indigeneity, 
because it ignores the question of Indigenous sovereignty.  
Before moving on to a reading of the dissent I would like to consider briefly one 
more aspect of the case – the fact that originally it was argued as a case not only about 
religious freedom but also about environmental protection. As we have seen, while the 
Indians were preparing to sue the Forest Service, claiming the violation of their right to 
the free exercise of religion under the First Amendment and AIRFA, a few environmental 
organizations were also preparing to sue over the G-O road, focusing on environmental 
protection statutes such as the National Environmental Policy Act. One may think the 
opportunity for the nations to create an alliance with many environmentalists fortunate, 
but Bowers and Carpenter tell a different story:  
Some lawyers involved in the case remember the period leading up to the 
litigation as one of constant negotiation and translation. The environmental 
groups and Indians shared a common goal – preventing construction of the road – 
but they lacked a shared worldview or vocabulary. Abby Abinanti recalls: “There 
was a strategy of cooperation with environmental [parties] which was strained. It 
was like we did not speak the same language. [We] saw something happening and 
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knew it was wrong … but we were never comfortable with each other, nor did we 
have a common language/feeling, or so it seemed to me.”230  
Not speaking the same language and not sharing a worldview may seem as a small 
problem, not enough to deem the collaboration between the Indians and 
environmentalists unsuccessful. But the fundamental difference in approach to the issue 
has a real consequence. As we have seen, while the case had been on appeal to the Ninth 
Circuit, Congress passed the California Wilderness Act, “render[ing] moot many of the 
issues that led to the intervention of the State of California and the six environmental 
groups that lent collateral support to the Indians’ claims.”231 And so by the time the case 
reached the Supreme Court, the Indians were left on their own, and the case seemed 
much less significant than it had seemed before the enactment of the California 
Wilderness Act. That the case has been decided as one about free exercise with no 
environmental consequences might have led to the decision in the case. While the 
environmentalists have gotten what they wanted through the legislature, the Indians were 
left unprotected by the Court. The failure of both the religious freedom framework and 
the environmental framework to protect the Northwest Indians’ relation to the High 
Country has led me to explore the possibility to read Lyng as a case about Indigenous 
sovereignty.   
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CHAPTER THREE: INDIGENEITY 
 
Introduction 
 
Robert Miller points out that the Yurok, Karuk, and Tolowa Indians have used the 
Chimney Rock area to perform rituals and to prepare for religious and medicinal 
ceremonies since at least the early nineteenth century.232 According to the Theodoratus 
Report, “Intrusions on the sanctity of the Blue Creek high country are therefore 
potentially destructive of the very core of Northwest religious beliefs and practices,” and 
“the spiritual nature of the region involved and the demonstrated importance of that 
region to the concerned Native American individuals and communities prohibit the 
construction of Chimney Rock section of the G-0 road.”233 
Nevertheless, according to the Supreme Court, the government’s plan did not 
violate the Indians’ right to religious freedom regardless of their effect on the religious 
practices of the respondents because it compels no behavior contrary to their belief. In 
other words, the Government can do whatever it wants with its land (understood merely 
as property), even if it virtually destroys a religious practice, as long as the destruction of 
this religious practice is not the explicit target of the Government’s action. Justice 
O’Connor writes in her majority opinion that “The Free Exercise Clause is written in 
terms of what the Government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the 
individual can exact from the Government,”234 presenting us with an interpretation of the 
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First Amendment free exercise clause as protecting an individual right. O’Connor’s 
interpretation of religious freedom is tightly related with the Court’s understanding of 
land as private property, rather than a place of worship. Howard Vogel strongly criticized 
Lyng, arguing that “the Anglo-American understanding of land, expressed through a 
conventional understanding of doctrinal principles of property law, shapes the Court’s 
reading of the facts and adds to the difficulty of seeking a resolution that might heal the 
conflict.”235 
Justice Brennan, dissenting, points to the absurdity created by focusing on one 
aspect of this land (as federal property) and ignoring another aspect of it (as a place of 
Indigenous worship), which causes the “gravest threat to their religious practices.”236 As 
he puts it, “the Court believes that Native Americans who request that the Government 
refrain from destroying their religion effectively seek to exact from the Government de 
facto beneficial ownership of federal property.”237 Justice Brennan in his dissent lays the 
ground to critiquing U.S. legal conceptions of land and of religious freedom as deeply 
intertwined. Moreover, he raises the possibility that it is a conception of land as property 
– rather than an interpretation of religious freedom – that motivates the Court’s decision. 
The relationship between conceptions of state sovereignty and of land as property is 
explored below. 
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Justice Brennan’s Dissent 
 
Justice Brennan dissents “because the Court today refuses even to acknowledge the 
constitutional injury respondents will suffer, and because this refusal essentially leaves 
Native Americans with absolutely no constitutional protection against perhaps the gravest 
threat to their religious practices.”238 Brennan acknowledges that “for Native Americans 
religion is not a discrete sphere of activity separate from all others.”239 He quotes from 
the Theodoratus report, saying that “any attempt to isolate the religious aspects of Indian 
life ‘is in reality an exercise which forces Indian concepts into non-Indian categories’.”240 
This acknowledgement of Western intellectual imperialism seems very progressive and 
welcome in a Supreme Court decision, even if only as part of a dissenting opinion. In Part 
One we took this logic a step further and suggested that religious freedom is an 
unsuitable category for the pursuit of justice by American Indians altogether. As Tisa 
Wenger points out, the conflict over Native American religious freedom always involves 
the question whether the practice in question is “authentically” religious. Religion as a set 
of beliefs, practices, and institutions that can be separated from other spheres of life is a 
uniquely European colonial concept, and American Indians started to use it only after 
contact, to refer to Catholicism, while referring to their traditional ceremonies as 
“custom.”241 Adopting the concept of religion for pragmatic reasons in cases such as 
Lyng is a strategy that tends to fail. “Separated and abstracted from other spheres of life, 
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‘religion’ becomes the picturesque repository of tradition and sentiment, made irrelevant 
to what appear to be the more real-world concerns of land and government.”242 Whether 
or not we agree that framing the case as one about religious freedom is problematic, as it 
leads to a (depoliticized) debate over the religious nature of the relationship between 
Indigenous peoples and land, making land central to the debate is useful, as it allows the 
debate to take indigeneity into consideration. This is what Justice Brennan does when he 
explains Indigenous religiosity as deeply related to specific locales. 
 Justice Brennan mentions stewardship – “the individual’s relationship to the 
natural world” – as a “pervasive feature” of Native American lifestyle, calling this 
relationship “the Indian religious experience.”243 He explains Native American religion at 
length, but for the purpose of this chapter, the following sentence is key: “Where dogma 
lies at the heart of Western religions, Native American faith is inextricably bound to the 
use of land. […] land is itself a sacred, living being.”244 Brennan later compares Lyng to 
the situation in Wisconsin v. Yoder:  
Here the threat posed by the desecration of sacred lands that are indisputably 
essential to respondents’ religious practices is both more direct and more 
substantial than that raised by a compulsory school law that simply exposed 
Amish children to an alien value system. And of course respondents here do not 
even have the option, however unattractive it might be, of migrating to more 
hospitable locales; the site-specific nature of their belief system renders it 
nontransportable.245         
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Acknowledging the strong locality of Indigenous lives is undoubtedly important, as we 
have seen in Part One. On the other hand, while this strategy failed in the Supreme Court 
(presenting the relation to the High Country did not lead to a First Amendment 
protection), here it does the work of producing indigeneity as fundamentally unique, or 
different not only form the majority culture but also from other minorities. What I argue 
in Part Two is that while presenting the relationship to the High Country is essential to 
the case, it is the political relation to the land that needs to be at the foreground of the 
debate, not instead of, but in addition to, the religious relation to the land. 
 Brennan’s strongest words appear in the final section of his dissent. This case, he 
writes, “represents yet another stress point in the longstanding conflict between two 
disparate cultures – the dominant Western culture, which views land in terms of 
ownership and use, and that of Native Americans, in which concepts of private property 
are not only alien, but contrary to a belief system that holds land sacred.” The Court, he 
continues, avoids addressing these “potentially irreconcilable interests,” turning the task 
to the legislature. In his view, “Native Americans deserve – and the Constitution 
demands – more than this”.246  
 While Justice Brennan worries about turning this task to the legislature, legal 
scholar Marcia Yablon sees Congress (as well as government agencies) as suitable to 
address this task. As we have seen, it was indeed Congress who eventually protected the 
area from development. Given this conclusion to the story, one could raise doubts about 
the ability of the courts to promote social change, doubts that were convincingly raised in 
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Gerald Rosenberg’s well-known work The Hollow Hope.247 Rosenberg’s theory raises, in 
turn, doubts about the usefulness of litigation in constitutional matters, and specifically, 
in our case, in the postcolonial context, when neither precedent nor public opinion 
support social reform. Deciding this case with attention to indigeneity (which takes us 
away or beyond the constitutional free exercise dispute), therefore, seems important to 
me. But I would like to ask what his opinion teaches us about indigeneity, especially 
given the following quote:       
Because of their perceptions of and relationship with the natural world, Native 
Americans consider all land sacred. […] respondents here deemed certain lands 
more powerful and more directly related to their religious practices than others. 
[…] adherents challenging a proposed use of federal land should be required to 
show that the decision poses a substantial and realistic threat of frustrating their 
religious practices.248  
Here, I believe, the problem in Brennan’s enthusiastic embrace of the Theodoratus Report 
becomes apparent. Brennan’s dissent becomes an exploration of indigeneity – Native 
Americans consider all land sacred – rather than a discussion of a specific area, that for 
reasons that neither the majority opinion nor the dissent mention ended up not being a 
part of any of the relevant nations’ reservations. The relationship between the Northwest 
Indians and the High Country has a complex history, one that should not be confined to 
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the boundaries of the category of religious freedom. Thinking about this history through 
the category of Indigenous sovereignty helps to complicate the story. One of the 
dimensions of the relationship of the Indians to the High Country is undoubtedly 
religious, but the relationship is also cultural, social, and political. Focusing on the 
sacredness of land to American Indians is problematic because it does not distinguish 
between the three nations involved in the case and other Indigenous peoples. Even though 
it does acknowledge that “certain lands” are “more powerful and more directly related to 
their religious practices” than other lands, this qualification is only secondary; it is not as 
important as the sweeping characterization of Native Americans as people who consider 
the land (or nature) sacred. Brennan, thus, essentializes indigeneity. The tendency of 
courts to essentialize indigeneity is discussed and critiqued by scholars of law and of 
ethnic studies.249 I survey their scholarship in the next section. One of the characteristics 
of Indigenous difference as it is produced in legal discourse is the connection between 
Indigenous peoples and the past, making Indigenous identity static, ignoring its fluidity 
and evolvement with the time, especially through its encounter with and survival of 
colonial encounters. Here is how Brennan does it in his final words about Lyng:       
[…] today’s ruling sacrifices a religion at least as old as the Nation itself, along 
with the spiritual well-being of its approximately 5,000 adherents, so that the 
Forest Service can build a 6-mile segment of road that two lower courts found had 
only the most marginal and speculative utility, both to the Government itself and 
to the private lumber interests that might conceivably use it.250 
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Before addressing the authenticity discourse that is on display in this last paragraph, I 
would like to return to Brennan’s point that “for Native Americans religion is not a 
discrete sphere of activity separate from all others.”251 This seems to be a secular 
approach that sees Indigenous epistemologies or ways of life as fundamentally religious. 
This raises the question what happens to religion when it is examined by secular law. On 
the one hand, we might expect the secular method of examination to secularize the 
examined phenomenon – and we have seen it happening when we reviewed the history of 
religious freedom jurisprudence; nevertheless, in Brennan’s dissent, Northwest Indian 
epistemology, in which “religion is not a discrete sphere of activity separate from all 
others,” becomes religious, even though Brennan himself acknowledge that religion is a 
Western category, inadequate to describe Indigenous ways of life.    
What happens to religion as an object of study when the method of examining it is 
secularized? Different thinkers have offered different answers to this question, and here I 
address only a few – Talal Asad, José Casanova and Charles Taylor – whose 
conversation I find productive. The identification of secularity with modernity, which 
presents secularity as a necessary product of the progress of history, occurs in the 
nineteenth century, and it is largely associated with Max Weber and his secularization 
thesis.252 All three thinkers with whom I am concerned here can be read as responses to 
Weber. Weber’s thesis is represented in different ways by its different critics, all of 
whom offer modifications and problematizations of it rather than alternative theories.  
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Take for example Casanova’s interpretation of the secularization thesis.253 
According to Casanova, secularization can be understood as having three aspects: (1) a 
decline in the power of religion (or the number of adherers); (2) religion is less present in 
public debate; (3) the differentiation of spheres (if in the past religion was the organizing 
principle of all spheres of life, in modernity each sphere – politics, economics, aesthetics, 
etc. – is organized around its own logic, and religion becomes only one of these spheres 
of life). In the 1980s we witness a renewed rise of religion in different parts of the world 
– Islam in the Middle East, fundamental Christianity in the U.S. – and this rise casts 
doubts with regards to Weber’s thesis. Casanova, in response to these doubts, offers that 
while the first two aspects of secularization do not describe our contemporary world, the 
third and most essential aspect of secularization – the differentiation of spheres – does. 
Religion has become one sphere of life among many different ones, and as such it is, in 
and of itself, a secular phenomenon. According to this interpretation, we moderns cannot 
but see religion as a secular phenomenon. Understanding religion as one among many 
ways to organize reality is fundamentally secular (as opposed to understanding art, ethics, 
and, the economy to serve a religious purpose).         
 Taylor’s question in A Secular Age is a bit different than Casanova’s.254 Taylor 
takes the secular as a given and asks about the conditions of its possibility, as opposed to 
whether or not our modern world is secular. Taylor asks, in other words, why it is 
impossible to be secular in the year 1500 but possible in the year 2000. Taylor’s account 
focuses on a different aspect of Weber’s thesis (though he never refers to Weber by 
name). In premodernity there were two aspects of religiosity: one is the belief in a 
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transcendent realm beyond our own, and the second is the distinction between the sacred 
and the profane within our own world. Accordingly, there are two stages of 
secularization: disenchantment (no more transcendence) and the disappearance of the 
sacred from this world. What Taylor takes as a given is disenchantment. The purpose of 
his book is to search for the possibility of “fullness” within immanence. His question is 
about lived experience rather than on ideas, as he declares, but his account mixes together 
intellectual and material history. One could argue that Taylor uses this mixed method 
intentionally, because what he is really searching for is the possibility of a religious 
existence in a secular world. His method does not seem “secular” to me, perhaps because 
it is not systematic (the social imaginary and its effects in the world are accounted for 
together, not even analytically separated), and (perhaps as a result) nothing happens to 
the category of religion throughout his work. If in Casanova’s analysis we could see that 
religion is secularized in modernity, in Taylor’s account religion remains the same and is 
struggling to find its place in this secular age.        
 Asad sees religion in modernity as a new, secularized phenomenon.255 An 
example would be the waqf – sacred land – that has no metaphysical implication 
whatsoever; it is sacred in the sense that it belongs to religious authorities.256 Asad sees 
secularization not as a necessary development but as a contingent one; it occurred in 
Europe and was exported elsewhere. He examines Egyptian law and politics that in 
modernity are organized around a secular principle. The most important contribution of 
his work to our current exploration is, I believe, the distinction between secularity and 
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secularism. While secularity is an epistemology, secularism is an ideology. Secularity as 
an epistemology is so total that it includes religion in it; secularism is the way in which 
we attribute value to the secular. As a result, secular(ist) law is unable to understand 
religion religiously – as a phenomenon that is not separate from all other spheres of life. 
Brennan’s observation, therefore, suggests that we should think of the phenomenon in 
front of us as Indigenous rather than religious. Let us see if that might work. 
 
Why is Indigeneity Important? 
 
The legal philosopher Jeremy Waldron offers a conceptual analysis of indigeneity (“a 
term of art in the politics and philosophy of cultural rights of First Peoples”) in his essay 
“Why is Indigeneity Important?”257 The question motivating Waldron’s analysis is: “what 
does it add to our understanding of the predicaments and choices facing the people and 
government of New Zealand, to describe Maori (the Ngai Tahu people of New Zealand’s 
South Island, e.g.) as the indigenous people of that country?”258 The desire to find an 
answer to this question has motivated my exploration in this chapter and the next one. 
The question can be narrowed as follows:  
In the process of trying to come to terms with historic injustice perpetrated by 
white settlers and by colonial and postcolonial authorities in Australia, New 
Zealand, Canada, the United States, and other countries over the past 300 years, 
how important is it to bear in mind that some of these injustices were perpetrated 
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against the indigenous inhabitants of those countries? No doubt people and 
governments acted oppressively to many groups; no doubts they still do. But it is 
widely believed that injustices perpetrated against Maori, or Aborigines or Native 
Americans are more egregious – or at least different in kind – than injustices 
against immigrant groups, or religious minorities, or slaves and their descendants. 
It is thought that injustice against Australian Aborigine, or Native Americans or 
Maori is specially salient, not only on account of its extent and its human 
consequences, but just because it was perpetrated against the original people of 
the land.259     
This question implies an understanding of colonialism as a discrete event – “a historic 
injustice.” To begin answering this question, I argue, following Patrick Wolfe, we need, 
instead, to see colonialism as a structure, and injustice as an inherent characteristic of this 
structure, which is, as such, ongoing rather than historic.260 This notion is explored 
below.    
Against the concept of indigeneity, Waldron invokes the legal concept known as 
“principle of first occupancy,” explaining that “[t]his principle holds that the first person, 
or the first people, to take possession of a piece of land acquire special rights over it, so 
far as property and sovereignty are concerned.”261 Waldron explains: 
If the resources of our society are wrongly distributed – if land, wealth, income, 
and power are wrongly distributed – then distributive justice demands a 
readjustment. Such redistribution has happened on a large scale and small scale in 
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the past. Maybe it should happen again. But that is not enough – say some writers 
and politicians – if the issue is indigeneity. Indigeneity calls for a more radical 
approach: not just remedial measures to address maldistribution, but a restoration 
to the descendants of indigenous peoples of some or all of the rights – rights of 
sovereignty, rights of property – that were once held by their ancestors.262   
In other words, indigenous peoples’ claims are different from other minority groups’ 
claims (African Americans might demand reparations, immigrants might have a claim 
against prejudice and discrimination, but Indigenous peoples claim something radically 
different). A theory of indigeneity must take this difference seriously. 
Indigeneity can be defined in two different ways, Waldron tells us. One definition 
refers to the “descendants of the earliest populations living in the area.” The other refers 
to the “descendants of peoples who lived in the territory before the entrance of a 
colonizing population.”263 While in some places (such as Australia) the concepts are 
coextensive, in others (such as India) they are not. And even if we concentrate on the first 
definition, Waldron says, there is still considerable indeterminacy.  
The fact is that humans have been migratory animals since our emergence in 
Africa more than a hundred thousand years ago, and it is plain that the application 
of the term indigenous to human populations is always going to be somewhat 
different from its application to plants, for example. Humans are not indigenous in 
the way that plants are. We have not sprung from the earth or evolved within the 
territories with respect to which we claim to be indigenous.264      
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Waldron cites James Anaya’s definition of indigeneity, according to which peoples are 
“indigenous because their ancestral roots are embedded in the lands in which they live 
[…] much more deeply than the roots of more powerful sectors of society living on the 
same lands or in close proximity,”265 but he is not satisfied with this definition. 
Waldron tells us that the second definition (“descendants of people who lived in 
the territory before the entrance of a colonizing population”) often suggests not only 
temporal priority but also a great disparity between the few generations that have passed 
since colonization and the millennia in which the Indigenous populations have occupied 
the territory. But this is not always the case. Waldron is aware of scholars who argue 
against the desire to define this term – either because it is impossible to define or because 
the task needs to be left for Indigenous peoples themselves.266 “Those who believe that 
indigeneity is important,” he continues, “believe that its importance consists in the 
challenge it poses to current patterns of sovereignty and property rights.”267 Some argue 
that it is also important because of cultural rights and language issues. 
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The logic is quite simple. Indigenous peoples were not just waiting to be 
colonized in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. They were living and 
thriving with their own systems of polity, law, and economy. Those systems were 
there first; and they have a continuing moral status that is grounded in that 
priority. Colonization disrupted that, often brutally. Such disruption establishes 
the current regime of property and sovereignty as presumptively illegitimate. 
Now, in some cases where a present regime is judged illegitimate, the appropriate 
response is to look forward to arrangements that might be more just or 
appropriate. But with this sort of illegitimacy – the illegitimate disruption of an 
indigenous regime – the remedy involves looking back to pre-existing 
arrangements, and finding a structure now that is more respectful of those 
arrangements than the colonial and settler regimes have been to date.268    
While the claims of immigrants or the descendants of slaves are utopian (they look for 
justice where it has not yet existed), the claims of Indigenous peoples are more grounded 
in preexisting reality.269 The point is that peoples who have been sovereign in the past, 
remain sovereign in the face of illegitimate occupation or even annexation. “The 
sovereignty of the dispossessed peoples continues, awaiting reversion, despite the loss of 
territory and even total illegal annexation … [W]here people have been forcibly 
subjugated, their sovereign title continues in abeyance and can later be restored.”270  
Most people do not call for complete reversion of the status quo, but any claim for 
justice for Indigenous peoples relies to some extent on an idea of Indigenous entitlement. 
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Waldron seems to be moving toward a definition of indigeneity that would tie it together 
with sovereignty, but he returns quickly to the analytic distinction between indigeneity as 
first occupancy and indigeneity as prior occupancy, both of which are problematic, each 
for its own reasons.271 The first definition correlates with a principle of first occupancy, 
which is based on Locke’s theory of property in Chapter Five of Two Treaties, II, and the 
second definition correlates with a pragmatic conservative principle of respecting existing 
arrangements (Waldron calls it a “principle of established order”).272 Waldron explains 
the problem he finds with the established order principle as a basis for Indigenous claims 
for justice with an example: 
If the basis of M’s complaint of injustice is that M held resources in a stable 
pattern of established occupancy and P disturbed that pattern, then whether 
reversion is an appropriate remedy will depend in part on whether P has now 
established a stable pattern of occupancy, which is entitled to respect on exactly 
the same principle as M’s was.273  
The principle of first occupancy is problematic as well, according to Waldron:  
The Principle accords moral privilege to an occupant, in virtue of that occupant’s 
not having dispossessed anyone else. The title of such occupant is supposed to 
have absolute priority over anyone whose occupancy was affected by war or 
violence. But in relation to territory and resources, violently dispossessing another 
person or another people is not the be-all and end-all of injustice, and it is not the 
only basis on which we might raise a moral question mark over an entitlement. 
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Refusing to share resources with others is also a form of injustice; refusing to 
modify a holding based on First Occupancy in response to demographic or other 
changes in circumstances is an injustice. Taking more than you need, or 
occupying so much that subsequent arrivals have nothing to occupy, is an 
injustice.274 
Waldron is aware of critiques that can be addressed at his analysis – his discussion is too 
analytic, to Western, too liberal. But I see the first definition as problematic for another 
reason: basing a definition of indigeneity on Locke’s theory of property is problematic, 
because it understands land as a commodity, it is grounded in a Christian worldview, and 
for these two reasons it is not fitting to describe Indigenous relationships with the land.  
But indigeneity, Waldron insists, cannot be sui generis as James Tully suggests, 
generating a set of claims that “do not derive from any universal principles, such as the 
freedom or equality of peoples, the sovereignty of long-standing, self-governing nations, 
or [even] the jurisdiction of a people over land they have occupied to the exclusion and 
recognition of other peoples since time immemorial.”275       
Waldron does not offer us any answers, but he does open up a question that we 
should address, because he pinpoints exactly the notion of the Supreme Court in Lyng 
that worries about the possibility of the Indian nations demanding de facto ownership of 
public lands. To answer the question of indigeneity, we will need to either find a 
universal principle that justifies the struggle for Indigenous justice, or to convincingly 
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argue that indigeneity is unique. I turn now to scholarship on Indigenous sovereignty, in 
search for an explanation.   
 
Indigenous Sovereignty 
 
The question of indigeneity in the U.S. context (as in other postcolonial contexts) is a 
political question. While the Lyng decision, including Brennan’s dissent, depoliticizes it 
by analyzing the relationship between the nations and the land in question only as 
religious, recent scholarship on indigeneity emphasizes the political implications of the 
concept by closely examining it in relation to the question of sovereignty.276 Karena 
Shaw, for example, thinks of the ways in which indigeneity as a form of difference 
challenges the discourse of sovereignty:  
[…] contemporary politics are framed by discourses of sovereignty. These 
discourses are neither natural nor neutral. They reproduce a space for politics that 
is enabled by and rests upon the production, naturalization, and marginalization of 
certain forms of ‘difference.’ Indigenous politics illustrate and challenge this in 
three ways: first, Indigenous peoples are among those both implicitly and 
explicitly produced and marked as ‘different’ in and through sovereignty 
discourse, and this is one of the enabling conditions of sovereignty discourse; 
second, even as these discourses enable Indigenous peoples’ political claims, they 
also continue to be marginalized by and through these same discourses; and, third, 
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through their (necessary) engagement with this paradox, these movements are 
encountering, challenging, and reshaping the ‘limits’ of contemporary politics. 
Thus, even as Indigenous politics are framed by these discourses and practices, 
they also, in part because of their centrality to them, expose, denaturalize, and 
reformulate them.277 
When indigeneity is understood (or produced) as Indigenous difference it “takes on an 
almost sacred character and becomes a compelling idiom for articulating rights, values, 
and identities.”278 The rights discourse that goes hand in hand with the discourse of 
difference, interpellates political questions into legal ones.279 This has become, Jennifer 
Hamilton argues, the main tool for Indigenous peoples to make political claims, 
especially in Anglo settler states. Hamilton talks about “a double blind in the cultural 
production of indigeneity in which the very conditions that enable indigenous peoples to 
make compelling legal claims based on difference can simultaneously lead those claims 
to failure.”280 She demonstrates how “the deployment of such culturalist discourse in law 
creates a specific context in which broader political assertions, especially those 
concerning sovereignty and land rights, are potentially undermined.”281  
Kevin Bruyneel asks where American Indians fit in relation to the American 
political system – “inside, outside, or somewhere in between?”282 This is a question about 
Indian sovereignty – if they are sovereign peoples then they are considered “outside”; 
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accordingly, if they are inside then they are not sovereign (only the U.S. is sovereign). 
Bruyneel seeks to open up a “third space” – an in-between space – for Indian sovereignty, 
one that will allow Indigenous peoples to be at once inside and outside the U.S. political 
realm. For Bruyneel, this is their position in reality, and his goal is to allow for a theory 
of sovereignty that would fit this reality. Bruyneel’s analytical suggestion is refreshing 
and promising: he calls it “concurrent sovereignty” (a legal situation that exists in a few 
states and Bruyneel wants to adopt theoretically). Bruyneel points to the binary nature of 
sovereignty and looks for a way to break through this binary, a binary that makes 
sovereignty into self-sufficiency.283  
Thinking about sovereignty in the context of Lyng invites us to think of it in a 
non-binary way, as bringing together law, religion, and land. Here I am recounting some 
of sovereignty’s features, in order to clarify its relationship with indigeneity. Sovereignty 
is an ambiguous concept, classically defined as supreme legal authority, one that has both 
legal and theological bases – a legal authority based on divine right. The vast literature on 
Indigenous sovereignty focuses either on the theological dimension or on the legal 
aspects of it.284 Neither, I believe, captures the complexity of the concept of sovereignty. 
In law, sovereignty is practiced through jurisdiction, as Lisa Ford points out, and so 
                                                           
283 Ayelet Shachar, albeit asking a different question, suggests a similar solution, which she calls 
“overlapping jurisdictions.” See Ayelet Shachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and 
Women’s Rights (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
284 On the theological dimension see, for example, George E. Tinker, Spirit and Resistance: Political 
Theology and American Indian Liberation (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2004), and Steven T. Newcomb, 
Pagans in the Promised Land: Decoding the Doctrine of Christian Discovery (Golden: Fulcrum 
Publishing, 2008); on the legal dimension see, for example, Robert A. Williams, Like a Loaded Weapon: 
the Rehnquist Court, Indian Rights, and the Legal History of Racism in America (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2005), and Lisa Ford, Settler Sovereignty: Jurisdiction and Indigenous People in 
America and Australia 1788-1836 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011). 
118 
 
 
 
sovereignty is legalized and depoliticized.285 In theology, we usually think of God as 
sovereign, and of political sovereignty as a feature of divine will, so politics is tied 
together with theology, not with positive law. Lyng remains a case about law and 
religion, leaving aside the political, and neglecting the question of Indigenous 
sovereignty altogether.  
The U.S. Supreme Court has struggled with the limits of Indian sovereignty since 
early nineteenth-century. In 1823, in Johnson v. McIntosh,286 the Supreme Court adopted 
for the United States the “right of occupancy” version of colonial sovereignty. This 
remains the basic legal position of federal Indian law, despite the fact that divine right is 
not accepted elsewhere in United States law. The Johnson decision may be seen as 
secularizing sovereignty as it applies the doctrine of Christian discovery in the secular 
state. A recent example that shows the discovery doctrine’s long-lasting effect on courts’ 
decisions in cases regarding Native American sovereignty is the 2005 case of City of 
Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York,287 which cites the doctrine of discovery in 
a footnote.   
The secularization of sovereignty by the Marshall Court involved transforming 
Indians from “pagans” to “savages” and from Indigenous peoples to a racial minority. 
The secularization of the terms of the dispute is significant because it led to the shifting 
of the focus of postcolonial critique from questions of collective rights to land and to self-
determination to individual rights, based on racial or ethnic identity. According to Patrick 
Wolfe, “[o]n the passing of the frontier, US Indian Policy sought to incorporate Indians 
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into settler society not as so many separate tribes but generically, individually, and as a 
whole – which is to say, as a race.”288 While some scholars frame the problem as 
racism,289 others believe that focusing on race and ethnicity conceals the real object of the 
dispute, namely, land. As Byrd puts it, 
The conflation of racialization into colonization and indigeneity into racial 
categories […] masks the territoriality of conquest by assigning colonization to 
the racialized body, which is then policed in its degrees from whiteness. Under 
this paradigm, American Indian national assertions of sovereignty, self-
determination, and land rights disappear into U.S. territoriality as indigenous 
identity becomes a racial identity and citizens of colonized indigenous nations 
become internal ethnic minorities within the colonizing nation-state.290 
When race and ethnicity become the focus of our critique, we are distracted from the real 
questions we need to ask and from the possibility of resisting U.S. colonialism more 
effectively.291 Wolfe reminds us that what he calls “the logic of elimination” that is tied 
with U.S. colonialism used race as its main tool. “Indigenous North Americans were not 
killed, driven away, romanticized, assimilated, fenced in, bred White, and otherwise 
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eliminated as the original owners of the land but as Indians,” he writes.292 A postcolonial 
critique, then, should go back to a recognition of American Indians as Indigenous peoples 
rather than a racial or ethnic minority. Moreover, as Mark Rifkin notes, both discourses 
of racial difference and equality and discourses of cultural recognition are deployed by 
the U.S. in ways that reaffirm its authority to determine the issues that would count as 
part of its political system. These discourses mask, according to Rifkin, “the structuring 
violence performed by the figure of sovereignty.”293 Native peoples are simply defined as 
those who are not sovereign. Thus, they help to define the state as sovereign.  
The U.S. grants certain rights to Native Americans who reside in its territory 
based on their racial status: how much Indian blood they have in them. Barker writes that 
the racialization of Native legal status by blood is a process that allows the state to 
individualize Native legal rights and so to defer attention from the collective rights to 
sovereignty and self-determination Native peoples possess under international and 
constitutional law.294 One effect of this racialization and individualization is ignoring the 
common good that defines Native peoples as communities, namely, their aboriginal 
relation to the land. It transforms them from communities of citizens with shared interests 
to a collection of individual citizens bearing liberal-universal rights. George E. Tinker 
criticizes this individualization using a slightly different terminology: 
[…] the political and economic bias in the international discourse is to recognize 
only states as the fundamental actors in international political discourse. As such, 
the natural national entities that make up indigenous peoples’ communities are 
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seen today as merely ethnic minorities within state structures, who may have 
individual rights but who do not have any distinct set of community or cultural 
rights as an independent people. Hence, the sovereignty or autonomy of 
indigenous nations is a priory bracketed from consideration in any state 
discourse.295 
The racialization and individualization of Native Americans by the U.S. has the effect of 
requiring one to prove that she is an “authentic” Indian in order to be granted individual 
rights. This is the concern (and object of critique) of many scholars of indigeneity, 
including Eva Garroutte, Tisa Wenger, Kathleen Birrell, and Jennifer Hamilton.296 The 
notion of authenticity has been vastly criticized. One of the problems with this notion is 
that representing “authenticity” successfully would mean that U.S. colonialism did not do 
any harm to native identity. Barker writes: 
The United States escapes the consequences of its own historical sins by having 
real Indians situated in a far distant past before colonialism and imperialism 
mattered and embodying those cultures and identities today as though colonialism 
and imperialism have had no substantive or significant long-term consequences. 
Native peoples are confronted with the impossible task of representing that 
authenticity in order to secure their recognition and rights as sovereigns.297  
This call for authenticity has devastating cultural implications, Barker continues. “Being 
authentic” often means in the eyes of the West that one has to adhere to “traditional” 
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values, in a way that can create an identity crisis for Native Americans who are expected 
to be homophobic and misogynistic, among other traits that the West considers to be 
“pre-modern.” Ayelet Shachar adds that there may be “disproportionate costs imposed 
upon traditionally less powerful group members.”298 In many cases, accommodation of 
the different traditions and practices of minority groups depends on demonstration of 
“authentic” characteristics, and results in risking the weaker group member’s citizenship 
rights.299 James Clifford writes about the relation between poverty and authenticity in the 
American Indian context: 
Economic success […] can bring significant increases in wealth. But it also 
encourages new hierarchies, communal divisions, and dependency on external 
markets and capital resources. Whatever material progress has been made over the 
past few decades is unevenly distributed. Indigenous populations in most 
contemporary nation-states remain poor, lacking adequate health and education, at 
the mercy of predatory national and transnational agents of ‘development.’ The 
modest, but real, gains in control over land and resources achieved by native 
groups in recent years are fragile, always susceptible to reversal by 
overwhelmingly more powerful majority populations. Intractable double blinds – 
for example, an assumed contradiction between material wealth and cultural 
authenticity – are imposed on tribal people aspiring to something more than bare 
survival in settler-colonial states.300  
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Hamilton asks when and how indigeneity matters in the legal sense. In her work, she 
seeks to understand how indigeneity is legally produced and to apprehend its broader 
political and economic implications. By ‘indigeneity’ Hamilton refers not to “the specific 
ontologies and epistemologies of peoples living throughout Native North America,” but 
to “the political, economic and legal articulations of indigenous difference,” and “the 
discursive and material effects of these articulations.”301 She examines the deployment of 
Indigenous difference within a particular spatial and temporal scope (the Native 
Northwest coast in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries). Hamilton 
emphasizes the context of multiculturalism as the background against which we need to 
understand indigeneity. “[…] indigeneity refers to the idea that the content and meaning 
of indigenous difference is produced in particular contexts, in response to a variety of 
social, political, and economic forces,” writes Hamilton.302 In other words, for Hamilton, 
cultural difference in general, and Indigenous difference in particular, is not essential, 
inherent, or natural. Therefore, it would be wrong to talk about indigeneity in terms of 
authenticity. Indigenous difference is produced, and law is one of the spheres where it is 
produced. 
Birrell thinks of indigeneity in the context of law and literature. According to 
Birrell, “The narratives of law and literature both create and legislate meaning,” and in 
her work she focuses on “their mutual creation and legislation of indigeneity.”303 Birrell 
argues that “legal narratives conceive of indigeneity in terms of a putative ‘authenticity,’” 
and suggests that “the aesthetic of Indigenous literature disrupts and deconstructs the 
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law.”304 Birrell follows Wolfe in arguing that law embraces a notion of “the ‘authentic’ or 
whole indigenous subject, framed and referenced by mythic time and complex kinship 
rather than by the impacts of colonialism.”305 Birrell moves away from the discourse on 
authenticity and argues, following Michel Foucault and Judith Butler, that “In the context 
of native title, the colonial schema in which the common law conception of indigeneity 
operates compels a particular performance from the indigenous subject, in order to appear 
before the law at all.”306 This is a crucial point in my reading of the decision in Lyng. 
When we conceive of indigeneity in terms of authenticity we do not only ignore the role 
that law plays in producing the indigenous, we also treat it as a fixed identity. Birrell, 
following James Clifford, argues that literature dissolves this fixity, even of momentarily. 
I believe that thinking of indigeneity in the context of sovereignty and religious freedom 
has a similar effect. As Chris Peters explains during the Lyng trial: 
Many people who are not familiar with our religious ways think that Indian people and 
Indian religions only existed in years gone by. However, our elders continue to maintain 
and preserve our religious beliefs and spiritual ways. Indian religions continue to exist 
today; increasing members of our young people are taking a more active role in the 
traditions and ceremonies of our people. These traditions are passed down from 
generation to generation. With these religious beliefs and traditional customs, we look 
proudly into the future.307 
Jean Bethke Elshtain writes that “theological understandings had migrated into early 
modern political sovereigntism.”308 She thinks of the ways medieval ideas about God as 
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sovereign have influenced early modern (“post-medieval,” in her words) conceptions of 
the sovereign state and their relation to modern notions of self-sovereignty. In terms of 
methodology, Elshtain warns us from over-abstracting our concepts, especially when it 
comes to political concepts such as sovereignty: “Without concrete history, political 
thought becomes a gnostic enterprise – all words, no flesh; all spirit, no body. Then, 
disastrously, that disembodied enterprise invites schemes and ideologies that are imposed 
over the living, incarnate tissue of human life.”309 One of my aims in this work is to  
avoid the over-abstraction that Elshtain warns us against. According to Elshtain, who 
follows Hendrik Spruyt,310 the present system of sovereign states that many take for 
granted is a modern development that is not inevitable.311 Sovereignty has not always 
been tied to territory,312 and the idea of divine right monarchy is also an early modern 
invention.313 For Joan Cocks sovereign power (or “sovereignal freedom”) is not only a 
modern invention, but it is also a delusion, and one that poses political dangers as well, 
especially when it is democratized.314 Cocks casts doubt with regards to the aspiration to 
Indian sovereignty, asking about “the tendency of those oppressed by sovereign power to 
make counter-sovereignty bids to save themselves”315:   
Human rights advocates and other progressives condemn the sovereign power of 
xenophobic majorities and defend the aspirations to sovereign power of 
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vulnerable peoples, but what exactly makes the exclusivism of privileged 
citizenship a minus in the ledger of democracy, and the exclusivism of penetrated 
indigeniety a plus?316 
This doubt is in line with Taiaiake Alfred’s assertion that sovereignty is not an 
appropriate political objective for Indigenous peoples, as the concept itself is essentially 
Western, and has served as a tool in colonizing Indigenous peoples.317 I take this critique 
of the quest for Indian sovereignty seriously in my work, and I try to answer it because 
even though I see the problematic it points to, I see a great theoretical potential in this 
concept.   
Bruyneel might have an answer to this serious doubt, and it is one that I favor. 
The concept of state sovereignty presents us with what Bruyneel calls “a false choice.”318 
Advocates of sovereignty for Indigenous nations often present us with a false choice 
between two possibilities only: (1) acknowledging aboriginal sovereignty with the 
consequence of destructing the sovereignty of the occupying state; and (2) continuing to 
deny aboriginal sovereignty. This is a false choice because both options accept the same 
(secular) conception of sovereignty. Shachar presents us with another problematic aspect 
of this binary: granting full jurisdictional power to the state, she argues, might be suitable 
to protect the individual rights of the less powerful members of minority groups, but it 
does so at the expense of relegating their cultural identity to the private sphere, in a way 
that fails to acknowledge their cultural identities; granting full jurisdictional power to the 
group, on the other hand, would be suitable to protect cultural diversity, but at the cost of 
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enabling the systematic maltreatment of specific members by their accommodated group. 
However, there is a third option. According to Bruyneel, 
[...] it is possible for both entities to enjoy concurrent sovereignty. The false 
choice here is that either indigenous tribes and nations must become sovereign 
states, thereby destroying the settler-states within which they reside, or their 
citizens must accept unambiguous inclusion in the settler polity, thereby denying 
their collective claim to sovereignty.319  
Shachar proposes a model that avoids this false choice: the joint governance approach. 
According to this model, some people will jointly belong to more than one community 
and will accordingly bear rights and obligations that will derive from more than one 
source of legal authority. These proposals are ones that I take seriously, and I believe that 
they carry both practical and theoretical potential that is missing from the essentializing 
discourse on Indigenous religious freedom that appears in Lyng. 
 
Conclusion 
 
One could tell the story of Lyng in many different ways. This case is remembered as a 
decision that interpreted religious freedom too narrowly and property rights too broadly; 
as a case that demonstrates the advantage of the political process of legislation over the 
legal route of litigation; as a story about the attachment of Indigenous peoples to sacred 
lands despite colonization (the tribal-centric story is “a story of a community forced to 
defend itself against the assimilationist agenda of the federal government – and 
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developing a contemporary political identity in the process,” according to Bowers and 
Carpenter).320 While Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion is infamous for sacrificing 
Native American religion for the sake of protecting the government’s property rights, 
Justice Brennan’s dissent may be celebrated as sensitive to cultural difference, 
acknowledging the differences between Western religion and Native American religion, 
and the unique relation between Native Americans and the land they inhabit. However, 
while “courts have become increasingly fluent in ‘culture talk’,” this discourse has been 
critiqued “as simplistic, essentializing, and incomplete.”321 In this chapter, I tried to show 
how – albeit all the obvious advantages of Brennan’s dissent over O’Connor’s majority 
opinion – Brennan’s “culture talk” participates in depoliticizing Indigenous identity.  
Miller writes that “If an Indian religious case was ever going to win in the 
Supreme Court, it was Northwest Indian.”322 Yet, the Indians lost the case. “Given the 
fact that […] no Jewish, Muslim, or Native American plaintiff has ever prevailed on a 
free exercise claim before the Supreme Court,”323 there may be a reason to doubt the 
effectiveness of the constitutional route for minority groups in general, and for 
Indigenous peoples in postcolonial contexts in particular.  
In the next chapter I explore the historical context that I think we need to take into 
account if we want to read the Lyng case as one about sovereignty. This historical context 
is described in the evidence and in the testimony in the Lyng trial. When we read these 
texts we can see that the parties to the case do see the historical context as essential to 
deciding the case. Nevertheless, the courts have ignored it in their decisions. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: SOVEREIGNTY 
 
Introduction 
 
What happens when we place the Lyng decision in its historical context? As I have 
discussed in Part One, there is disagreement between scholars whether the practice for 
which protection is sought in Lyng is religious or not. Deloria writes that thinking of this 
practice in historical context proves it religious: 
Traditional [Indian] religions are under attack not because they are Indian but 
because they are fundamentally religious and are perhaps the only consistent 
religious groups in American society over the long term. If kidnapping children 
for boarding schools, prohibiting religious ceremonies, destroying the family 
through allotments, and bestowing American citizenship did not destroy the basic 
community of Indian people, what could possibly do so? The attack on religion 
today is the secular attack on any group that advocates and practices devotion to a 
value higher than the state. That is why the balancing test has been discarded and 
laws and ordinances are allowed primacy over religious obligations.324  
My argument in Part Two opposes Deloria’s. I argue that reading the Lyng decision 
within the historical context that Deloria refers to allows us to shift our attention from 
religious freedom and read the case as one that is about Indigenous sovereignty. In what 
follows, I read the local history as it is described in the Theodoratus Report and alluded 
to by some of the witnesses in the Lyng trial, a historical account that explains how it 
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came to be that the High Country never became a part of any of the local nations’ 
reservations. I then place this local history within a survey of the broader history of U.S.-
Indian relations, although with a legal focus. I end this chapter with a discussion of the 
theoretical concerns that arise from the historical accounts.  
 
Local History 
 
The “History” chapter of the Theodoratus Report contextualizes the proposed 
government development plan within “the larger milieu of Indian-White relations.”325 
The purpose of the archival research was to conduct “analysis of the time depth of the 
religious tradition of the area.”326 While I find this objective problematic, because it 
assumes that religious traditions are immutable, the survey did end up showing “past 
impacts on the ritual tradition of the study area [...] of various non-Native American 
incursion into the project/study area,”327 which helps to support the argument of this 
dissertation, that the Lyng story is not only about religious freedom but about Indigenous 
sovereignty as well.  
In what follows, I read this part of the report – which focuses on the history of 
Indian-White relations in Northwest California – as part of a broader history of the 
relations between Indians and Whites in the U.S. in the same period, with special 
attention given to the legal aspects of this relationship. I also read some of the testimonies 
in the Lyng trial, focusing on the parts of the testimony that place the local story (even if 
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only implicitly or indirectly) within the context of this broader history of contact, 
conquest, and intergenerational trauma. Read within this context, the development plan is 
revealed as one that cannot be understood as a mere decision by the government about 
how to manage its lands; the plan is revealed as one that has the power to erase a culture 
that is in the midst of its revival against grave threats to its vitality.  
The purpose of the historical part of the Theodoratus Report is to discover 
possible effects of the history of local Indian-White relations on contemporary Indian use 
of the High Country. This context, the report tells us, will help us to better understand 
present concerns in the area, because it will show us the general course of events which 
have shaped the lives of the people who live in Northwest California. In addition, this 
context is useful in the assessment of past impact on religious/ritual tradition. 
The historical survey reveals a complex relationship between local Indians and 
Whites, as opposed to the overwhelming emphasis of violence in most existing accounts. 
These accounts’ focus on warfare between Indians and Whites in the Klamath River in 
the 1850s and 1860s has overshadowed other aspects of the relationship, such as the 
integration of Indian people into the labor force (“a fact which accounts in part for the 
survival of Indian people even though in the initial stages coercion was the method of 
integration”328), the Federal Government’s attempts to convert Indians to Christianity, 
and intermarriage between Indians and Whites. The report shows a wide range of 
interactions, arguing that concentrating on any one type of relationship in the historic 
process in isolation from the others is misleading. As we will see later in the this chapter, 
Indigenous scholars such as Alfred argue that focusing on only one type of historic 
                                                           
328 Ibid., 108. 
132 
 
 
 
relationship – especially on conquest – supports the “myth of state sovereignty,”329 or the 
belief that only the U.S. – and not Indian nations – can be (and has always been) 
sovereign. 
The history of Indian-White relations in Northern California began with European 
exploring expeditions sailing northward to scout the western coast of North America. 
These expeditions were carried on primarily under the Spanish Crown, began shortly 
after the conquest of Mexico, and continued for over two hundred years until the Spanish 
made a permanent settlement in Alta California. The local Indigenous peoples learned 
from these expedition parties about the existence of European peoples, the usefulness of 
trade goods created by a mercantile economy, and the effects of exotic diseases 
introduced by those parties.  
In 1769, the Spanish Crown established a Franciscan Mission system in Alta 
California because of concerns about the Russian Empire’s possible expansion into 
America from the north. The Friars and the Spanish government intended the mission 
system to convert Indians into Spanish-speaking Catholics, and to teach them European 
trades and farming techniques. Then Indians were supposed to be integrated into the 
Spanish social order, and the missions were supposed to be secularized (which meant that 
the lands held by the missions were supposed to be returned to the Indians). For reasons 
discussed below, this did not occur. The mission establishment in California had 
destructive impacts on Native life and culture, and we see demographic decline that 
began with the founding of the first mission in 1769 and continued until the Mexican 
government began to secularize the mission in 1834. The California Indian population in 
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1769 was estimated at about 310,000. In the period between 1834-1846 the estimated 
population was between 150,000-175,000.330 Some Indians resisted this intrusion and 
conflicts between Indian groups and rancheros occurred, and the presence of soldiers 
became regular in California by 1820. This background is important to us because it has 
affected policies regarding American Indians during the Mexican and American periods, 
but Northwest Indians remained isolated and removed from this relationship for a while. 
In 1828, representatives of the fur trading industry entered the country of the 
Yurok, Karuk, and Hupa peoples. The first recorded encounter between an expedition 
and a group of Indian people was on May 25, 1828 near the junction of the Trinity and 
Klamath Rivers. The American expedition wanted to trade with the Indians for fur. A few 
encounters with Yurok people are described in detail by the expedition’s secretary and 
quoted in the Theodoratus Repot.331 Although the expedition remained in Yurok territory 
for only a brief time, their reports suggest that the Native people seemed willing to trade, 
especially for blankets and metal tools. The secretary consistently remarked that the 
Indians appeared friendly. The meeting between the American fur traders and the Yurok 
signaled the end of the isolation of Northwest Indians, now that a practical overland 
between Oregon and California had been established. In 1843 the fur trade was deemed 
unprofitable and discontinued.332 It is interesting to note that local Indians were isolated 
throughout the period of nation-to-nation relations between the U.S. and American 
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Indians. The 1831 U.S. Supreme Court case of Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia333 
marks the beginning of the period of domestication, when Indian nations were considered 
“domestic dependent nations.” I elaborate on this period and its significance in the next 
section. 
During the Mexican War in 1846, United States military commanders became 
responsible for managing Indian affairs in California, but their main purpose was to 
mollify California’s non-Indian population. In establishing a code of Indian-White 
relations in the newly conquered Mexican province, the military governors relied on the 
advice of landholders, whose main concerns were with the Indian livestock raiding and 
the need for a stable supply of Indian laborers. Because of California’s isolation from the 
rest of the United States, makers of Indian policy in Washington, D.C. were willing to 
allow the local population to shape Indian policy in the newly acquired territory. But the 
discovery of gold in 1848, and the Gold Rush to California that followed it, marked a 
radical change in the patterns of Indian-White relations. For the first time, California 
Indians were outnumbered by non-Native gold seekers who had little respect for Native 
land or life. While the landholders had an interest in protecting Indian people for the sake 
of using their labor, the gold seekers had no such interest. The California Indian Wars (a 
series of murderous expeditions against Indian people) are described as resulting from the 
view of Indians by gold miners as an obstacle in the path to quick wealth.334    
Meanwhile, in 1850, California enacted a statute entitled “A Law for the 
Government and Protection of the Indians,” which was an integral part of the 
domestication policy mentioned above and discussed more thoroughly below. The law 
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provided that any Indian who was not in the employ of a White man could be sentenced 
to labor on a farm for four months. It also allowed the indenture of Indian children until 
they reached adulthood, with the consent of their parents or if the parents were dead. This 
harsh law was open to grave abuse, and professional Indian hunters travelled around 
California, killing Indian parents, capturing their children, and selling them to White 
ranchers. 
The Theodoratus Report stresses that Indian-White relations were not confined to 
these situations. Many Indians worked for wages in mines in various areas of California 
in the early days of the Gold Rush. The report describes trade relationships suggesting 
that the White traders tried to take advantage of the Indians’ ignorance of White trading 
practices, that the Indians knew they were being cheated and tried to avoid it in various 
ways, and that they did not always succeed in avoiding it.335 But The Klamath River was 
rich in gold, the mining towns around it grew quickly, and the rapid growth of the non-
Indian population in California created a crisis in local Indian affairs. In response, the 
federal government appointed Indian commissioners to make treaties with California 
Indians. The north coast of California fell under the jurisdiction of Redick McKee, 
chairman of the commission. In order to visit the Indians of the Klamath River region and 
negotiate treaties, he requested fifty troops, for he believed the Indians were “a bold, 
independent, warlike race, with but little, if any, knowledge of our government, or its 
resources and consider the immigration of our people … as an invasion, entitling them, if 
not to revenge, at least to pecuniary compensations.”336 
                                                           
335 Ibid., 115. 
336 McKee to the Tenth Military Department, June 17, 1851 (quoted in the Theodoratus Report, 116). 
136 
 
 
 
McKee was provided thirty-six troops under the command of Major Henry W. 
Wessells, who wrote about the area of the junction of the Klamath and Trinity Rivers that 
if it were not for the search for gold, it “would scarcely have been trotted by the foot of 
white man,” noting that this spot occupied “a central and commanding position with 
regard to numerous tribes on both sides of the river, and on the Klamath itself below the 
junction.” Wessells describes the Yurok and Hupa people as follows: “with few 
exceptions, [they] came freely into our camp, bringing their women and children, and 
exhibiting an appearance of open, cheerful frankness entirely different from that of any 
tribes heretofore met with.”337 
On October 6, 1851, representatives of Yurok, Karuk and Hupa communities 
signed a treaty with the U.S. in which they agreed to “relinquish, cede, and forever quit 
claim to the United States, all their rights, title, claim or interest of any kind which they 
or either of them have to lands or soil in California.”338 In return, the United States agreed 
to set aside a reservation “forever guaranteed” to the Indian signatories. The land 
reserved for the Indians measured approximately twelve miles in width and twenty miles 
in length. The United States reserved the right to farmland on the reservation, the right of 
way over the land, and the right to establish military posts, erect buildings, and make 
improvements to accommodate their officers. The Indians were forbidden to sell any part 
of their lands to anyone except the United States, and Whites could lease reservation 
lands only with the consent of the Indian agent. The Indians agreed to remove to the 
reservation within three years, and the U.S. agreed to provide farmers, mechanics, and 
school-teachers to instruct them in the language, arts, and agriculture of the Whites. This 
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treaty was similar to others made with California Indians, the Theodoratus Report 
explains. The treaties established U.S. sovereignty, acquired from the Indians legal title to 
their Native land, set aside lands reserved for the Indians, provided teachers of European 
trades for the Indians, and required the government to give Indian people sufficient 
livestock, seed, implements and other items necessary to carry on a self-sufficient 
livestock grazing and farming operations on the reservation. The U.S. was bound to 
protect Indian people on their reservations, to see to it that White offenders against 
Indians were prosecuted in state courts, and to give Indians some provisions with which 
to live. 
Some segments of California society were working against the treaties. Many 
non-Indians believed that the treaties reserved too much valuable agricultural and mineral 
land for California Indians. Consequently, in 1852 the Senate resolved to refuse to ratify 
all eighteen California Indian treaties. The refusal to ratify the treaties led to changes in 
Indian-White relations. Local Whites together with the state government had a greater 
role in shaping these relations in the lack of federal control. A miners’ code was 
established to regulate Indian-White relations, according to which Indians would be 
punished if they were suspected of crimes against Whites. While the code’s purpose is 
described as protecting Indians from maltreatment and preserving the peace with them, 
the punishments counted in the code are harsh and without due process. The Theodoratus 
Report describes several events following this code, including some burned Indian 
villages. These events led eventually to the establishment in 1855 of the Klamath River 
Indian Reservation, but the establishment of the reservation did not calm the situation 
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down, and warfare between Indians and Whites in the region is described at length in the 
Report.339  
The Report describes Yurok life on the lower Klamath River reservation between 
1855-1862 as better than that of other Indians on the north coast. This is because they 
were allowed to live in their traditional territory. The Klamath River reservation was 
considered “the only one in California worthy of praise.”340 The geography helped the 
Yurok and other local Indians remain fairly isolated and protected from Indian-hunting 
expeditions and other strangers. By 1859, one observer noted that there were over 220 
acres of land under cultivation on the reservation. However, in 1862, after a hard winter, 
a flood swept down the Klamath and ruined the reservation, leaving its 2000 Indians in a 
state of starvation.  
Superintendent Hanson searched the north coast for a suitable refuge for the 
displaced Yuroks, and decided to settle them on the Smith River, where Whites had 
established some twenty farms. He negotiated with the farmers for the purchase and 
improvement of their land and arranged to rent it in the meantime. He sent a group of 400 
or 500 Indians from Humboldt County to the land he rented to establish a reservation. 
They walked there barefoot through snow, rain, and mud, and started building houses 
right when they got there. The federal government, however, did not approve the 
purchase, which meant that the Indians spent the next few years tilling land that belonged 
to Whites, including a former Klamath River Indian Agent. But government documents 
show that the Yuroks did not stay on the Smith River, and by 1864, most of them 
returned to their homeland. The report describes hard labor conditions on the Smith River 
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reservation, including severe punishments by White supervisors, as one possible reason 
why the Yuroks left.341 The reservation was closed in 1869, and the Indians who resided 
there were removed once again, this time to Hoopa. 
According to the report, 2000 Yuroks were living on the Klamath River again at 
this point, and the government, while not concerned by it, did not want to establish a new 
reservation there. The California superintendent at the time recommended that the 
government do nothing since the Yuroks were living at “their old homes subsisting 
themselves without any expense to the government.”342 Until 1891, those 2000 Yuroks 
lived on the Klamath River outside of government control, even though the federal 
government still owned that land. The Hoopa Valley reservation was the only reservation 
in Northwest California at the time. The report describes difficult conditions on the 
Hoopa reservation, including violence and injustice, while life on the Klamath River is 
described as peaceful. Several attempts were made to convince the Yuroks to move to the 
Hoopa reservation for their protection, but most of them consistently refused. The Local 
Agent observed in 1871 that “the love of the Indian for the home of his fathers is so 
strong that he will seldom leave it for any prospect of good that may be held out to him” 
and recommended to make the old Klamath reservation a dependency of the Hoopa 
reservation.343  
This agent was replaced by a Methodist minister after only one year as the Hoopa 
agent, in accordance with President Grant’s policy, which gave various church groups 
authority to nominate Indian agents. The purpose was to hasten the process of converting 
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the Indians to Christianity and making them into useful citizens, as described in more 
detail in the next section. Some of the Christian employees were interested not only in 
conversion but in gold, and mining activity by Whites on the Hoopa reservation 
increased. In 1874, the local agent reported that the mining intruded upon graves and 
sacred places, and that this intrusion bothered the Indians. The agent ordered the miners 
to leave but had no support from the commander, who did not evict the miners.344 Whites 
also expressed interest in the timber on the Klamath River, but local agents consistently 
recommended protecting the area by either letting the Yuroks control it or extending the 
Hoopa reservation boundaries to include it.345          
 During the early 1880s there was a growing movement toward allotment, which I 
describe in more detail in the next section. Allotment meant breaking up reservations into 
farm-sized units, distributing the parcels among Indian families, and returning the 
remainder to the public domain for further disposition. The Theodoratus Report explains 
that while most reservations were established by treaties and therefore could not be 
closed without legislative action, the California reservations were established by 
executive orders and could be altered or abandoned by administrative decision.346 In 
1883, the Indians on the lower Klamath (which was still technically a reservation, even 
though the Indians were largely left to run their own lives there) were told that the 
reservation could be allotted to family heads. The Yuroks, realizing their precarious 
situation, petitioned for allotment because they preferred to be able to maintain some of 
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their homeland to the alternative option, that their reservation would simply be 
terminated.     
 “In spite of the intent of the legislation,” the report tells us, “it was not the Indians 
who were the principal beneficiaries of Indian allotments on the Klamath River”: 
Of the 25,000 acres in the original reservation, only 10,000 were allotted to 
Indians. In 1918 the Hoopa Superintendent noted that “for some reason the land 
that was sold [to Whites, from the excess that was returned to the public domain] 
contained practically all of the valuable timber and the land that was allotted to 
the Indians was what was left over.” The Superintendent knew “nothing about the 
circumstances under which these allotments were made but each time that I make 
a trip to the territory I have it more forceably impressed upon my mind that 
somehow the Indians did not get a fair portion of the land.”347  
The study reports that in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, there is 
evidence that Indians in the Klamath River region continued to rely on places in the High 
Country for medicine, power, and protection, despite the disruptions of the previous 
decades.348 The report also cites evidence of Karuk ceremonies, including the Deerskin 
dance, performed in the area. The latest testimony brought in the report is from 1928, 
which is significant because it means that the ceremonies were still carried at a time they 
could be transmitted to people alive at the time the study was conducted. Finn Jacobs, a 
Karuk man, wrote a letter describing the use of the High Country in some detail and 
complaining that the Whites did not follow the strict religious rules that the Karuk 
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applied to the sacred land. He explained that “All Pick-ya-wish ground should be kept 
holy,” like “school and cemetery” are to White people: “no one should go around it until 
it is necessary.” He describes ceremonies that are carried over a period of several days 
“every year, during August, [in] the dark of the moon.” To conduct the ceremonies 
properly, the proper person should climb two mountains in the Pick-ya-wish grounds, but 
Whites had constructed fences that obstructed the path and this “spoils it.”349  
 The Six Rivers National Forest was created after World War Two, and the report 
describes the debate over its name (the name “Yurok” had been proposed, but the 
Forester opposed giving it an Indian name). Significant parts of the High Country have 
been under Forest Service control since then, and the use of areas such as Doctor Rock by 
the Service in the 1950s is described, suggesting no knowledge of the significance of the 
area to Northwest Indians. However, in 1965, Forest Service awareness of the spiritual 
significance of the area is documented, when a forest supervisor describes Doctor Rock 
as one of the important sites in the area and the Indians who use it:     
 The Karok Indian Medicine Men (doctors) climbed the twenty miles of trail from 
Orleans on the Klamath River each summer to this point to meditate with the 
spirits. They remained for several weeks fasting and cleansing their souls in their 
church under the skies.350    
 The historical part of the Theodoratus Report contextualizes the Lyng case and shows 
how it came to be that the High Country is under the control of the Forest Service and not 
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of the Northwest Indians. This is a significant context, that I believe should have been 
taken into account when the case was decided. Apparently, the Theodoratus team thought 
that this context should be taken into account by the Service when deciding whether to 
carry out the disputed development plan. However, both the Service and the Court 
ignored this context when making their respective decisions, and I believe that it is the 
legal frameworks of free exercise and of environmental justice that allowed them to 
ignore it. This chapter asks what it means to take this context seriously, and to answer 
this question I am now turning to a broader historical survey, to show how the local 
history described in the Theodoratus Report fits into the legal and political developments 
in the U.S. at the time.     
 
Legal and Political History 
 
The first encounter of Northwest Indians with White Americans in the late 1820s 
coincided with the transition from a treaty-making period, when Indian communities 
were considered sovereign nations, the relationship with whom is regulated by 
international law, to the domestic period – when Indian communities were considered 
“domestic dependent nations.” The transition is marked by the case of Cherokee Nation 
v. State of Georgia (1831). The Cherokee brought an action before the U.S. Supreme 
Court against Georgia, who had been continuously attempting to dispossess them from 
their lands, as a foreign nation. Chief Justice John Marshall found himself in a difficult 
situation. If the Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction of this case between a foreign 
government and a state and ruled against Georgia’s aggression, as the international legal 
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standards required, the authority of the Court would be jeopardized. The hostile chief 
executive, Andrew Jackson, would likely seek to undermine or render impotent any 
ruling against Georgia’s aggression. Rather than face the potential of a decision that 
might be ignored by the federal executive, Marshall described the Cherokee nation as a 
“domestic dependent nation,” thus denying the Court jurisdiction as the action was not 
between a foreign nation and a state.351  
Chief Justice Marshall, while denying Indian nations status as foreign nations, 
established the unenforced right under United States law of Indian nations to occupy, as 
domestic dependent nations, the land Indians believed was theirs. The aggression of the 
State of Georgia and the executive branch could not be checked by the limited legal 
rights of land occupation Marshall had tried to establish for the Indigenous populations, 
and this period was marked by forced removal and relocation of Indians, including the 
Cherokee “Trail of Tears.”352 Jill Norgren reads this case alongside the other famous 
Cherokee case, Worcester v. Georgia (1832),353 arguing that Marshall had to twist history 
in order to define Indian nations as domestic dependent nations and ultimate title as 
resting with the federal government. She also argues that while Marshall intended to 
protect Indian sovereignty, he ultimately failed.354    
Taken together with Johnson v. McIntosh, an 1823 land title precedent the later 
cases relied upon, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and Worcester v. Georgia created the 
theoretical foundations for situating Indigenous peoples in the legal system of the United 
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States, and they are known as the Marshall Trilogy. Operating under a modified form of 
the Doctrine of Christian Discovery, Johnson established the legal notion that simply 
discovering Indigenous peoples established ownership by the discovering Christian 
European power of the underlying title to the lands Indian peoples lived on. This gave the 
discovering power the exclusive right to purchase the lands the Indigenous peoples 
continued to have the legal right to occupy. As Indian nations did not own the lands they 
occupied and could only sell their lands to the discovering power or their successor in 
law (as the United States was to Great Britain after Independence and to France after the 
Louisiana Purchase), Indian nations were not fully sovereign foreign nations, but 
domestic dependent nations, with the United States standing as their guardian (in theory, 
but rarely in practice), as Marshall determined in Cherokee Nation. In Worcester, 
Marshall affirmed the supremacy of the United Sates government over Indian relations 
and the powerlessness of the states over Indians and the internal affairs of sovereign 
Indian nations. This was the established legal theory, even if historical practice did not 
necessarily conform to the theory.355 
The era of domestic dependent nations involved a long period of transition and for 
the initial decades of this period the Indians of the southwest were not under any claim of 
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United States jurisdiction. The treaty making process remained in place until 1871.356 
Over this period the U.S. government pressured Indian nations to remove from the east, 
cede land, and used negotiation or force to reduce Indigenous land holdings to smaller 
and smaller reservations. Attempting to limit the Indigenous population to reserves in less 
violent ways, the federal government moved the Indian Office from the Department of 
War to the Department of the Interior in 1849.357 Initially intended by many of the non-
Indian population as places for the Indigenous peoples to retain self-government, by the 
late nineteenth century, Indian reservations had begun to be seen and used as tools for the 
destruction of Indian self-governance and the forced adoption of Christian faiths and the 
cultural ways of the dominant non-Indian population.358  
The assault against Indigenous culture and sovereignty began one of its more 
aggressive phases with allotment. In 1887 the U.S. Congress passed the Dawes Act, 
which called for breaking up reservations into individual allotments privately owned by 
individuals. Each head of an Indigenous household was to receive 160 acres of land and 
expected to become a farmer.359 The “surplus” land was to be made available for use by 
the settler population. In the period of allotment, land held by the Indigenous population 
shrunk from 138 million acres to 48 million, with 20 million acres of that land being 
semi-arid or desert.360 During the era of allotment, Indian reservations were ruled by 
Indian Agents of the Federal government.361 As part of the policy of the destruction of 
Indigenous religion and culture, the federal government provided for Christian 
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missionary boarding schools that were intended to prevent the transmission of Indigenous 
religion and culture to the next generation. It was during this period that resistance, both 
Indigenous and non-Indian, grew to these repressive policies. Non-Indians who hoped to 
secure constitutional protections for Indian religious freedom worked to get the 1924 
Citizenship Act passed. This act conferred upon American Indians United States 
citizenship, whether they wanted it or not. Though initiated by those seeking to promote 
Indian religious freedom, the 1924 act providing U.S. citizenship to the Indigenous 
population has been viewed by many as another avenue with which to force the 
Indigenous population to abandon their culture in favor of that of the European 
immigrant population.362 
1934 marked the next major shift in federal Indian policy with the passage of the 
Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), or Indian New Deal. Championed by John Collier, a 
cultural pluralist who became Commissioner for Indian Affairs, the IRA was an attempt 
to reverse the policy of governmental, religious, and cultural destruction of Indigenous 
communities. The IRA promoted the adoption of Indian governments modeled on Euro-
American political forms. Collier ended the Bureau of Indian Affairs policies that 
criminalized Indigenous cultural practices and instituted a revolving development fund to 
promote economic growth on reservations. Allotment, while already largely abandoned 
due to Indigenous resistance, was repudiated as a policy.363 
Indian reactions to the IRA process of creating European-style governments was 
as varied as the conditions of Indian peoples. Many Indigenous groups who were on the 
brink of social destruction were able to restructure and revive under IRA governments, 
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like the Washoe. Other Indian nations with surviving traditional governments, such as the 
Hopi, found the IRA government to be in direct competition with their traditional forms 
of organization, and adoption of IRA governments caused new political divisions within 
Indian communities. 
After the Second World War, federal policy changed yet again with a renewed 
assault on Indigenous sovereignty, and the termination era began. The federal 
government sought to terminate federal services that provided economic support to 
Indigenous peoples and eliminate their governments. In 1946 the United States 
government started the Indian Claims Commission (ICC) to provide financial redress for 
lands illegally appropriated from Indigenous peoples by the federal government. The ICC 
was a special administrative court designed to examine historical claims against the 
United State government for the illegal or unconscionable dispossession of Indigenous 
peoples from their lands in the lower forty-eight states. It was not empowered to return 
lands under any circumstances. Highly conservative in its approach, the ICC was 
intended to last only a decade but was not concluded until the late 1970s.  
The ICC was intended to lay to rest outstanding claims; the supporters of 
termination felt that, by addressing these outstanding grievances, the path would be 
cleared to end the separate political and cultural identity of Indian communities. To 
further this end, Indigenous people were offered financial incentives to move to urban 
areas and leave reservations. Additionally, Public Law 280 provided states with the 
power to take full criminal jurisdiction over Indian lands. In 1953, Congress passed 
legislation allowing for the removal of federal recognition and services to Indian nations, 
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and the federal government terminated the political and legal existence of 109 Indian 
groups between 1954 and the early 1970s.364 
 The termination process revived Indigenous efforts to preserve their religions, 
cultures, and political sovereignty. The 1960s saw the rise of Red Power and Indian 
militancy. In 1968 the American Indian Movement (AIM) was founded. In 1969, Indian 
activists seized Alcatraz Island, justifying their actions on treaty provisions that stated 
unused federal installations were to be returned to local Indians. In 1972, AIM and other 
Indian organizations participated in the larger cross-country caravan known as the Trail 
of Broken Treaties. This event ended with an unplanned occupation of the Department of 
Interior building where the Bureau of Indian Affairs was headquartered in the District of 
Columbia. The occupation ended peacefully through negotiations. Among other 
concessions, the U.S. Government agreed to pay the fairs of the occupiers to return home. 
In 1973, AIM occupied the church at Wounded Knee in what has come to be known as 
Second Wounded Knee.365  
Among the less deadly actions of his administration, President Nixon renounced 
termination and ushered in what is known among scholars as the era of renewed Indian 
sovereignty or the era of government to government relations. The Nixon administration 
undertook reforms that promoted government to government relations between Indian 
governments and the United States. Both Indians and official governmental policy 
supported this new era of self-determination. The federal government ceded control of 
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more and more functions to Indian governments. The policy gained formal standing as 
law in 1975 with the passage of the Indian Self-Determination and Education Act.366  
1978 saw the passage of two landmark pieces of legislation that addressed Indian 
rights. The U.S. Congress passed the Indian Child Welfare Act in 1978 in part to address 
the widespread abuses by state children services agencies taking Indian children and 
placing them in non-Indian homes, for both foster care and adoption.367 That same year 
saw the United States Congress pass the American Indian Religious Freedom Act. This 
law changed the official stated policy to one of preserving and protecting the religions of 
the Indigenous peoples of the land it now occupied. The American Indian Religious 
Freedom Act provides for consultation with Indian leaders when governmental actions 
might impact Indian sacred sites, but it provides no substantive protections. It is at this 
point that the Lyng lawsuit begins. 
 
From Domesticity to Dignity 
 
“Dignity,” a 50-foot-tall statue in Chamberlain, South Dakota, was designed in 2016 to 
honor the cultures of the Lakota and Dakota people. The face of Dignity was modeled 
after three Native American women, ages 14, 29, and 55. “Dignity represents the 
courage, perseverance and wisdom of the Lakota and Dakota culture in South Dakota,” 
says sculptor Dale Lamphere. “My hope is that the sculpture might serve as a symbol of 
respect and promise for the future.” The statue’s description online includes the words 
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“grace,” “beauty,” “peace,” and “tolerance.”368 Thus, it invites us to reflect on the 
relationship between dignity, indigeneity, and virtue. It also invites us to think about the 
gendered aspects of this relationship: why is Dignity a woman? Why is she modelled 
after three different women of different ages? Rhetoric of dignity and virtue has been 
deployed to domesticate women, and this point is important to my argument.    
My goal in this section is to bring together two important concepts in human 
rights law that are extremely difficult to define and that have been vastly criticized for 
their elusive nature, because I believe that thinking of the two together will help to 
broaden or to complicate our understanding of both. I came to this project assuming that 
indigeneity will help me to make dignity a more relevant concept for the advancement of 
justice, beyond the discourse on human rights that has continuously failed marginalized 
groups, such as women and racialized minorities. My intuition was that the human rights 
discourse that is controlled by the concept of dignity is problematic because of two of its 
prominent features: it simultaneously individualizes and universalizes. Indigeneity, on the 
other hand, shifts our attention from persons to peoples, allowing us to think of rights as 
collective or communal, taking us beyond the liberal philosophy that has justified so 
many of the West’s wrongs. I still think that this argument can be made, and that it is 
worth pursuing, but I also discovered that dignity can help to complicate our 
understanding of indigeneity in unexpected ways. I was inspired by the work of 
Bernadette Atuahene, who ties dignity with property in a novel and persuasive way, and I 
discuss her work and its application to my dissertation in this section.369 
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Is human dignity a useful political concept for us today? Is it reducible to respect 
or to autonomy? Some think it is useful because it can mean whatever one wants it to 
mean; others think it is useless for that same reason. For example, Reva Segal has shown 
how both pro-life activists and pro-choice activists have used dignity to support their 
opposing positions.370 It is certainly productive, I think, to acknowledge dignity’s 
elusiveness. Perhaps we can only understand fully what dignity means at instances when 
society fails to protect the dignity of its members. Perhaps we only know dignity in the 
face of indignation. In Ranjana Khanna’s words, “It may often be very clear what it 
means to be treated without dignity, but it is less clear what dignity is except at times 
when the term itself is instrumentalized.”371 Erin Daly writes that in Israel (and this is 
true for many constitutional democracies as well), dignity “has been described as ‘the 
source of all human rights […] Indeed, it is human dignity that makes a person worthy of 
rights’.”372 Though it is agreed that dignity must be protected, it is not clear who 
possesses it, what exactly it is, and what the normative implications are of recognizing it 
in those who possess it. 
 Nevertheless, Atuahene uses dignity as the central concept in her theory. She does 
so because:  
it resonates across cultural, geographic, and religious divides. Although moral 
philosophers such as Kant have been important for how Western thinkers 
understand dignity, it is a concept that also can be located within cultural and 
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religious belief systems found in regions such as Africa, Asia, the Middle East, 
and Latin America.373 
Her definition of dignity is based on two central elements: equal human worth and 
autonomy. She defines dignity as “the notion that people have equal worth, which gives 
them the right to live as autonomous beings not under the authority of another. 
Consequently, individuals and communities are deprived of dignity when subject to 
dehumanization, infantilization, or community destruction.”374 
 Atuahene writes about what she calls “dignity takings” and “dignity restoration” 
in South Africa, but I find her theory useful in linking dignity and indigeneity, which is 
my task in this section. According to Atuahene, the term “dignity takings” applies “when 
a state directly or indirectly destroys or confiscates property rights from owners or 
occupiers whom it deems to be sub persons without paying just compensation or without 
a legitimate public purpose.”375 She argues that a comprehensive remedy for dignity 
takings entails what she calls “dignity restoration,” which she understands as 
compensation that addresses both the economic harms and the dignity deprivations 
involved. 
The definition of dignity takings that ties together the expropriation of land with 
dehumanization of its occupants helps me to respond to Waldron’s question, discussed in 
Chapter Threex, why indigeneity is important. I start with the Doctrine of Discovery. 
Two Papal Bulls, from 1455 and 1492, had declared the legitimacy of Christian 
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domination over “pagans,” sanctifying enslavement and expropriation of property, 
specifically in the lands discovered by Christopher Columbus. What was termed “the 
Doctrine of Christian Discovery” saw American Indians as sub-human because they were 
not Christian, and Chief Justice John Marshall used the language of these Papal Bulls to 
justify state dominion over Indigenous peoples in a series of Supreme Court decisions 
early in the nineteenth century, replacing the terms “Christian” and “pagans” with 
“European” and “savages” – a term that also dehumanizes Indians, even if this 
dehumanization was secularized.  
Based on the notion that Indigenous peoples could not possess title to land, Indian 
title was a colonial fiction, created by Marshall in order to grant Native peoples some 
property rights while allowing the U.S. to maintain control over land, especially its sale 
and distribution. Marshall ruled that Indian nations had only “the right of occupancy.” 
They can do whatever they want with the land while they occupy it, but they cannot sell it 
to anyone but the sovereign. According to Marshall, discovery of a given territory 
granted the European discoverer the right, against other European nations, to acquire 
Indian land (by purchase or conquest) and then grant that land to non-Indians. On the one 
hand, the Court created a new property right for Indians, one that all parties, including the 
state, were bound to respect. At the same time, the Court took away absolute control of 
Indian land by Indians. The Court said that Indians possessed an occupancy right that 
only the discovering sovereign could extinguish. Thus, discovery did not vest title in the 
discoverer; it gave the discovering nation the right to extinguish Indian title via purchase 
or conquest. The rights of the discoverer were against those of other nations staking a 
claim to Indian land; they were not necessarily rights over Indians. The Court now said 
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that Indians could convey their land to the discovering sovereign and to no one else. So 
the sovereign’s rights derived from discovery, and the Indian’s rights came from 
occupancy. Residence in a given area conferred Indian title upon an Indian nation.  
We can ask how come such a revolutionary property expropriation did not do 
anything to the institution of property, and one possible answer would be that the people 
whose property was expropriated were already considered nonmembers of the 
community and therefore not worthy of property rights. In the Native American case, 
they were also considered too nomadic to own land and too unwilling to make significant 
improvements that would clarify their claim and give them moral weigh. And so the 
answer to Waldron’s question about the importance of indigeneity would be that taking 
their lands required their continuing dehumanization and the denial of their sovereignty 
and autonomy, which Atuahene sees as the violation of their dignity.  
As we have already seen, the nineteenth-century Marshall Court – along with 
creating Native title – also domesticated Indian nations, referring to them as “domestic 
dependent nations.” When I talk about this domestication I mean three things: (1) the 
discourse of domesticating or civilizing the savage Indian (“kill the Indian and save the 
man”), which calls for the implementation of policies that albeit the rhetoric of 
humanization that accompanied them definitely violated the dignity of American Indians, 
infantilized them, and destructed their communities; (2) The attack on Indian sovereignty 
through the domestic sphere (including the practice of out-adoption, the forced removal 
of Indigenous children from their families to attend government-funded boarding schools 
and the allotment of reservation land in severalty); (3) The legal definition of Native 
Americans as “domestic dependent nations” in the Supreme Court in the nineteenth 
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century. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that the 
nationhood of Indian communities was limited primarily by U.S. military conquest. It 
defined the Indian political organization as “domestic dependent nations” and their 
members as “wards of the nation,” existing in “a state of pupilage.” According to the 
Supreme Court: “Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his 
guardian. They look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its 
power; appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the president as their great 
father.”376 Beth Piatote writes that “Assimilation-era policies […] were driven by the 
notion that the tribal-national polity, as a competing national sovereignty, must be 
destroyed. And the way to break up the tribe was to break up the Indian family and to 
cultivate children’s allegiance to the United States rather than to the tribe.”377 
A telling example can be found in a speech by Indian Rights Association activist 
Merrill Gates in 1885: 
The question whether [Indian] parents have a right to educate their children to 
regard the tribal organization as supreme, brings us at once to the consideration of 
the family. And here I find the key to the Indian problem. More than any other 
idea, this consideration of the family and its proper sphere in the civilizing of the 
races and in the development of the individual, serves to unlock the difficulties 
which surround legislation for the Indian.378  
Linking the fate of the Indian home with that of the Indian nation, Gates continues:  
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We must as rapidly as possible break up the tribal organization and give them 
law, with the family and land in severalty as the central idea. We must not only 
give them law, we must force law upon them. We must not only offer them 
education, we must force education upon them.379 
Bowers and Carpenter think about domestication in the context of Lyng. As part of the 
assimilation policy of the early twentieth century, Indian religion was outlawed and 
referred to as “the devil’s religion.” As a result, many Indian peoples stopped performing 
certain rituals or were forced to go underground. In the face of racism and discrimination, 
many Indians tried hard to conceal their Indianness, undergoing a kind of identity crisis. 
The worst identity crisis was experienced by the generation of Indians who were sent to 
Indian boarding schools – the worst manifestation of the assimilation policy. Indian 
children from the Lower Klamath River were sent to residential schools in Northern 
Oregon. According to Bowers and Carpenter,  
These children left the Reservation speaking tribal languages, believing in their 
cultural covenants, and practicing the religion – only to be beaten and punished 
for exactly these traditional practices by boarding school teachers and 
administrators. These students became the first generation of Indian people from 
the Klamath River not to live in their aboriginal territory or participate in annual 
tribal religious ceremonies.380 
When they returned from boarding schools to the reservation, they found extreme 
poverty, no job opportunities, and felt alienated from their traditional ways of life. “Yet, 
even at this low point,” observe Bowers and Carpenter,  
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Hope was on the horizon – the civil rights era of the 1960s was headed to the 
Klamath River. The generation raised pre-contact was still alive. Although they 
were weary to “be Indian,” they still knew their traditions. Children born in the 
1940s and later were not sent away to boarding schools and in fact, they had been 
exposed to a better education in local public schools. Some of them had made it to 
college, graduated, and headed home.381 
Their experiences at the university had politicized them, having been exposed to Indian 
activism in Alcatraz and Wounded Knee. They were eager to reassert their Indian identity 
and to engage their elders in a political movement. Nonprofit organizations in Northwest 
California, funded by the U.S. as part of the government’s “war on poverty” campaign, 
were involved in organizing local Indians, “Remarkably,” write Bowers and Carpenter, 
“within a few years the people began to dance again.”382 Medicine women returned to the 
High Country. “These events were significant to revitalizing the tribal religion and many 
of the participants would later become plaintiffs in the Lyng litigation.”383 In the Lyng 
trial, when witness Peters is asked by the judge about the impact that the development 
plan might have on the revitalization of local Indian nations, he explains that the High 
Country is “where we get personal power that reaffirms our Indianness and our way of 
life. To disrupt it and to destroy it, as the Forest Service is proposing to do, would 
definitely have an impact on the regeneration of Indian people. Currently it would totally 
destroy any hope of our grandchildren from knowing what that area has for them.”384 
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Domestication is, of course, the way in which patriarchal societies oppress 
women as well.385 The domesticity regime that created a private-public divide and 
confined women to the private sphere, can be thought of as violating women’s dignity 
even if the same regime uses the idea of dignity to justify itself. This brings me back to 
the South Dakota statue. Is building this statue – a 50-foot tall Indian woman in the 
public square – a practice that can begin to restore dignity (both women’s and Indian’s)? 
This is definitely the stated goal of the White donors and sculptor, who worked closely 
with local Native advisors to make sure his creation would be culturally appropriate. 
Local Lakota teenage girls testify that having such a model – finally a Lakota woman to 
literally look up to – makes a real difference for them. While this statue does not address 
the economic harm that was done to these people, it might be starting to address the 
violation of their dignity. At the closing of this section, I would like to return to the words 
of sculptor Dale Lamphere, who sounds as if he himself has read Atuahene: “The thing 
that I’m trying to do is to create a real presence in this sculpture. You know, I have at 
some point to let go of my own pre-conceived notions and let her have her own life […] 
and that’s a subtle process.”386 
 
From Sovereignty to Freedom 
 
Deloria notes that “Equality under the law […] was a secularized and generalized 
interpretation of the Christian brotherhood of men – the universal appeal of individuals 
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standing equally before God now seen as people standing equally before the law and 
secular institutions.”387 But isn’t sovereignty a secularized Christian concept? Taiaike 
Alfred responds to this worry, writing that when we think about sovereignty in relation to 
Indigenous peoples, rather than understanding it as supreme political authority, we must 
frame the discussion within an intellectual framework of internal colonization, which he 
understands as “the historical process and political reality defined in the structures and 
techniques of government that consolidate the domination of indigenous peoples by a 
foreign yet sovereign settler state.”388 And while internal colonization is the political 
reality of most Indigenous peoples, Alfred reminds us that the idea of state sovereignty 
has been contested – both practically and theoretically – since its imposition.  
The discourse on Indigenous sovereignty is therefore an interplay between notions of 
dominion (the Western conception of sovereignty) and notions of freedom, respect and 
autonomy (the Indigenous account of political relations).  
 According to Alfred, history is written in a way that supports the myth of state 
sovereignty and with it the colonial project: while in reality, encounters between 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples were as rich and diverse as any other cultural 
encounter – “war, peace, cooperation, antagonism and shifting dominance and 
subservience”389 – this history has been erased in favor of a fiction of a single 
sovereignty. “Controlling, universalizing and assimilating, these fictions have been 
imposed in the form of law on weakened but resistant and remembering peoples.”390 
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 Alfred refers to original treaties between European sovereign states and 
Indigenous peoples in North America, documents that always recognized Indigenous 
peoples as the original occupiers of the land, and referred explicitly to their separate 
political existence and territorial independence. While the written history of North 
America tells a story of sovereignty that is binary (to use Bruyneel’s language), Alfred 
says that this story is limited factually (European settlement was negotiated rather than 
absolute), as well as theoretically:  
[…] the discourse of sovereignty upon which the current post facto justification 
rests is an exclusively European discourse. That is, European assertions in both a 
legal and political sense were made strictly vis-à-vis other European powers, and 
did not impinge upon or necessarily even affect in law or politics the rights and 
status of indigenous nations. It is only from our distant historical vantage point, 
and standing upon a counterfactual rock, that we are able to see European 
usurpation of indigenous sovereignty as justified.391 
Albeit the fictional nature of the concept of sovereignty, it has nevertheless limited the 
way we think, Alfred admits. The conceptual and definitional problematic scholars tend 
to address is that of the accommodation of Indigenous peoples within a legitimate 
framework of settler state governance. “When we step outside this discourse, we confront 
a different problematic, that of the state’s ‘sovereignty’ itself, and its actual meaning in 
contrast to the facts and the potential that exists for a nation-to-nation relationship.”392 
 Indigenous scholars have explored this problematic, though. Alfred reads Russel 
Barsh and James Henderson’s The Road: Indian Tribes and Political Liberty, a landmark 
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work that critiques the notion of sovereignty from within the historic and legal 
framework of state sovereignty.393 Alfred reads their work as “profound,” emphasizing 
the potential for “tribal liberty” and state sovereignty to coexist according to their theory. 
“In this sense,” writes Alfred, “The Road follows the trajectory – native sovereignty 
within and in relation to state sovereignty – first set forth in the 1830s in the Cherokee 
decisions, which suggested that tribes were ‘domestic dependent nations’.”394  
 But sovereignty is practiced through institutions beyond legal doctrines – Alfred 
points to political, economic, and intellectual strategies that the state uses in order “to 
impose and maintain its dominance.”395 Alfred reads Vine Deloria and Clifford Lytle’s 
work as showing how the legal doctrine is mirrored in governmental structures:396   
In considering the question of the “sovereignty” of indigenous peoples within its 
territorial borders, the state takes various positions: the classic strategies include 
outright denial of indigenous rights; a theoretical acceptance of indigenous rights 
combined with an assertion that these have been extinguished historically; and 
legal doctrines that transform indigenous rights from their autonomous nature to 
contingent rights, existing only within the framework of colonial law.397  
We see these strategies in the various policies described below, of domestication, 
termination, and assimilation. With these policies, Alfred writes, “the potential for 
recognition of indigenous nationhood has gone unrealized.”398 It is therefore within a 
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framework of domestication – and the intellectual and political environment that the 
domestication project created – that Indigenous peoples had to struggle for freedom and 
power.  
Once Indigenous peoples started to regain the capacity to govern themselves, 
Alfred writes, Indigenous scholars have started to doubt the viability of working within 
the system. They stopped considering themselves “the nations within” – a status that saw 
Indigenous peoples as sovereign but always saw their sovereignty as inferior to that of the 
state. An intellectual trend that criticized the authority that the U.S. and Canada claimed 
to have over Indigenous peoples emerged, a trend that Alfred refers to as “the project of 
deconstructing the architecture of colonial domination.”399 This movement asserted, on 
the one hand, a prior and coexisting sovereignty and, on the other, a right of self-
determination for Indigenous peoples in international law. Alfred reads Robert Williams’ 
critique of what he calls “the discourse of conquest,” according to which law has been the 
most significant tool of European colonial genocide.400 After Williams’ critique, writes 
Alfred, “any history of the concept of sovereignty in North America must trace the 
manipulation of the concept as it evolved to justify the elimination of indigenous 
peoples.”401  
Alfred also reads David Wilkins’ work, pointing to the U.S. Supreme Court’s role 
in simultaneously protecting Indigenous sovereignty and limiting it, as is especially 
apparent in the creation of the status of “domestic dependent nations.”402 All this has led 
                                                           
399 Ibid., 463. 
400 Robert Williams, The American Indian in Western Legal Thought (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1990). 
401 Alfred, “Sovereignty,” 463. 
402 David E. Wilkins, American Indian Sovereignty and the U.S. Supreme Court: The Masking of Justice 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1997). 
 
164 
 
 
 
to a sentiment within Native communities, according to which “sovereignty” is 
inappropriate as a political objective for Indigenous peoples, a sentiment that Alfred 
expresses throughout his scholarship. What does it mean to completely reject the existing 
intellectual and political structures for the relationship between Indigenous peoples and 
the state? What does it mean to reject the idea of sovereignty altogether? Alfred reminds 
us that Indigenous peoples had their own systems of government before contact; he 
reminds us of the complications in adopting a European notion of (colonial) power into a 
post-colonial system of Indigenous communities.    
Using the sovereignty paradigm, indigenous people have made significant legal 
and political gains toward reconstructing the autonomous aspects of their 
individual, collective and social identities. The positive effect of the sovereignty 
movement in terms of mental, physical, and emotional health cannot be denied or 
understated. Yet this does not seem to be enough: the seriousness of the social ills, 
which do continue, suggests that an externally focused assertion of sovereign 
power vis-à-vis the state is neither complete nor in and of itself a solution. 
Indigenous leaders engaging themselves and their communities in arguments 
framed within a liberal paradigm have not been able to protect the integrity of 
their nations. “Aboriginal rights” and “tribal sovereignty” are in fact the benefits 
accrued by indigenous peoples who have agreed to abandon autonomy to enter the 
state’s legal and political framework.403  
A movement for Indigenous self-determination, Alfred writes, has nevertheless found 
success in re-instituting systems that promote Indigenous values. This success required 
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rejecting of the legitimacy of the state and recovering traditional Indigenous ways, first 
by activists and then by intellectuals. In Canada, Alfred writes, the Indigenous struggle is 
to restore the original relationships with the state, thus transcending colonial structures of 
domination. Alfred sees a great potential in this struggle. But he also recognizes the 
problems integral to this struggle. “The core problem for both activists and scholars 
revolves around the fact that the colonial system itself has become embedded within 
indigenous societies.”404 While there is a revival of traditional culture, the political 
structure is still dictated by Western paradigms, which causes alienation within 
Indigenous communities.  
A perspective that does not see the ongoing crisis fueled by continuing efforts to 
keep indigenous people focused on a quest for power within a paradigm bounded 
by the vocabulary, logic and institutions of “sovereignty” will be blind to the 
reality of a persistent intent to maintain the colonial oppression of indigenous 
nations. The next phase of scholarship and activism, then, will need to transcend 
the mentality that supports the colonization of indigenous nations, beginning with 
the rejection of the term and notion of indigenous “sovereignty.”405 
What will an Indigenous government be like after self-government is achieved? Alfred 
asks. Indigenous self-government will not be a replica of pre-colonial systems of 
government; it will adapt to modern administrative techniques. But he hopes that the new 
system will embody the underlying values of Indigenous communities. His fear is that 
new systems will resemble non-Indigenous systems, thus inflicting self-oppression. To 
avoid this, the discourse of sovereignty needs to be constantly criticized. “Traditional” 
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Indigenous nationhood, Alfred explains, are non-hierarchical – “there is no absolute 
authority, no coercive enforcement of decisions […] and no separate ruling entity.”406   
 Alfred mentions Deloria again, and specifically the distinction the latter drew 
between Indigenous conceptions of nationhood and notions of state sovereignty or self-
government. While self-determination is appropriate for nations, self-government, 
delegated by sovereign states, is inappropriate. According to Deloria, delegated forms do 
not address the spiritual basis of Indigenous societies.  
Self-government is not an Indian idea. It originates in the minds of non-Indians 
who have reduced the traditional ways to dust, or believe they have, and now wish 
to give, as a gift, a limited measure of local control and responsibility. Self-
government is an exceedingly useful concept for Indians to use when dealing with 
the larger government because it provides a context within which negotiations can 
take place. Since it will never supplant the intangible, spiritual, and emotional 
aspirations of American Indians, it cannot be regarded as the final solution to 
Indian problems.407 
Similarly, Alfred (following Deloria) critiques notions of aboriginal rights or land rights, 
that are usually viewed as progressive, as ones that still operate within a colonial legal 
framework, and therefore even achieving them actually amounts to very limited progress. 
Indigenous peoples “must conform to state-derived criteria and represent ascribed or 
negotiated identities in order to access these legal rights.”408 As we saw in the previous 
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chapter, the conception of indigeneity as fixed and tied to the past serves the purpose of 
maintaining the myth of conquest that Alfred has described above, and with it, state 
legitimacy. But this story is anti-historical, according to Alfred. The legitimacy of the 
state was not achieved through the rule of law but through illegitimate means, such as the 
spread of diseases and massive immigration. Only recently have Indigenous communities 
been able to manipulate state institutions, and they have gained support from other 
marginalized groups. The state, realizing that it can no longer ignore the Indigenous 
voice, has responded by attempting to draw Indigenous peoples closer to the state, 
securing certain rights that in reality only helps maintaining the image of the “authentic 
Indian” and with it the myth of state legitimacy.    
“Is there a Native philosophical alternative?” Alfred asks. “In most traditional 
indigenous conceptions, nature and the natural order are the basic referents when thinking 
of power, justice, and social relations.”409 In these views, the relationship between human 
beings and the earth is one of partnership. Because the land was created by a higher 
power, human beings have no right to possess it or dispose of it. The partnership with the 
earth gives human beings special responsibilities within the areas they occupy, “linking 
them in a natural and sacred way to their territories.”410 This notion is opposed to the 
current U.S. notion of economic development that makes the natural world into resources 
and commodities (especially on Indigenous lands), Alfred writes. Many Indigenous 
traditions strive for a balanced relationship with the environment; they aim for the 
sustainability of the earth and the well-being of the people.  
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Unlike the earth, political and social institutions were created by men and women, 
and they have the power and responsibility to change them. “Governance structures and 
social institutions are designed to empower individuals and reinforce tradition to maintain 
the balance found in nature.”411 Sovereignty is, of course, a political rather than a natural 
structure. “For people committed to transcending the imperialism of state sovereignty, the 
challenge is to de-think the concept of sovereignty and replace it with a notion of power 
that has at its root a more appropriate premise.”412  
For Alfred, following Tully, postcolonial justice will abandon the idea of 
European superiority or any demand for a single language or epistemology. It will move 
beyond the imperial, totalizing, or assimilative impulse and toward a respect of the 
diversity of voices that take part in political relationships. “It is no longer possible to 
maintain the legitimacy of the premise that there is only one right way to see and do 
things.”413 Moreover, Alfred calls for a coexistence of individuals, communities, and all 
elements of creation – a coexistence in which human beings have no priority in “deciding 
the justice of a situation.”414 
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CONCLUSION 
 
2018 marks the thirtieth anniversary of the Lyng decision. Why return to it now? In her 
letter to Justice O’Connor, Judge Abinanti portrays the precarious relationship between 
religious freedom and environmental justice when she writes: 
I hope heaven has no harvestable timber; or, if it does, I hope your people never 
have the ingenuity to find heaven and sail there. (I know how important that place 
is to many of you.) Because if you can get there, and if there is any economic 
benefit to be had, heaven will surely be harvested, mined, developed, parceled out 
or otherwise required to yield a profit.415 
Abinanti’s imaginary harvested heaven demonstrates that neither religious freedom nor 
environmental justice is significant enough a right to trump the interest in profit in the 
U.S. In other words, property is always more important than the sacred. I find this 
illustration helpful in the closing of this project. The Lyng story, which started as one that 
was both about religious freedom and about environmentalism,416 at its end created the 
two as separate routes, because the California Wilderness Act ostensibly resolved the 
conflict around the G-O road and the Supreme Court decided the case as an exclusively 
free exercise case. In hindsight we can say that both routes are unsuccessful, which I 
believe is because they conceal the real issue underlying the Lyng case, and similar cases: 
Indigenous sovereignty.         
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While religious freedom has been at the center of public attention in recent years, 
it seems to have gravitated toward questions of gender and sexuality and away from 
ethnic, racial, and colonial issues.417 The Smith case that was decided by the Supreme 
Court two years after Lyng has become the most well-known American Indian religious 
freedom case, and it has directly led to battles between Congress and the Supreme Court 
regarding the interpretation of this right, but Smit would not have been decided as it was 
if it were not for Lyng. In Smith, the Court denied unemployment benefits to two 
practitioners of “Peyote religion” who lost their jobs after using peyote in a Native 
American Church service. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority, interprets the 
free exercise of religion protected in the First Amendment, as “the right to believe and 
profess whatever religious doctrine one desires.”418 Therefore, the First Amendment 
prohibits any “governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such.”419 Scalia 
summarizes the precedent: “The government may not compel affirmation of religious 
belief, punish the expression of religious doctrine it believes to be false, impose special 
disabilities on the basis of religious views or religious status, or lend its power to one or 
the other side in controversies over religious authority or dogma.”420 But Scalia also 
acknowledges that “exercise of religion” involves not only belief but action, such as 
“assembling with others for a worship service, participating in sacramental use of bread 
and wine, proselytizing, abstaining from certain foods or certain modes of 
transportation.”421 
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 O’Connor, concurring, states that:  
The Court today extracts from our long history of free exercise precedents the 
single categorical rule that ‘if prohibiting the exercise of religion … is … merely 
the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the 
First Amendment has not been offended.’ Indeed, the Court holds that where the 
law is a generally applicable criminal prohibition, our usual free exercise 
jurisprudence does not even apply.422  
O’Connor critiques this majority opinion, arguing that “To reach this sweeping result, 
however, the Court must not only give a strained reading of the First Amendment but 
must also disregard our consistent application of free exercise doctrine to cases involving 
generally applicable regulations that burden religious conduct.”423 Is O’Connor’s opinion 
in Smith in line with her opinion in Lyng? Juxtaposing at the two opinions highlights an 
important difference between the cases. While Smith is probably the most famous Indian 
religious freedom case in the U.S., the conflict at its center is fundamentally different 
from the conflict at the center of Lyng. Smith remains a case about religion as an 
individual practice rather than communal identity. It seeks the accommodation of 
otherwise-illegal action, whereas Lyng seeks protection of Indigenous peoples’ relation to 
the land they inhabit.  
While the Indians lost in Smith, the decision attracted strong reactions from other 
religious communities and from Congress, who passed in 1993 the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act in response to Smith. RFRA aims to enact the Sherbert test, discussed in 
Part One of this dissertation, into law. It declares that “Government shall not substantially 
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burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general 
applicability,” unless the government action furthers a compelling government interest 
and it is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. The Court in response ruled 
RFRA unconstitutional as it applies to the states in its 1997 decision in City of Boerne v. 
Flores. In response to this ruling, several states passed their own RFRAs,424 and Congress 
passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA),425 which 
defines religious exercise as “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or 
central to, a system of religious belief.”   
Albeit Congress’ strong reaction to Smith, cases about American Indian sacred 
sites have not been argued as cases about religious freedom since Lyng. Could Lyng have 
been argued as a case about Indigenous sovereignty? It probably could not have, because 
if we had seen the Indian nations involved in the case as sovereign, the Supreme Court 
would not have had jurisdiction over them or over the area. This is due to the courts’ 
binary understanding of sovereignty that I discussed in Chapter Four. As we have seen in 
recent cases such as the Dakota Access Pipeline, sacred sites cases are argued as ones 
about environmental justice. This worries me, because it, too, neglects the perspective of 
the people involved and depoliticizes the conflict. Moreover, according to a recent New 
York Times article, “the Trump administration has sought to reverse more than 60 
environmental rules,”426 demonstrating the current precariousness of environmental 
protection. If what we want to protect is Indigenous sovereignty, we need to talk about 
Indigenous sovereignty. Resolving the case as one about either religious freedom or 
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environmental justice will not do. But in order to have a productive conversation about 
Indigenous sovereignty in the context of sacred sites cases, we need to transcend the 
binary conception of sovereignty, according to which only states can be sovereign. What 
might a non-binary conception of sovereignty look like?  
In Basic Call to Consciousness, John Mohawk ties together “The meaning of 
sovereignty. The respect for Mother Earth. The search for integrity, the circle of life. 
Oppression, conquest, colonialism, exploitation. Genocide.”427 I am positive that we will 
not achieve justice if we think about these things as disconnected. Moreover, as long as 
we think about Indigenous issues, rather than about Indigenous peoples, as Oren Lyons 
notes is the case of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, we will 
not achieve justice.428 Lloyd Burton describes the problem similarly: 
[…] when a court analyzes a sacred site case by viewing it only through the lens 
of First Amendment analysis or only through the lens of trust responsibility 
doctrine analysis, it is looking at only half the picture and doing only half its 
historical homework. Using either perspective alone is like viewing the situation 
through a spyglass, while to use both is like looking through binoculars. The latter 
provides both a wider angle view and a greater depth of field.429   
Following this analysis, we might say that what is missing from the Lyng decision 
(including the dissenting opinion) is an acknowledgement that, “once having evicted 
tribes from their traditional homelands and having taken measures throughout the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to destroy tribal religions and cultures, the U.S. 
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government bears some responsibility for at least allowing them to maintain affiliation 
with their holiest sites and traditional religious practices.”430 This notion helps me to 
envision what it means to think about sovereignty in a non-binary way. What I am 
striving for is the kind of protection that would recognize both the Indian nations’ power 
to decide how to use the holiest of their sites and the responsibility of the U.S. to promote 
the wellbeing of these nations. As we learn from theories of transitional justice and from 
other postcolonial situations, it would be naïve to think that there is any possible solution 
that does not require the U.S. to take responsibility for the wrongs it has done its 
Indigenous populations. As I see it, there are three possible routes toward a restoration of 
justice in our case. One is through the court system, another is through a political process, 
and the final one would be led by social movements. Let us examine these possible 
routes. 
 The legal route, as we learn from Lyng, would involve one of two possible 
arguments: either providing the courts with a better framework to understand religion 
more robustly, or arguing sacred sites cases as ones about Indigenous sovereignty. From 
a legal realist point of view, both these arguments would fail. Legal realism is based on 
the distinction between “law in the books” and “law in action,” and it argues, against 
theories of legal formalism, that court decisions are driven by material motivations rather 
by following legal precedents. Therefore, if the courts in cases such as Lyng are 
motivated by the desire to maintain U.S. sovereignty over Indian sacred sites, it does not 
matter how well the Indians would argue the case – they are doomed to lose. This goes 
back to the question of defining religion. What I showed in Part One of this dissertation is 
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that a more robust understanding of religion would not save the Indians from losing in the 
Lyng case. This is because of the unexamined underlying issue of Indigenous 
sovereignty. Thinking of the Lyng case as one that is (also) about sovereignty helps to 
think about religion in relation to land on the one hand, and in relation to oppression on 
the other hand. But, as I argued in Part Two of the dissertation, the existing legal 
framework does not allow for arguing the Lyng case as one about Indigenous sovereignty 
because the Indian nations in the case do not have a treaty on which to base a sovereignty 
legal claim. Indigenous sovereignty, therefore, is useful to me only theoretically, as a 
framework that opens up the possibility to think about Lyng within its historical colonial 
context.        
 One may argue that it is still beneficial to bring cases such as Lyng to court 
because the cases receive public attention and courts would eventually follow public 
opinion, because they are dependent on the public’s trust. But given the limited financial 
resources of Indigenous communities, is litigation really the best way to spend their 
money, if they are likely to lose in courts? The political route may seem more promising. 
 When we look at the history that is recounted in Chapter Four of this dissertation, 
we see that the relationship between the federal government and American Indians has 
changed over the years and has not been limited to violence. There have been attempts by 
the government and by congress to promote Indian sovereignty, and therefore it might be 
possible to envision similar relationships in the future. Moreover, specifically in the Lyng 
case, it was congress who eventually protected the High Country from development. 
Does this mean that the political route is more promising than the legal route? Scholars 
have shown that government agencies such as the Forest Service have been more willing 
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than the Supreme Court to protect Indian sacred sites. They therefore argue that the Lyng 
decision, that leaves the protection of the High Country in the hands of congress and the 
Forest Service, was correct and appropriate. But as we have seen time and again, the 
Forest Service has failed to protect Indigenous sacred sites in the High Country and in 
other cases since Lyng. Environmental protection by congress has also been unstable. 
AIRFA’s consultation requirements may have been a step in the right direction toward 
something along the lines of co-management of sacred sites on public lands, but even 
after the act’s amendments in 1994 it has been considered to be “without teeth.”       
The biggest problem with the legal and the political routes is the power that they 
give the U.S. in deciding the fate of Indigenous peoples. Both routes recognize the 
sovereignty of the U.S. and they also allow the U.S. to determine the terms of the debate. 
If we want to move in the direction of concurrent sovereignty or co-management, an 
alternative route should be considered. I see hope in the third proposed path, that of social 
movements. As we have seen in Chapter Four of this dissertation, the relationships 
between Indians and Whites in northwest California were not limited to warfare and 
violence. A range of relationships, including intermarriage and employment, were 
recounted in the Theodoratus Report. In the Lyng case itself, unexpected alliances 
between the local Indigenous communities and environmentalists were formed. Recently, 
we have seen an overwhelming support by White Americas of the Standing Rock 
protesters against the Dakota Access Pipeline. Beyond the American Indian case, we see 
movements such as BDS in South Africa and in Israel/Palestine, and the Movement for 
Black Lives in the United States, bringing about hope for real social change, as did 
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historical movements in the United States, such as the American Indian Movement, the 
Civil Rights Movement, and the Black Panthers.  
Social movements can open themselves to a range of practices, including ones 
that are inspired by transitional justice, such as truth commissions, reparations, apologies, 
and prosecutions, to respond to the structural injustices that exist in states that have not 
undergone regime transition in their relation to Indigenous peoples. Those movements 
can open themselves to Indigenous worldviews and jurisprudences rather than simply 
continuing to privilege the legal mechanisms of the state. As I have argued throughout 
this dissertation, the voices of the Indigenous witnesses in the Lyng case need to be heard 
and the courts have been ignoring them. Alternative legal mechanisms that are not limited 
by the adversary procedure that rules the common-law system can provide a platform for 
marginalized voices to be heard and to more robust stories – about religion, about 
injustice – to be told. While colonial law and legislation limit Indigenous peoples’ 
political, cultural, and social authority, alternative modes of conflict resolution can 
establish Indigenous identities and cultural knowledge as foundational to social reform. 
One advantage of such alternative mechanisms is that they can be flexible in their 
relation to the state – they can work side by side with formal legal mechanisms, enjoy 
government support, or subvert state power altogether. They can transcend the rights 
discourse that is promoted by legal texts such as the Lyng decision and focus on 
expanding the social collective imaginary, allowing Indigenous voices to be heard. There 
are examples of such collaborations between Indians and Whites in the U.S, such as the 
voluntary ban on climbing Mato Tipila / Devils Tower during the month of June, or the 
attempts by Christian activists to convince their individual churches to formally repudiate 
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the Doctrine of Christian Discovery. The U.S. Supreme Court is unlikely to overturn 
Johnson v. McIntosh; it is unlikely to overturn Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery 
Protective Association. It is the courts’ function to translate human stories into legal 
language, to convert communities into rights-bearing individuals. Scholars and activists 
are not limited to existing legal frameworks. If the religious freedom at the center of Lyng 
is “hollow,” as Justice Brennan declares, we need to strive for an alternative, more 
substantial freedom: we need to strive for sovereign freedom.         
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APPENDIX A431 
Tuesday, March 15, 1983      1:45 pm O’clock 
The Court: Very well, you may proceed. 
Ms. Miles: Call Lowanna Brantner, who is at the stand, now. 
Lowanna Brantner 
Called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, having been first duly sworn, was examined 
and testified as follows: 
The clerk: Please state your full name for the record. 
The witness: Lowanna Bratner. 
The clerk: Your occupation? 
The witness: Was a housewife. 
The clerk: Thank you. 
The court: You may proceed. 
Direct Examination 
By Ms. Miles: 
Q. Mrs. Brantner, can you tell us your tribe? 
A. Yurok. 
Q. When were you born? 
A. 1908, 22nd of February. 
Q. And where were you born? 
A. Mettah on the Klamath River.  
Q. Where is Mettah located? Is it in the reservation? 
                                                           
431 Reporter’s Transcript, 226-235. 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Where do you live now? 
A. At Mettah. 
Q. How were you raised? 
A. I was raised as a full-blooded Indian baby should be raised and growed [sic] up as one. 
Q. Who were you raised by? 
A. My grandparents. I was raised by my grandparents, so I was taught by the elders about 
our tradition, about our church, about our people.  
 I was fortunate. Today I’ll say “fortunate.” Many times I thought it was not 
fortunate that I was born to four of the biggest houses in the Yurok strip where the 
famous dances had come up, the White Deerskin Dance, the Jump Dance and the Brush 
Dance and many other games, and how the Indians had to use the High Country to go and 
pray so that when they come back to the lowlands, we can share with one another.  
 My place has been that I have a lot of those relics that I share with my neighbors, 
the Hoopas, the Karok’s [sic] and my own people to uphold and to see that our religion 
go [sic] on as it has for thousands of years past.  
Q. When you say you share these items, what do you mean you are “sharing them”? 
A. Well, down through the years, due to the fact that there were soldiers and people who 
came through and destroyed, burned, killed, a lot of the relics were burned or taken.  
 So now, a few of us are left in the three tribes and we take and share. So and so’s 
got a Brush Dance. Their time come, [sic] their time to dance, we give them so many 
piece relics they need and the other people do the same so that the dance can be 
performed the true way as it has been for thousands of years.  
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Q. Do you hold a position within your people? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That’s different from others? 
A. Yes, I was taught -- I'm not an Indian doctor, but I was taught how the Indian doctors 
do, because three of my grandmothers, one from Buff Creek, one from Saa’ and one of 
them from Orick was as Indian doctor.  
 But then Indian doctors that train, they are just like it is of the medical doctor 
today. They fill so many different categories. Some is for brains and some is for bones 
and some of them for other ailments.  
 Years ago, we use our herbs from the High Country where god had left a piece of 
land dedicated to be the use of the tribes, to go there and pray like they say Mecca, or 
different places through the world where the people go by the thousands. 
 We were only allowed to take those that have passed the test and proven, for they 
come back to the lowlands and then we pray for our people, asking for help and these 
dances were not performed for the beauty; they were performed asking that we’ll have 
plenty to eat, we would have plenty of game, for conservation was the mainstay of our 
livelihood and through these canyons -- and we always wanted to protect the top of the 
mountain, because anyone that knows the Klamath, for the first two miles, it’s just rock, 
stray bluffs and cliffs. 
 So beyond that, god left us a strip about ten miles wide where the Karoks can 
come and gather their grain, their seeds and things and once I heard they say, “do you 
hunt at Doctor Rock?” 
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 No, Ma’am, we do not hunt at Doctor Rock. It’s a sacred place. Nothing is killed 
at Doctor Rock and Chimney Rock. Chimney Rock is a man’s place to go have -- to 
prove that they can stand anything that comes along and be brave, to face the world.      
 So the people can have the knowledge and carry on and we, older people watch 
the younger boys -- they are raise by the old men and taught. The young girls are 
separated and they are taught and that was a thing was left to me by these great houses 
and these great rulers. 
 We had no chief. We had head men and we all got together and anything that 
come up, we would come together and talk it over and if there was anything that needed 
help, then we would see that they all got help, whether that was something that had 
happened, why they didn’t have any food or whether there was sickness. These doctors 
would go there -- not everybody -- and it’s the same way, speaking of how we had lived. 
 Your Honor, may I proceed? 
 The court: Sure. 
 The witness: How we had lived, we the people from Bluff Creek, which is no 
more now -- that's where we had our Boat Dance or our White Deerskin Dance. 
 Unbeknownst, unknown to me and my people, we didn’t know that the BIA, even 
though we had a treaty which we didn’t know later that it was not ratified -- we gave all 
we had promised, way beyond the mountains for them and for the land that we were to 
have in there, to keep our homes.  
 In that way we lost everything and now we are standing on the last peak, Doctor 
Rock, Chimney Rock. My neighbors have lost a lot of their ceremonial grounds due to 
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mismanagement of the people, not because they were cruel, but because they didn’t 
understand. 
 The court: Not because they were what? 
 The witness: They are not cruel. 
 The court: Cruel? 
 The witness: Or unkind. They just did not understand. 
 The court: Who was it that didn’t understand?  
 The witness: The new people that came into the Indian country.  
 The court: By the “new people,” who do you mean? 
 The witness: The White people. 
 The court: The White people? Well, you are generous in saying they aren’t cruel. 
All right, go ahead. 
 The witness: So, today I am here, the last place we have. I’m looking back. The 
Tolewah Tribe, which is a great nation at one time, their villages was [sic] in the town or 
the city of Crescent City, Smith River and all through there. They have nothing of their 
ceremonial grounds, but many of them go to the High Country where they have for 
thousands of years and prayed where they were told to go, Summit Valley. 
 The Karoks, they come over the mountains. There is [sic] trails there today and 
we could show it to you, where those trails are. They are secret to everybody else. There 
are just a few who know where they are, which lead to the High Country, Doctor Rock, 
Chimney Rock, which is a sacred place. 
 Only a few people that are left in these great tribes that was [sic]. All we need 
now is to have the understanding and my understanding was always and I was so happy 
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that we had the Six Rivers National Forest next to our big reservation. Of course, I was -- 
my understanding and reading that they were there to protect these lands, so that 
everything was cared for for the use of all people and their rights, and where they could 
go, some of them to have a home even.  
 Now, it’s not speaking unkind, but when the Six Rivers National Forest destroyed 
my village and then allowed them to go in there and mine, part of that Bluff Creek, my 
people, their bones floated down the Klamath River and it’s the same now. On the mouth 
of the River where we used to have the White Deerskin Dance ending, there is a station 
up there that the soldiers put in. 
 I understand that everything was dumped into the ocean, all the debris from their 
bathhouses and all through there run into the ocean and contaminated it so we have 
nowhere to gather our seaweed or mussels. It’s not fit to eat and up on through the 
Klamath River, if you were to go through there, it would make you sick. One of the most 
beautiful rivers in the world. I wrote an article on it once, I was so proud of it. Now, I am 
heartsick about it.  
 The mountains have all caved in. some of the most beautiful streams, we have 
only concrete left. 
 Blue Creek, and that -- that goes to the steps that leads [sic] up to the Doctor Rock 
and the High Country. We need that because they have the best spawning grounds. I 
understand they say there is also falls in there and -- 
 The court: Ma’am, I’m very sorry to interrupt you and I am very sympathetic to 
everything you say, but I think we are a little off the track of what you’ve been called for 
and I will ask the attorney to ask you some questions.  
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 The witness: Thank you for giving me the time you gave me.  
 The court: No, I am very interested, but I think it’s a little bit off track of the 
particular thing we are talking about now. Some of it, not all of it. 
 The witness: Okay. 
The court: Thank you. You see, the one thing that I got from your testimony very 
clearly is that as a -- and I’m not trying to put words in your mouth, but I want you to 
know that I think I understood what you are saying, is that due to the deprivations 
occasioned by the Whites, such as the pollution of the streams and the like, and the taking 
over of more and more land, that the preservation of this particular piece of sacred land 
has become all the more important.  
 That’s in part what you are communicating to me; is that right? 
 The witness: Yes. 
 The court: All right, go ahead. 
 Ms. Miles: Actually, she covered everything in her answer, it was so lengthy. 
 The court: Yes, even the fish. 
 Ms. Miles: I have no further questions, your honor. 
The court: All right. Do you have any questions?  
Mr. Sherwood: No, your honor.  
Ms. Walz: I have no questions.  
The court: You may cross-examine her. 
Cross-Examination, 
By Mr. Hamblin: 
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Q. Only one question. Miss Brantner, you mentioned that at times you and others 
would go up into the High Country to gather herbs for medicine? 
A. Yes.  
Q. If I understand, do you still -- do you still do that or people that you know still 
do that? 
A. Yes. Yes, I know because I give the relics to my people to perform their 
dances about three to four times a year. 
Q. And they still go up? 
A. That is the only place they can go, because that was a site that was set aside 
and things are planted there that I don’t know the words. I’m not an educated woman, but 
they don’t grow nowhere else and they are beautiful and they are there. 
I am proud they are there, but I would be happy to say that we don’t need no 
roads to lead in there to destroy the things that are so tiny and growing and there is 
nowhere these animals can go that are living there, because there is nothing left toward 
the river.  
Q. You are speaking of the Blue Creek area, now?  
A. Yes.  
Mr. Hamblin: Fine, no further questions.  
The court: Thank you for your testimony. There is a very bad step there, so please 
be careful.  
Mrs. Brantner, I think -- I think I want to say something to you. I don’t know 
where the ball is going to finally bounce. I haven’t heard all the evidence, but I think you 
should go knowing that what you’ve said has been very helpful.  
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The witness: Thank you, your honor. 
The court: All right.     
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APPENDIX B432 
Sam Llewelyn Jones, Jr., 
Called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, having been first duly sworn, was examined 
and testified as follows: 
 The clerk: Please state your full name. 
 The witness: Sam Llewelyn Jones, Jr. 
 The clerk: Spell your last name, please. 
 The witness: J-O-N-E-S. 
 The clerk: Your occupation? 
 The witness: I am retired. 
Direct Examination, 
By Ms. Miles: 
 Q. Mr. Jones, where do you live? 
 A. I live at the Martins Ferry on the Klamath River, Hoopa River Indian 
Reservation. 
 Q. And what tribe are you? 
 A. I am a Yurok, full-blooded Yurok. 
 Q. Were you born on the reservation? 
 A. Yes, I was born March 10th, 1913. 
 Q. Can you tell me about your schooling? 
 A. I went to school in Martins Ferry Elementary, California. I went to high school 
in Riverside, Sherman Institute, Riverside, California. 
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 Q. Is that a Bureau of Indian Affairs school? 
 A. Bureau of Indian Affairs school. 
 Q. Do you participate in traditional ceremonies? 
 A. Yes, I am a dance maker for the Brush Dance. I’ve been giving Brush Dance 
for the last ten years. You have to collect your ceremonial things. You go to different -- 
like Lowanna Brantner here, she has regalia. I go to her and tell her I’m giving a dance, 
Hoopas, Karoks, and they all come to the Brush Dance.  
 I have to settle up with all the debts. You have to pay the people that died. That’s 
in our medicine that we give the Brush Dance.  
 We have a child that’s sick, that we doctor him to grow better in life. We have to 
have a medicine lady that fasts for ten days and she makes the medicine and she has to 
have a medicine girl that I have to get to the Brush Dance.     
 She has to pledge that she has no sex or can’t have her period. The mother that 
brings her child has to be the same thing. Can’t have no sex or have any period or 
anything in that line. 
 Then you have feed [sic] the people, you have to gather your singers. Not 
everybody is gifted to sing and some of our people is [sic] gifted to sing, so they dance 
and you’ve got to get them to dance in your Brush Dance. 
 You’ve got to get your singers lined up, your regalia and all that and when they 
dancing [sic] in the hall where you’re doctoring this baby, the people that singing [sic], 
it’s kind of like a prayer to the spiritual world. They bring in the good spirits in. 
 The people that’s [sic] dancing with them, they have a -- about twenty in a pit, 
girls and boys. A girl can’t participate in it if she’s married or have a child. No more 
190 
 
 
 
dancing for her and the stomping on the ground and jumping in the middle is driving all 
the bad spirits away and the guys that singing is [sic] praying to the spiritual world to 
bring the good spirits in to help the baby that you are doctoring.  
 Q. Mr. Jones, can you explain how what you’ve just been discussing, what is the 
Brush Dance -- is that correct? Were you just speaking about the Brush Dance? 
 A. Yes.  
 Q. How does that relate to the High Country that we’ve all been listening about? 
 A. The medicine lady goes to the High Country for her spiritual power where she 
makes her -- does her fasting and stuff to help a child that’s -- we are doctoring there. 
 Q. So the ceremony you are talking about, that was where? Where does that take 
place? On the river?  
 A. They have one -- the one I take care of is in Weitchpec and they have one at 
Pecwan and one at Requa and one in the Karok country in Somes Bar. 
 Q.  So the dance takes place -- 
 A. For the Brush Dance. 
 Q. And someone has to go up to the High Country to --  
 A. Call a spirit from the High Country.  
 Q. Will constructing the road that the Forest Service has planned affect your 
ability to carry on this ceremony you have just described? 
 A. Yes, it will. the High Country is like our church. In building a road through our 
church would be really destructive in my frame of mind. I don’t know about anybody 
else, but that’s what my belief is. That’s our belief, our Indian belief. 
 Q. Do you use -- 
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The court: Mr. Jones, why would it be destructive? 
The witness: They have to pray. When the medicine lady goes out there to pray, 
they stand on these rocks. They call them Doctor Rock and Chimney Rock and they 
meditate. I mean the forest is there looking out. They talk to the trees and rocks, whatever 
is out there. 
Our people talk in their language to them and if it’s all logged off and all bald 
there, they can’t meditate at all. They have nothing to talk to and after they get through 
praying, their answer comes from the mountain. The medicine lady that goes there or 
man will see a light or a phantom or whatever they see and then their prayers are 
answered.  
Ms. Miles: Q. Do you use in another way, these people to cure you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. If you can share with us? 
A. Yes, this High Country isn’t just made for doctoring somebody. You go out 
there to be a lot of other things. A good boat maker, good hunter, good fisherman, good 
stick player, good gambler. You do all that. In 1942 when I went to the service -- 
The court: Pardon me? Hold your thought about 1942 and you went to service. 
What’s a good stick player? 
The witness: A stick player is a team that we got three players in a game, but you 
can have five or six substitute for each time, and we had a team in Weitchpec. 
The court: It’s an athletic game? 
 The witness: It’s an athletic game. 
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The court: And when you speak of a good gambler, does that mean just what it 
says, somebody who plays poker? 
The witness: No, Indians have their own gambling game. They have sticks and 
one stick has a black thing around it, a black fern. 
The court: It’s a game of chance? 
The witness: Yes, you have eleven sticks from that one side, you win the game.  
The court: You answered my question and you were talking about 1942. What 
were you saying? 
The witness: In 1942 when I went to war, they went to the High Country, Doctor 
Rock, Chimney Rock, to pray for me to be -- to come home. 
My grandmother made an Indian plate for me to come back to eat in and when we 
got up to the Ruhr River, we were spearheading the German army and they knocked the 
bridge out. They zeroed in the 88th and they knocked everybody out and I was still sitting 
there.  
In all belief, that’s our Indian powers working there, our Indian beliefs. 
Ms. Miles: I have no other questions, your honor. 
The court: Do you have any questions? 
Mr. Sherwood: I have no questions. 
Ms. Walz: I have no questions, your honor. 
The court: All right. Mr. Jones, thank you for your testimony. You may step 
down. Watch your step. 
The witness: Thank you for listening.   
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